The New Centurions

New Concepts for Policing

 

When I first started to outline this article, I was thinking about big bold steps to be taken in order to re-direct police services.  I got the idea from a tweet by Sen Harris, in which she said, “We need to demilitarize the police”.  Well, I couldn’t disagree more.  The reason police departments have military equipment is so that they can deal with the most serious violent crimes and criminals.  Police departments need armored vehicles and high caliber weapons, so that they can deal with gangs and organized criminal enterprises which are using those tactics, but they don’t need to bring them every time they engage the public (we’ll talk about that as a separate issue next time).  Those enterprises have no regard for human life, if they did they wouldn’t be kidnapping kids or young adults and forcing them into slavery, they wouldn’t be selling drugs to the most vulnerable within our society, just so they can make money.  So, to fight in this war the police have to have military style weaponry and they should be using them with efficiency and effectiveness.  You wouldn’t throw rocks at someone with a bazooka, so why would we expect the police to fight without the right tools.

But for the purpose of this article I’ll leave the strategic planning up to those responsible for administration of police departments whether at the local, State or federal level. 

Great interview about the changes needed in policing here:

https://twitter.com/FareedZakaria/status/1272231871896850434

Instead I want to concentrate on a more tactical or operational approach with simple solutions that will most probably be unpopular, especially with the rank and file, but I believe will go a long way in changing the culture within departments, assist in avoiding corruption or unwanted police behaviors and change the way the public views and interacts with the police.  The good news is, these ideas for change don’t need the rule of law.  They just need to be implemented as a new way of thinking and conducting business.  This will take real leadership; change is driven from the top.  While the need for change may be driven from the masses, change actually comes about because those in-charge decide to make the changes being requested. 

In ancient Rome, the Centurions were the professional officers of the Roman Army.  They commanded the troops, which sometimes meant that from time to time they enforced Roman law outside of the military legions they commanded.  Unfortunately in those times they also administered punishment by cutting or burning people’s hand off for stealing or other petty crimes or used a vine staff, with which they disciplined even Roman citizens who were protected from other forms of beatings by the Porcian and Valerian Laws (what punishments Roman citizen could be subjected to; they were not allowed to be humiliated or demeaned with degrading or shameful forms of punishment; such as, whipping, scourging or crucifixion.  Non-citizens and slaves had a different set of rules).  Hopefully, we’re way beyond that.  

At least, I like to think we are, but we can create new Centurions by:

First, stop appointing police chiefs based on political affiliation.  Currently, for the most part chiefs are either appointed by the city/county board, mayor or other elected officials or are elected themselves. Both methods are political.  Since laws are apolitical and should be enforced apolitically, so should the appointment of the police charged with enforcing those laws equally and justly.

Second, first and second-line supervisors should take a test that includes police administration, social – emotional, non-escalating skillsets, leadership skills, human rights and the protection of personal dignity training.  Allot more time needs to be spent of developing social skills needed in conflict resolution, at least at the same level that they spend on equipment usage techniques.

Thirdly, patrolman should be assigned “beats” randomly but with purpose and clarity.  The most troublesome neighborhoods should be assigned to those officers with the most experience.  There should always be a senior and a junior officer together whenever possible.  We should get rid of the notion of “Partners”, whereby, the same two people are assigned a specific sector each and every shift, so that they always work together.  Sure, there is an advantage to having “partners” as the patrolmen become familiar with each other and the neighborhoods they serve.  But conversely, they also become “too friendly” with each other or the residents, and worse, by becoming either complacent or tolerant of bad behaviors.   Additionally, the argument will be made that the patrolman needs to be able to trust his/her partner with their life.  That’s true, but if you can’t do that with everyone in the department, then there’s a problem.  The public also demands the same expectation. 

Over the years we got away from two man patrols due to budget cuts and other factors.  I think we should go back to them.  No more single patrols.  I’m not saying just to double everyone up by consolidating patrol zones.  No, this will only lead to longer response times.  Instead, I’m saying double force sizes by bringing on new officers.  Many will say, “We don’t have the money”.  To me that’s just another way of saying, I’m too lazy to do the hard work to figure out how this can be done.  So, I don’t buy the argument that it will be too costly.  Think about this, we just spent several trillion dollars on corporate and public welfare for COVID relief and didn’t bat an eye.  Not to mention the 10’s of trillions we’ve spent and are spending on the bank bailout of 2008.  It’s not about money, it’s about deciding.

Fourth, everyone in an administrative position, who is physically capable, should work “the road” once a week or a couple days a month – maybe a weekend or night shift.  Even those will mobility issues could have a role.  This gives fresh eyes and reminds everyone why they are there – to serve and protect.

And finally, move personnel around within departments, within organizations.  The military does this with regularity and at tremendous costs.  But the benefits far outweigh the costs.  Each move brings “new life”.  Getting a fresh set of eyes on things is invaluable.  It brings with it; fresh and innovative ideas, opportunities for personal growth, problem solving, and deters complacency and stagnation.  It also roots out those who have a history of misconduct.  New supervisors usually don’t tolerate bad behaviors that old supervisors allowed to go unaddressed. 

A recent study of police training revealed, that on average policeman in the US receive less than a thousand hours of training, whereas their European counterparts receive thousands of hours.  Most police chiefs in Europe are also lawyers or have law degrees, as do many mid-level supervisors.  I don’t believe this requirement exist within the US.  Maybe it should?  

Calls for defunding the police are just wrong.  Police departments need more resources not less.  That said, so do social programs that address the root causes of criminality and unwanted behaviors.  We need to add funding that teaches non-aggressive tactics and de-escalation techniques, social – emotional learning skills, and coping tools that deal with attitudes and behaviors.

I worked for ten years with the Carabinieri, the Italian National Police.  In those ten years I never once saw them man-handle anyone.  Sure they put people in handcuffs and took them to jail but I never witnessed any aggressive tactics on their behalf.  They always talked the guy into getting handcuffed. 

Great article about Carabinieri tactics, here:

https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/10/american-cops-could-learn-a-lesson-from-italys-carabinieri/

To illustrate my point, a few years ago, my son was travelling from Italy to the US.  He had been visiting his aunt and grandma.  At the airport in Rome, he placed his backpack on the conveyor belt at the x-ray machine.  After it was scanned, a Policeman approached him and asked my son to accompany him.  They went to a room, and the policeman pulled an apple, sandwich and serrated kitchen knife from his backpack.  The Policeman said, “Young man, we have one question, who packed your lunch your Mom or your Grandma?”  The Policeman knew, my son being in his thirties was old enough to know better than to bring a knife through the checkpoint.  He also knew that Moms being Moms in Italy meant, someone else had packed his lunch; Mom or Grandma had packed the knife so he could peel the apple, it was just logical. Clearly my son wasn’t a threat.  The Policeman kept the knife and my son boarded his plane.  I believe that had a similar incident occurred here in the States my son, would most probably have gotten arrested for possession of a deadly weapon, would subsequently have a criminal record, which could have an impact on his employment possibilities. 

We have a saying in the military that, “soldiers will be soldiers”.  In other words without supervision they will do stupid stuff.  Good behaviors AND bad behaviors are learned.  Shouldn’t we be doing everything we can to make sure good behaviors are nurtured, if so it’s about leadership?

Change comes from big and bold thinking.  Look at, putting a man on the moon.  Pretty big stuff there!  We didn’t know how we would do it but we decided we would.  Then it came down to many, and I mean many, small steps to get us there.  Well, if we are to truly reform the police, policing and the interactions they have with the public, we’ll need to take many small steps to get there.  NASA had many failures along the way, but eventually they figured it out.  I believe we can too, after all this is America – this is who we are.

Everything I know about security I learned in kindergarten and I've been updating ever since

I know many of you remember that in kindergarten we learned to play fair, share tools, put things back in “the cubbie” where they came from, put your name on your stuff, be quiet during nap time and in general to be good neighbors.  Well, I learned something else, too.  LESSON LEARNED: HE WHO HAS THE TOYS GETS TO CONTROL THE GAME AND IS THE BOSS OF THE OTHER KIDS.

Fast forward to the third grade, I learned that if someone was bullying me,  I had to fight them to get them to stop or get someone else who would do that for me.  I know, can you believe that this beautiful face was getting bullied in the third grade.  Well, it’s true and all because I kissed a girl who was a fifth grader.  So I did what every skinny, respectable guy would do – I got her to beat him up. LESSON LEARNED: GET SOMEONE ELSE TO DO YOUR DIRTY WORK!

When I was in the fifth or sixth grade, my criminal career started and ended in a span of a few minutes.  You see, there was a pack of rubber bands on the shelf at the Ben Franklin store and I really wanted them but I didn’t have the money.  I put some in my jacket pocket and left the store.  As soon, as I was walking out a county sheriff car pulled into the parking spot directly in from of the store.  The store had a revolving door, which allowed me to reenter the store without ever really exiting.  I put the rubber bands back on the shelf and waited for the sheriff to leave the store before I went home, scared to death.  I have to admit, every time I’d see a police car while growing up I always wondered if “they knew about that” incident. LESSON LEARNED: ONCE YOU’VE DONE IT YOU’VE DONE IT FOR LIFE.

And then upon entering the military, I became an Air Policeman.  God works in crazy ways.  Since I was mostly stationed in Europe from the time I was twenty until I retired in 1993, my biggest security lesson was tracking terrorist activities and fighting the “the Communist, the bastards”.  LESSON LEARNED: THERE ARE BAD PEOPLE OUT THERE WHO WISH ME (US) HARM.

Later in my career, I thought and was taught to think this way, that all you had to do was put a camera on it to watch or post a guard and crime would stop.  Your stuff would be protected. Neither a camera or a guard will prevent, they may deter, and unless the response force is within a reasonable distance to respond they probably won’t deter either.  I’ve always wondered why organizations spend thousands and still get “ripped off”.  Upon analysis it usually comes down to them using the wrong mitigation strategy for the wrong threat or the security is “so tight”  it becomes a burden or tax and people don’t want to pay the tax, even those who are authorized to do so.  They’ll find a way around it so that life is convenient. So, unless your security system is specifically designed to deter and prevent unwanted behaviors, it won’t do that. Sure there is always some deterrence but a dedicated aggressor will not be detoured.  They will bring the tools they need.  Also, if there isn’t a dedicated response force, all you’ll be doing with your fancy system is taking pictures of what happened. LESSON LEARNED: SECURITY IS SUPPOSED TO BE ABOUT DETERRENCE/PREVENTION AND INSTEAD IT’S ABOUT CONVENIENCE.

Well, after my heart attack a couple years ago, my cardiologist said I’d probably live another 30 years.  I’ve used three so far, so who knows what I’ll learn in the next 27?

What Message Does Your Security Send – Fear or Trust?

In order to have proper physical security, mitigation strategist and those responsible must understand the types of aggressor groups, what motivates them and the tools they need in order to be successful.
  

Aggressors fall into four main categories: criminals (sophisticated/unsophisticated, organized/unorganized), protesters (organized/unorganized), terrorist (domestic/transnational/State sponsored) and subversives (intelligence agents [State/non-State sponsored]).


And, there are four main aggressor objectives; to inflict injury or death on people, to destroy or damage equipment, facilities or other resources, to steal equipment, material or information, and to create adverse publicity.


Tools on the other hand, don’t fall into any category and are virtually unlimited.


Unfortunately, the security industry has been approaching school security from the wrong angle.  We keep thinking, if one is good two must be better and we can harden our way to a perfect world.  We can’t.  School shootings and worse will continue, I’m sad to say, until we start eliminating the causes that promote this behavior. 


School systems have developed a variety of multi-disciplinary programs that address prevention and response to mental health issues if a student manifests behavior that might precipitate violence on a grand scale; i.e., bullying, addiction and interpersonal violence.  But this is still not enough.

Some security companies offer “social media behavioral monitoring” and are analyzing a person’s social media presence in “real time” and reporting actionable intelligence of patterns or suspicious behaviors to authorities, but this alone isn’t enough.  Using artificial intelligence, and deep learning are great but they’re just another tool.   And, just because a person manifests some type of anxiety or disruptive behavior it doesn’t necessarily mean they’ll act out and it doesn’t mean that that person will become a school shooter.


I believe we need to get to the cause of the angst.  Why does a “perfectly normal kid” decide to go to a school and shoot it up?  Does the “prison look” of many schools contribute to this phenomenon?  Is it possible, that the chain-linked fence surrounding the school yard, the metal detector that everyone passes through and the roaming armed guard all contribute in some way?  Now, just because that has become the “new normal” it doesn’t mean every kid will grow up and commit a criminal act, but there is no doubt that they will carry this angst with them into adulthood.


You don’t have to look very far to see examples of the “big dog” in your face approach and the subliminal message of something bad is expected to happen.  

We can address behavior in the built environment in a non-traditional way as a substitute to the confrontational in your face kind of way.  The approach must be more subtle, in fact, the more transparent it is the more effective it will be.  

Normally, to deter crime, we put up signs that say, “Cameras in Use” and some folks get creative saying, “Smile you’re on camera”.  For access control, we usually mark our territory by placing a chain-linked fence or some other type of “barrier” on our boundary-line.  It has a limited effect because a dedicated threat will bring the tools needed to circumvent it.  Build a big fence; they’ll bring a bigger ladder.  Make it even higher and they’ll bring an even bigger ladder or tunnel under it.  Sure, there is somewhat of a deterrent, but the reality is, a dedicated “bad actor” will bring the tools needed in order to be successful.   


In the early “90’s, Crime Prevention through Environmental Design was introduced to connect these two worlds – unwanted behavior and a physical deterrent.  Research shows that the concepts of natural surveillance, natural access control, territorial reinforcement and maintenance contribute to the deterrence and reduction of criminal activity.  CPTED is not the sole reason, but it helps. https://www.cptedtraining.net/


The basic concept of CPTED is if we can design the space so that it is almost always under observation “bad actors” won’t act bad.  I believe it needs to go further than that.  Not only do we need to design the space using these concepts, but we also must design the space so that “bad acting” can’t occur.  Additionally, in the off chance it does the built environment should help to reduce its effects and not contribute to its severity.  


A couple of years ago researchers in the European Union conducted a survey.  They asked elementary school kids who had emigrated from a country where there was war to draw what they considered safety or security to be.  The kids drew pictures of fencing with razor-wire and “gunships” overhead.  Then the researchers asked the same question to kids from Europe who had not be exposed to hostile environments and those kids drew houses with trees, stick families, a dog and sunshine.  Shouldn’t we be striving for the “sunshine” scenario?


The harder we make it for the “bad guy” to do things the more of a deterrent there is.  There is some truth to that but on the other hand, if security is a tax your people won’t pay it and they will figure out a way to circumvent it.  This in turn defeats its purpose.


Getting away from hardening schools after every incident by using “big dog” philosophies will take time, nonetheless, we can begin immediately.  I submit that beginning this school year, administrators should use the checklist provided by the Partner Alliance for School Safety (PASSK-12) www.PASSK12.org to conduct a physical security risk assessment of their campus and whenever possible replace traditional mitigation solutions they would normally opt for with a hardscaping, landscaping or art strategy.  Creativity and student, staff and community involvement are essential.


Success in security is sloppy.  It’s entangled.  It’s very hard to distinguish where detection, assessment, policy and procedures, response and engagement begin and end.  Addressing behavior must be coupled with addressing the physical environment.  They require a different amount of time, effort and commitment to produce positive results but nonetheless are equally important.  In order for students, and later as adults, to thrive we must create environments, internal and external, that address the need for “well-being” in both the social and physical ecosystems, and if we can do that in a more aesthetically pleasing way, then why not?

More about a softer approach to security: https://www.securityindustry.org/2018/04/05/the-puppy-movement/

My Book The Solutions Matrix: A Practical Approach to Security Engineering for Architects, Engineers, Facility Managers, Planners and Security Professionals is on sale at https://www.hainessecuritysolutions.com  

Haines Security Solutions is a contributor to the Security Industry Association’s education platform, “Center of Excellence” at https://www.securityindustry.org/center-of-excellence/

Known knowns and unknown unknowns

"There are known knowns" is a phrase from a response United States Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld gave to a question at a U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) news briefing on February 12, 2002 about the lack of evidence linking the government of Iraq with the supply of weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups[1]



This quote tells us something about risk management.  Basically there are threats we know about and there are threats we don’t know about and there are threats that we don’t know we don’t know about.



From a risk management standpoint, that’s pretty disconcerting. 



In order to understand the unknowns you have to look at things from the “bad guys” perspective.  In other words, see what the "bad guy" sees.  And to do that you must understand that there are four aggressor types of criminal/man-made threat groups; criminal (sophisticated/unsophisticated, organized/unorganized), protestors (organized/unorganized), terrorist (domestic/transnational/state-sponsored), subversives (saboteurs/intelligence agents [state/non-state sponsored]).  In an effort to design better mitigation strategies planners must understand the “bad guys” motives or the reason(s) behind why they do what they do.  There are also four primary aggressor objectives; inflict injury or death to people, destroy or damage facilities, property, equipment or resources, steal equipment, material or information and create adverse publicity.



So how can I plan to reduce their effects let alone mitigate them?  The answer is really easier than you think.   Traditionally in risk management, we look at things from a probability standpoint.  We ask the question. “Will it happen here, and if so, what will the impact be”?  I believe, likelihood has little influence on risk.  I believe likelihood comes into play when talking about funding.  Our risk management methodologies assume the threat will be successful 100 percent of the time.  We calculate likelihood when it comes to cost benefit.



Our Asset Based Risk Analysis (ABRA) and Critical Asset and Infrastructure Risk Analysis (CAIRA) methodologies combine the aggressors motives and objectives with what the asset owner sees; thereby, giving a complete picture of risk.  



More about ABRA (Platinum GOVIES Award 2017 for Best Government Security Risk Methodology) https://view.joomag.com/march-2019-ast-magazine-march-2019-ast-magazine/0952115001553308799/p4?short



More about CAIRA (Platinum 2018 ASTOR Award for Best Risk Analysis Methodology in Homeland Security) https://view.joomag.com/july-2019-ast-magazine-ast-july-2019-magazine/0612002001563068627/p60?short



More about risk management and developing mitigation strategies can be found in my new book, The solutions Matrix: A Practical Guide to Soft Security Engineering for Architects, Engineers, Facility Managers, Planners and Security Professionals.  Order here  https://americansecuritytoday.com/dont-surrender-to-fear-new-book-the-solutions-matrix-by-doug-haines/

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[1] Full quote: Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we don't know we don't know. And if one looks throughout the history of our country and other free countries, it is the latter category that tends to be the difficult ones.

How Preventing the Wrong Threat Will Cost You

My nephew used to work for an IT company.  Upon returning to work after Christmas holiday, they noticed that the rear windows of the building had been broken and all of the computer equipment had been stolen.  The owner of the company did what anyone would do.  He called a security consultant. 

The consultant recommended fixing the windows, adding motion sensors in the hallway and an access management system at the main entrance.  


When the company employees returned after the Easter weekend, they noticed the rear windows had been broken out – again, and all of the computer equipment had been stolen – again. 


Why did this occur?  The security company had misanalysed the Design Basis Threat or DBT.  

Everything of value has a threat that goes with it.  If it has value then someone wants it - either the owner or someone else.  It is also possible that a treat can be naturally occurring, like a earthquake or tornado. Usually, protection from these types of threats are governed by ordinances or laws; i.e., earthquake or tornado protection in construction standards.  For man-made threats, on the other hand, there really isn't any legislation that governs prevention or protection, so it's up to us to focus on man-made threats.  There are four general categories of aggressor types; 1) criminals (sophisticated/unsophisticated and organized/unorganized), 2) protestors (both organized/unorganized), 3) terrorist (domestic/trans-national/state-sponsored, and 4) subversives (saboteurs/foreign intelligence agents).  Each type of threat has an Modus Operandi or tactic and tool it uses to execute its objective.  If you make a list of what those may be you can actually design the space so that it provides protection to the things of value inside.  It is also important to understand the objective of man-made threats, too.  They fall into one or more of these categories; 1) inflict injury or death to people,2) destroy or damage property, equipment or resources, 3) steal equipment, material or information, or create adverse publicity. Understanding the motives, the tactics and tools they use will go a long way in prevention and protection.

The solution the security company had provided failed because, they didn't address the correct DBT; which was, breaking and entering and not unauthorized access.  Although, entering through the window is a form of unauthorized entry.  They had recommended the solutions they normally would suggest to deter or reduce the effects of theft, and focused on electronics, but they hadn’t addressed the DBT of the windows being breakable in the first place and didn’t add non-electronic solutions to the mix.  Had the windows been replaced with laminated glass they would not have been able to be broken and then the other countermeasures would have been effective.  Another solution would have been to prevent access to the parking lot behind the building.  I don't prefer this method because it would be more aggressive and unsightly to use a gate or fence with gate.  Just replacing the windows would not have changed the aesthetics of the space, so that is my preferred solution.

More about non-aggressive/aesthetically pleasing security measures can be found here: https://www.securityindustry.org/2018/04/05/the-puppy-movement/

Case Study: Unimpeded Access Allows Illegal Dumping

The issue was that people were driving up to the banks of a stream and dumping trash; i.e., tires, mattresses, rubbish, etc.  The city called a security consultant.  And as expected, he recommended adding a camera to the site so that “things” could be monitored.  The camera fed back to the superintendent’s desk.  Of course, when the supervisor wasn’t there (weekends, evening/late at night, attending meetings, lunch, naps, etc.), all the time when someone would dump trash the dumping occurred and continued.  The superintendent was scratching his head on what to do.  After all, he just spent several thousands of dollars on the latest technologies and they didn’t seem to work.

Our solution was not electronic.  Instead, we suggested that they build a raised berm/curb using natural landscaping (trees/boulders/bushes, even park benches) so that the vehicle couldn’t drive up to the water’s edge in the first place.  We suggested specific landscaping strategies due to low cost and ability to prevent vehicles from reaching the stream.   We imagined that since the culprits couldn’t physically access the stream embankment without using a vehicle they would be  less likely to want to carry heavy objects from the roadway, across a bicycle/walking path and then into the wood clearing to reach the stream.  Our second reason was to ensure the aesthetics of the area were kept intact.  Sure, we could have suggested a fence along the embankment to deny access and achieve the same effect, but who wants to walk along a fence with barbed wire when they’re taking the dog out or jogging or cycling.

Related articles: 

https://www.securityindustry.org/2018/04/05/the-puppy-movement/

https://www.securityindustry.org/2018/09/14/creating-invisible-security-to-prevent-vehicular-attacks/ 

https://issuu.com/eqinternational/docs/urbana_25_april_2017-ilovepdf-compr/52

What the LA Ram Superbowl Game Plan Teaches Us about Home Security

What the LA Rams Superbowl Game Plan 

Teaches Us about Home Security

First, I have to admit I had hoped the Rams would win the Superbowl.  It would have made my blog sound allot better.  I could have boosted about how Sean’s crew had analyzed their adversaries and implemented the perfect countermeasures and protected the home front (after all they were the home team).

Then secondly, I admit I’m not a football buff and understand everything about the do’s and don’ts of the game.   But I can with confidence make some comparisons and analogies that I believe most of us can understand.

So, anyway, congratulations to the New England Patriots on their win.

The more I think about it the more I realized that the Rams loss actually teaches us more about sizing up the threats than I first thought.  It teaches us, that not only do we have to look at the attacking forces from our perspective but we also must consider how they see themselves and will adjust.

In security design, we call this the design basis threat or DBT.  In other words, what you’re trying to protect your asset (thing of value) from – whether it’s a natural threat; such as, wind, fire,  rain or a man-made threat; like, graffiti, burglary or theft of property.

The Rams coaching staff had to analyze what the Patriots were capable of (their modus operandi [MO] and then figure out how thwart it.  They also needed to formulate a plan that covered the entire field.  In essence, defense in depth – the front line, the linebackers, the safeties.  We’ve all heard, “The best defense is offense”.  How true.  Ask the Patriots.

Unless, you have a comprehensive plan for the protection of your home, the attacker, be it a burglar, tagger, etc. will circumvent your security by finding the weak spot and exploiting it.  Remember, just having a security camera or system is not enough.  You have to have security built in to every facet of your daily routine. 

For home security that starts with your on-line social media presence.  Don’t give too much information away.  I laugh when I think that someone couldn’t believe she was robbed while in Paris.  Like duh, if you brag about how expensive the stuff is that you have there’s a very strong likelihood that someone also sees the value and will try to take it from you.  There was a case this week in Los Angeles were a rapper was flashing a big wad of cash and posted it on social media.  Well, guess what, he got robbed. 

Next, are you doing other things that tip off those with bad intention?  Do you put boxes out on the curb the night before the trash truck comes by?  Do you put papers in the trash that someone could take out under the cover of darkness and open-up credit card accounts in your name?  When you got that big screen to watch the Superbowl on, did you mount it on the wall so that someone walking on the sidewalk in front of your house could see it through the window?

Your plan has to be comprehensive.  It covers not only what you do but also where you do it.  Start from the roadway and work your way inward, assessing what the bad guy is able to see.  Make sure all lights work and all gates, windows and doors lock.  We lock our car even when it’s parked in the garage and the door from the garage into the house.  These little things delay the perpetrators actions and may possibly give us enough time to call 911.

I few years ago, I posted that the best home security system is actually a plate of cookies.  I still believe that, if you take some freshly baked chocolate chip cookies to the neighbors.  They’ll thank you for them and inadvertently watch out for your stuff because now they think they owe you.  

Maybe if the Rams would have taken some cookies to the Patriot’s locker room before the game things would have turned out differently.

The Truth About Walls (Fencing)

A few years ago, I was asked by the editors of Security Middle East magazine[1] to write an article about perimeter security.  During the conversations with the editor that lead to the eventual article, she asked me to summarize what the article would be about.  I told her that in order to understand perimeter security you first needed to accept the fact that if you have a ten-foot fence the bad guy will bring an eleven-foot ladder. 

The idea that you can build a fence or wall and keep the bad guys out faded out sometime after the medieval ages when new technologies and new ways of conducting warfare came about.  Well, the same holds true today.

If you look up on Google the difference between a wall and a fence you’ll get the following explanation: “A fence is usually a wooden or metal structure that encloses a yard, pasture or other area…The difference between a fence and a wall is that you can almost always see through a fence, at least to some degree, while a wall is solid”.

If you look up fence purposes, you’ll get the following explanation; “A fence is a structure that encloses an area, typically outdoors, and is usually constructed from posts that are connected by boards, wire, rails or netting.  Alternatives to fencing include a ditch (sometimes filled with water, forming a moat)”.

Both definitions suggest that a boundary is formed between property that is not controlled and property that is controlled. 

Whether using a wall or fence, the purpose is to delineate a boundary; usually at a property boundary.  This is the true meaning of fencing or "walling", if you will.  To delineate property boundaries, in other words, you’re over there and I don’t care what you do but it you come over here you need to go down to the access point so I can check you out.  With that in mind, you could paint a line on the ground and put up a sign that says, “stay out or go over there for access”.  Both would achieve the same effect as a wall of fence.  So, why not just paint a line.  Because the value in constructing a fence or wall, is 1) to identify the boundaries of the controlled space, 2) to cause a delay in unauthorized access, and 3) to identify unwanted behavior.  An authorized person will not climb over a fence or wall, tunnel under it or cut through it.  An unauthorized person will, especially if they have nefarious intentions.  So, with that in mind, the fence serves an early warning system.  It tells us when someone breaches it that they have  “bad intentions”.  If they didn’t, they would not breach the fence/wall and would proceed to an access control point to display the proper credentials to gain entry.  Hopefully, the fence will be constructed in such a way as to delay their unauthorized access.  Sadly, even without tools a eight foot chain link fence with three strand barbed wire outrigger can be scaled or climbed over in about four seconds.  With tools, like a ladder or a truck to stand on it takes even less time.

Which brings us to the next truth, unless there is a guard or technology monitoring the fence-line in real time, we have no way of knowing if the boundary has been breached.  We must monitor for unauthorized access, respond to it, and engage the aggressor in real time.  The operative word here is “real time”.  If we don’t what’s the use?

Another thing to remember, no matter how solid, sturdy, high or how many bells and whistles are added, there will always be a way to circumvent whatever is put in place.  The key is, making sure there is enough time to delay the “bad guy or gal” so that his or her behavior can be identified and the “good guys/gals” have time to respond and engage.

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[1] Security Middle East magazine article More Power to the Perimeter link https://issuu.com/securitymiddleeastmagazine/docs/sme_july-_aug_2015_web?e=0/14330179

How to Protect Yourslf Against Burglary or Housebreaking by Using Surveillance Systems and Safe-rooms

I was watching the news the other night and just like every night, they were showing criminals that had broken in to homes while the owners were away.  There was even footage of the family dog chasing the burglar away.  But one story caught my eye.  It was the story of a homeowner who had installed a doorbell system with a camera.  We’ve all seen the ad where the bad guy approaches the home and the owner say “Get off my lawn” or something to that effect.  Then the perps run away.  It was one of those types.

In this particular case, the homeowner was inside the house with her son.  When the would-be burglar approached the door she got an image of the burglar standing by her front door.  He knocked on the door and pulled a gun from his waist band.  The homeowner took her son and hid in a closet and called 911.

Can’t say I blame her.  After all this was more than a burglary this had all of the potential of being a kidnapping, sexual assault or worse.  I think she did the right thing in hiding.  That said, however, a closet offers very little protection from a dedicated intruder.  What she needed was a closet that had been converted into a safe-room.  A room that was impenetrable from the outside.  There are materials out there that can be used in new construction or retrofitted to an existing closet space for a few thousand dollars. It could even be a DIY project over a weekend.  Shouldn’t every home have one? 

But the real problem here is that the homeowner had bought the security system thinking that it would protect them.  I guess it did, sort of, because she was able to see the perps and take action.  The standard action is to tell the perps to go away.  She didn’t do that, so in essence she didn’t use the system the way it was designed to be used.  Fortunately, the perps weren’t able to force the door open and eventually gave up and left. 

There are two things to remember about having a home security system; 1) it must be used the way it was designed in order to be truly effective, and 2) unless, there is a police or guard force’s immediate response, it really only collects evidence.

More about turning a closet into a safe-room, here:  https://drive.google.com/a/amuletbb.com/file/d/0B_EElZXso5ZmdUVZYVlXNFRscEU/view?usp=drive_web

More about how thieves target homes, here: https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:6466683287757733888/

More tips on what you can do so it doesn’t happen to you, here:  https://reader.mediawiremobile.com/NYREJ/issues/203922/viewer?page=57

A one-day class on safe-room and shelter design and construction will be conducted on 20 June 2019.  Sign-up by calling 805 509-8655 or sending an email to info@hainessecuritysolutions.com  

Architects Meet Security Halfway

Architects Meet Security Halfway

What Should They Do to Go All the Way? 

The normal process for building or inhabited space design goes something like this:  the client goes to the architect and describes his/her vision.  The architect interprets that vision using their creative juices.  That’s a good thing! Once the client approves the vision then project is handed over to an engineering firm to “build the guts”. Once the infrastructure is done and the project is finalized.  The client accepts the project.  At that point, it’s up to the client to coordinate the security features of the designed environment.

Sometimes, this process works.  But more often than not, it doesn’t for a very simple reason.  Everyone sees the project differently.  The first questions the architect asks the client is how many people, what type of space (open/shared/closed offices, how many floors, etc.?  During that conversation there should be questions asked that regard the Design Basis Threat; i.e, what types of threats are we trying to protect against? This particularly the case when it comes to man-made threats; such as, active shooter, hostile vehicle, insider threats.  Natural threats to buildings and people are usually governed by ordinances or codes; fire, earthquake, high winds, etc.  Man-made threats on the other hand are not usually governed by ordinance.

That said, when understanding man-made threats it is important to identify several keys elements of the threat:

1) Types of aggressors threats (covert or overt, group or individual, organized or not)

2) Aggressor motivations or objectives (inflict injury or death, damage or destroy property, steal equipment or materials, and create adverse publicity)

3) Aggressor tactics (both the modus operandi and the tools needed to be successful)

Unfortunately, these elements are usually left up to the security consultant towards the end of the project.  If they were considered during the initial 15% phase or 35% phase of the project, it could easily accommodate countermeasures that mitigate these identified threats purely by designing the space to do just that while still maintaining functionality and aesthetics.

The Department of Defense, Department of State and Veteran’s Administration mandate that a security representative be part of the design team from the very beginning.  The civilian world should follow suit, instead of the current halfway method.

Other trends in the built environment are discussed here:

Security Industry Association Technology Insight, Spring edition

https://www.securityindustry.org/2018/04/05/the-puppy-movement/

Security Industry Association Technology Insight, Fall edition

https://www.securityindustry.org/2018/09/14/creating-invisible-security-to-prevent-vehicular-attacks/ 

Parents and School Administrators are Buying
Security Equipment That Won’t 

Protect Children – Why?

Salesmanship and fear are the two main reasons.  Fear because active shooter events are more commonplace than a few years ago.  The recent discovery in New Mexico of abducted children being trained to carry out armed attacks at schools is frightening.  Since the federal government won’t address some of the underlying issues of gun violence by creating sensible legislation maybe they can concentrate instead on finding the horrifying number of missing kids that occur every year in America[1].  Just saying.

In the meantime, parents and school administrator know that something has to be done and have taken matters into their own hands.  

I applaud many States and school districts that have taken steps for comprehensive security improvements.  Unfortunately, there are an equal number of school districts that have only made superficial changes that really don’t offer protection from the active shooter threat or errant vehicle threats.  

Right after the February 14^th event in Parkland, everyone wanted to put more resource officers on campuses, more cameras and more access control.  While on the surface these may be good ideas, just getting more is not enough.  There must be processes in place that make them effective.  For example, if a school increases the number of CCTV cameras, then who monitors them in real time becomes essential.  Unless monitored in real-time, they only have evidentiary value.  The real value of CCTV is that it allows investigators to go back in time and figure out what happened.  We don’t need after-the-fact protection. 

Students and staff need to rely on protection that will actually protect them[2].

Bulletproof - C'mon really?

I saw a news report a couple days ago about a company offering “bullet proof” backpacks.  My antennae went up – way up.  There is no such thing as “bullet proof”!  The correct term is “ballistic resistant” or “bullet resistant”.  It may stop some types of bullets but it won’t stop all.  Therefore it is bullet resistant and not bullet proof.  Shady salesmen will play on your fear and lack of knowledge in knowing the difference.  Anyway, the news reporter had a marksman fire two types of handguns, which the backpack manufacturer said would be stopped, and they were, but when rounds from an AR15 (the most common type of weapon used in school mass shootings) were fired and the rounds went straight through the backpack and into the dirt berm behind.  The reporter asked why, and a guy whom I believe to be a company spokesman, said something to the effect, “well, it was shot at without books and binders being inside. That would change everything”.  To suggest that books and binders offer ballistic protection is just ludicrous.  Backpack manufacturers if I’m wrong AND you have the data to prove it!  Then do so and I will publically admit I was wrong.  

I’m amazed that Walmart and Costco are selling these backpacks for upwards of $100 and apparently do not make this distinction.  

Even if the backpack will stop a .9mm or .45mm, a person would have to be wearing it and be shot from the back.

Use Whatever You Can  

Police Departments and some companies have made a very profitable business out of teaching Run-Hide-Fight.  A defense strategy that teaches: run if you can, hide if you can’t and fight if you have to.  At first, this concept makes sense but the reality is the instructions being given during the R-H-F training actually teaches people to hide and use whatever they can for protection, or in worse case scenarios, use whatever they can to fight.  With this in mind, the idea that a student could hold a backpack in front of them and hide behind it, to me seems a little unreasonable.  I have a hard time imagining a ten year old reducing herself down to the size of a book-bag.  

Instead we should be teaching, to get out - Run-Run-Run - no matter what. Throw a chair through the window, punch thru the dry-wall - but do something that allows you to escape.  The idea of waiting for the "cavalry" to arrive and save the day is just crazy.  We could start designing all occupied spaces with, at least, two avenues of escape.  

This will take a considerable amount of time because first, we have to change our mindset about how we think about high occupancy spaces and how to design them to our advantage, and second, we have to actually implement these concepts into retrofitting classrooms or building new ones.

Don't D-I-Y This

A couple weeks ago, I was sitting next to a second grade teacher on a flight to Houston.  Of course, the conversation got around to school safety.  She said, “I don’t think about it.  I mean, I know what the security measures are for sheltering-in-place and fire drills and such but I really don’t give it much thought, and especially the “big stuff”.  I assumed she meant events like active shooters or terrorist attacks.  She’s right – she shouldn’t be worrying about security.  She should concentrate on teaching.  Educators should not try to D-I-Y this.  Instead, they should contact security professionals that are agnostic to products and are concerned solely with providing effective security solutions.  

That way, educators will get honest protection options that address issues on multiple levels and not just be sold more products.

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[1] National Center for Missing & Exploited Children   http://www.missingkids.com/KeyFacts

[2] One More Town – One More Family – One More Angel – One More Funeral February 22^nd 2018 on-line edition of American Security Today.  https://americansecuritytoday.com/one-town-one-family-one-angel-one-funeral/