Security - It Really is a T or F Question

I know many of you when you read the title thought, “Yep, security is a true or false question.  You’ve either got it or you don’t.  Well, purposefully I didn’t spell out what the T and F stood for. It isn’t true or false.

As many of you know, for some time now I’ve been advocating for a softer approach to security, especially when it comes to the design and layout of high-occupancy spaces.  And during my years of advocacy I’m come across some, who will agree, and others that play lip service and say, “Oh yea, that’s what we should do.”  And when they have their next opportunity to make the change they go back to their olds ways with the bigger, better, faster, stronger, in your face approach.

Recently, while collaborating with a local school district we took a softer approach.  After an active shooter threat (fortunately stopped prior to being carried out due to social media monitoring), parents wanted the District to heighten security by adding guards and cameras, and constructing fences on the perimeter.  They wanted this because that’s what they’ve been seeing on TV.  After every school shooting, there’s a rush to install more cameras, higher fences, and to hire more guards.  I don’t blame the parents; I blame the security companies who are selling their products with the idea that if one is good, two must be better – the more products sold the better for the bottom-line.  Some may argue that adding visible, in your face, deterrence works.  I’ll admit, there is some benefit; however, a dedicated threat will not be deterred – they will bring the tools necessary to circumvent whatever is in place. That said, we can argue until the cows come home about the benefits.  From my point of view, it’s not about effectiveness.  It’s about the psychological impact it has on our youth.  Recently, a local school board approved a bond for security upgrades.  The newspaper ran a picture of a ten foot metal fence gate to allow campus entry and mentioned that everyone would go through a metal detector.  I showed the article to a Latino friend of mine and he said, “They’re always looking at us like we’re all criminals.  The guys are in gangs and the girls are ‘ho’s.”  Is this the intended message?

Additionally, research shows us that “hardening” causes anxiety and even affects performance.  

https://network.aia.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=110227d5-dde4-9c0d-fa52-a23257148cca

Our approach is to add security features that are “hidden in plain sight”.  For example, instead of a fence to keep out trespasser we suggest a buried co-axial cable sensor system.  It provides a warning that someone has breached the perimeter, yet is unseen.  Another example, to keep unauthorized folks off of the roof we suggest placing large flower pots with bougainvillea near drainage pipes or next to other features that a person could climb to get to the roof.   Again, a solution that is unseen.

My article published in American Security Today magazine January 2020 https://view.joomag.com/2019-champions-edition-2019-champions-edition/0683429001578075665/p148?short

So which message do we want to send?  The message that we don’t trust you and we think there will be an incident or the message that we trust you, we expect you to act trustworthy and you can expect the same of others?

My book, The Solutions Matrix: a  Practical Guide to Soft Security Engineering for Architects, Engineers, Facility Managers, Planner and Security Professionals has a Quick Glance Checklist that will allow you to list your current security solutions and then list your ideas on how to take a softer approach.  Order your copy today via the CONTACT US link at https://hainessecuritysolutions.com

How Preventing the Wrong Threat Will Cost You

My nephew used to work for an IT company.  Upon returning to work after Christmas holiday, they noticed that the rear windows of the building had been broken and all of the computer equipment had been stolen.  The owner of the company did what anyone would do.  He called a security consultant. 

The consultant recommended fixing the windows, adding motion sensors in the hallway and an access management system at the main entrance.  


When the company employees returned after the Easter weekend, they noticed the rear windows had been broken out – again, and all of the computer equipment had been stolen – again. 


Why did this occur?  The security company had misanalysed the Design Basis Threat or DBT.  

Everything of value has a threat that goes with it.  If it has value then someone wants it - either the owner or someone else.  It is also possible that a treat can be naturally occurring, like a earthquake or tornado. Usually, protection from these types of threats are governed by ordinances or laws; i.e., earthquake or tornado protection in construction standards.  For man-made threats, on the other hand, there really isn't any legislation that governs prevention or protection, so it's up to us to focus on man-made threats.  There are four general categories of aggressor types; 1) criminals (sophisticated/unsophisticated and organized/unorganized), 2) protestors (both organized/unorganized), 3) terrorist (domestic/trans-national/state-sponsored, and 4) subversives (saboteurs/foreign intelligence agents).  Each type of threat has an Modus Operandi or tactic and tool it uses to execute its objective.  If you make a list of what those may be you can actually design the space so that it provides protection to the things of value inside.  It is also important to understand the objective of man-made threats, too.  They fall into one or more of these categories; 1) inflict injury or death to people,2) destroy or damage property, equipment or resources, 3) steal equipment, material or information, or create adverse publicity. Understanding the motives, the tactics and tools they use will go a long way in prevention and protection.

The solution the security company had provided failed because, they didn't address the correct DBT; which was, breaking and entering and not unauthorized access.  Although, entering through the window is a form of unauthorized entry.  They had recommended the solutions they normally would suggest to deter or reduce the effects of theft, and focused on electronics, but they hadn’t addressed the DBT of the windows being breakable in the first place and didn’t add non-electronic solutions to the mix.  Had the windows been replaced with laminated glass they would not have been able to be broken and then the other countermeasures would have been effective.  Another solution would have been to prevent access to the parking lot behind the building.  I don't prefer this method because it would be more aggressive and unsightly to use a gate or fence with gate.  Just replacing the windows would not have changed the aesthetics of the space, so that is my preferred solution.

More about non-aggressive/aesthetically pleasing security measures can be found here: https://www.securityindustry.org/2018/04/05/the-puppy-movement/

Case Study: Unimpeded Access Allows Illegal Dumping

The issue was that people were driving up to the banks of a stream and dumping trash; i.e., tires, mattresses, rubbish, etc.  The city called a security consultant.  And as expected, he recommended adding a camera to the site so that “things” could be monitored.  The camera fed back to the superintendent’s desk.  Of course, when the supervisor wasn’t there (weekends, evening/late at night, attending meetings, lunch, naps, etc.), all the time when someone would dump trash the dumping occurred and continued.  The superintendent was scratching his head on what to do.  After all, he just spent several thousands of dollars on the latest technologies and they didn’t seem to work.

Our solution was not electronic.  Instead, we suggested that they build a raised berm/curb using natural landscaping (trees/boulders/bushes, even park benches) so that the vehicle couldn’t drive up to the water’s edge in the first place.  We suggested specific landscaping strategies due to low cost and ability to prevent vehicles from reaching the stream.   We imagined that since the culprits couldn’t physically access the stream embankment without using a vehicle they would be  less likely to want to carry heavy objects from the roadway, across a bicycle/walking path and then into the wood clearing to reach the stream.  Our second reason was to ensure the aesthetics of the area were kept intact.  Sure, we could have suggested a fence along the embankment to deny access and achieve the same effect, but who wants to walk along a fence with barbed wire when they’re taking the dog out or jogging or cycling.

Related articles: 

https://www.securityindustry.org/2018/04/05/the-puppy-movement/

https://www.securityindustry.org/2018/09/14/creating-invisible-security-to-prevent-vehicular-attacks/ 

https://issuu.com/eqinternational/docs/urbana_25_april_2017-ilovepdf-compr/52

The Truth About Walls (Fencing)

A few years ago, I was asked by the editors of Security Middle East magazine[1] to write an article about perimeter security.  During the conversations with the editor that lead to the eventual article, she asked me to summarize what the article would be about.  I told her that in order to understand perimeter security you first needed to accept the fact that if you have a ten-foot fence the bad guy will bring an eleven-foot ladder. 

The idea that you can build a fence or wall and keep the bad guys out faded out sometime after the medieval ages when new technologies and new ways of conducting warfare came about.  Well, the same holds true today.

If you look up on Google the difference between a wall and a fence you’ll get the following explanation: “A fence is usually a wooden or metal structure that encloses a yard, pasture or other area…The difference between a fence and a wall is that you can almost always see through a fence, at least to some degree, while a wall is solid”.

If you look up fence purposes, you’ll get the following explanation; “A fence is a structure that encloses an area, typically outdoors, and is usually constructed from posts that are connected by boards, wire, rails or netting.  Alternatives to fencing include a ditch (sometimes filled with water, forming a moat)”.

Both definitions suggest that a boundary is formed between property that is not controlled and property that is controlled. 

Whether using a wall or fence, the purpose is to delineate a boundary; usually at a property boundary.  This is the true meaning of fencing or "walling", if you will.  To delineate property boundaries, in other words, you’re over there and I don’t care what you do but it you come over here you need to go down to the access point so I can check you out.  With that in mind, you could paint a line on the ground and put up a sign that says, “stay out or go over there for access”.  Both would achieve the same effect as a wall of fence.  So, why not just paint a line.  Because the value in constructing a fence or wall, is 1) to identify the boundaries of the controlled space, 2) to cause a delay in unauthorized access, and 3) to identify unwanted behavior.  An authorized person will not climb over a fence or wall, tunnel under it or cut through it.  An unauthorized person will, especially if they have nefarious intentions.  So, with that in mind, the fence serves an early warning system.  It tells us when someone breaches it that they have  “bad intentions”.  If they didn’t, they would not breach the fence/wall and would proceed to an access control point to display the proper credentials to gain entry.  Hopefully, the fence will be constructed in such a way as to delay their unauthorized access.  Sadly, even without tools a eight foot chain link fence with three strand barbed wire outrigger can be scaled or climbed over in about four seconds.  With tools, like a ladder or a truck to stand on it takes even less time.

Which brings us to the next truth, unless there is a guard or technology monitoring the fence-line in real time, we have no way of knowing if the boundary has been breached.  We must monitor for unauthorized access, respond to it, and engage the aggressor in real time.  The operative word here is “real time”.  If we don’t what’s the use?

Another thing to remember, no matter how solid, sturdy, high or how many bells and whistles are added, there will always be a way to circumvent whatever is put in place.  The key is, making sure there is enough time to delay the “bad guy or gal” so that his or her behavior can be identified and the “good guys/gals” have time to respond and engage.

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[1] Security Middle East magazine article More Power to the Perimeter link https://issuu.com/securitymiddleeastmagazine/docs/sme_july-_aug_2015_web?e=0/14330179

Using Landscaping to Control Access

I want to tell you about two incidents that required a security solution and how the first attempt at providing an adequate solution failed miserably.

First case – illegal dumping

The issue was that people were driving up to the banks of a stream and dumping trash; i.e., tires, mattresses, rubbish, etc.  The first solution provided added a camera to the site so that “things” could be monitored.  The camera fed back to the superintendent’s desk.  Of course, when he wasn’t there (weekends, evening/late at night, attending meetings, lunch, naps) the dumping occurred and continued.  The superintendent was scratching his head on what to do.  After all, he just spent several thousands of dollars on the latest technologies and they didn’t seem to work.

Our solution was not electronic.  Instead, we suggested that they build a raised berm/curb using natural landscaping (trees/boulders/bushes, even park benches) so that the vehicle couldn’t drive up to the water’s edge in the first place.  We suggested landscaping due to the ability to prevent the vehicle from reaching the stream.  We imagined the culprits wouldn’t want to carry the heavy objects from the roadway, across a bicycle/walking path and then into the wood clearing to reach the stream.  Our second reason was to ensure the aesthetics of the area were kept intact.  Sure, we could have suggested a fence along the embankment to deny access and achieve the same effect, but who wants to walk along a fence with barbed wire when they’re taking the dog out or jogging or cycling.

Second case – unwanted access to school property

The issue in this case was that community members were cutting across school grounds in order to shorten the distance to retail shops located near the school campus.  The first security company suggested erecting a chain-link-fence with 3-strand barbed wire outrigger around the entire campus perimeter with a gate for buses and parents/administrators.  When not in use the gate would be kept locked.  The administrators weren’t buying it.  What if a student climbed the fence and was injured?  And where were they going to get the manpower to manage the gate? 

Our solution was to construct on three sides a wooden split-rail fence approximately 4 feet high (similar to those used in the Atlantic Piedmont region) and then to place flower beds in front of the fence and thorny shrubbery and trees behind it so that it would be difficult to cut through.  The front of the campus was left open.  We also suggested installing "speed cushions" to allow just buses to enter the "drive up/drop off" area.  And to have a separate loading/unloading zone for the parent's cars, that would be controlled by school staff.  These solutions provided the aesthetic qualities the administrators were looking for.  We also suggested changing procedures but I don't want to give too much away here.  Needless to say a comprehensive change was needed to address the concerns of the school.

These are just two examples of how not all security solutions need to be electronic.  Unfortunately, surveillance companies will tell you that CCTV is the solution to everything.  The reality is it isn’t.  In both cases we used “natural access control” (Crime Prevention through Environmental Design [CPTED]) as a fundamental principle in our approach to reducing crime.

Additional CPTED ideas and other principles on deterring crime and the effects of terrorist attack will be discuss during a 3-day workshop, Designing Secure Buildings: Integrating Security Technologies being held in New York City, 11-13 Sep 18.

Our ROI Toolkit is available.  The Toolkit will help you justify to your boss why you need to attend this training.

Contact us at info@hainesssecuritysolution.com or call +1 805 509-8655 to register.

Visit us at https://hainessecuritysolutions.com/Training to find out about other classes we offer or to host a workshop. 

THE 5 MINUTE/5 DAY PLAN TO KEEP BURGLARS AWAY FOR

HOME AND BUSINESS OWNERS

Whether you’re a business owner or a homeowner “security” is about the protection of stuff and the people who use that stuff.  In the case of the business owners, that stuff is the store premises, the merchandise, the customers and employees.  At home, it’s about family members, keepsakes and property.  Even though, the stuff we are protecting is different, the concepts are the same.  They differ in application.  Good security means keeping someone from taking that stuff.  So, let’s look at what the business owner can do that the home owner can do as well.  For the next five days, we’ll spend 5 minutes each day taking steps that will keep would be “bad guys” away.

DAY 1 – From the outside looking in.  Stand on the outside of your property, beyond the property line or boundary and look at what you see.  You must do this on all sides of your property.  Remember, the “bad guy” will exploit your vulnerabilities no matter where he/she finds them.

Business/Homeowners – Look for avenues of approach, especially those that will allow access undetected.  If they exist, remove them to the maximum extent possible.  Since most likely you won’t be able to remove them entirely, add features that will assist you with detection; i.e., lighting, barriers (barriers slow forward movement or channel it).  The goal is to make it so that if the would-be perpetrator choses that route you will slow him/her down enough to detect him/her.  Warning:  CCTV is not a detection tool, so don’t think you can put a camera for detection.  CCTV is an assessment tool and as such, must be monitored 24/7 so that someone can assess the unwanted behavior, AND you must have a response force capable of responding within minutes.  If not, the “bad guy” will not get caught.  Another misconception is that, by putting a camera it will allow the police to catch the bad guy later.  Fact is less than one percent of the time this is true.  So, chances are you’d be wasting your money.

DAY 2 – Repeat Day 1 activities.  Return to the property line only this time at night or during hours of darkness.  Again, what do you see?  Additionally, look for any burned out exterior lights.  Lights are an effective tool in assisting assessment of unwanted behavior.  Bad guys don’t like light because it increases their chances of being caught.  

DAY 3 – Access points.  Walk to the nearest point of the structure where you would enter.  Then walk to the next one and so on until all access points have been looked at.

Business – This is usually an established entry/doorway from the public side-walk.  Check the locking mechanism.  Does the door fit snuggly against the frame?  Could someone “jimmy” the door open with a tool?  Don’t forget about your windows.  They can also provide access.  Just because they are large it doesn’t mean they won’t get broken.  The application of a fragmentation retention film (FRF), if installed properly, may assist with keeping the window intact and from being shattered.

Homeowners – This probably means that in the front of the house the access points would be the front door and any windows.  Check them for functionality.  Do this on all sides.

DAY 4 – Storage areas (shed/storage room/ garage)

Business – This may mean a separate structure or internal warehouse/storage room.  Observe the method of entry.  Can the door be secured when not in use?  Is the door monitored?  Does it need to be?  If a free-standing building, check all sides.

Home owner – If you have an outside building, such as, a storage shed where the lawn mowers, bicycles, etc. are stored, make sure there’s a lock that works.  Just because the shed is in the backyard, it doesn’t mean, a “bad guy” won’t get in to it.  If the bikes/lawnmower are stored in the garage, check the garage door that leads to the side or back yard.  Don’t forget about the car/driveway door.  Does it lock?  My wife always locks the door from the garage that leads into our laundry room and subsequently, in to our house.  Good job Honey! 

DAY 5 – Check your internal spaces. 

Business –  I was in a coffee shop the other day and noticed that they were using a laptop and a tablet for processing payments.  Both were left unattended on the counter.  It would have been real easy for an opportunists to grab the laptop or tablet and run out.  All they needed to do to reduce their risk was place the items behind the counter or on a shelf underneath and to take them out only when they used them.  If you own a business that stays open late or 24 hours, there are special considerations you need to make.  Primarily for the protection of your people/staff.  Remember, stuff can be replaced.  That’s why we have insurance.  People can’t.

Homeowners – The most common place for people to store valuables in their home is in their master bedroom.  Thieves know this.  Consider storing your valuables somewhere else that’s secure.  Just because you have a wall safe it doesn’t mean your stuff is secure.  The wall safe can be taken out of the wall if given enough time.  Remember, slow “bad guys” down so you can detect their behavior.

More tips and tools available at https://hainessecuritysolutions.com/Technology_Improvements  or by calling 805 509-8655.

3 COMMON MYTHS ABOUT

ACCESS CONTROL AND PERIMETER SECURITY

Most people think access control involves using technology or a guard who checks some form of identification to allow entry into a facility or building – a guard or electronics, and that it.  The security industry has made tremendous gains in the last several years with regards to increasing technology’s capabilities to enhance control at building or compounds.  While these advances assist they are not the cure all.  They are simply tools that assist in the detection of unwanted behavior.  

With that in mind here are three common myths about access control:

Myth 1 – The perimeter or boundary line must be robust in order to adequately provide access control.  This simply is not true.  The US Air Force uses a painted red line on the ground around its nuclear deterrent capable aircraft.  There’s no fence, there no standing guard – just a red line.  The line basically says to everyone, “If you’re on that side of the line, we don’t care who you are or what you do, but, if you want to come on this side of the line we want you to go down to the opening so we can check you out”.  So, really anything can be used – a rope, series of shrubs/plants or a painted line, something that says, here’s the line of demarcation that I care about.

Myth 2 – Fences are a deterrent – NOT!  It takes less than 4 seconds for an unskilled person to climb over a fence, including those with concertina or razor wire.  While adding some type of top guard makes them look formidable they’re really not very effective as a deterrent.  They’re real values comes in the form of detection.  They allow us to detect unwanted behavior.   Think about it, most authorized people will proceed to an access control point, they won’t climb the fence.  Only unauthorized people climb fences; therefore, it serves as a detection mechanism.

Myth 3 – The boundary line or perimeter is the only point available for security personnel to affect access control.  Actually, there are four layers of physical security and each can provide for effective access control, if used correctly.  The layers are; 1 – boundary line or property perimeter, 2 – exterior enclave, 3 – asset façade, and 4 – internal controlled or restricted spaces.  Each layer provides an additional opportunity for control, if used effectively.  Not every asset has a layer 2 or 4 but all have layers 1 and 3, even if, the asset is free standing.  In this case, the façade serves as both layers 1 and 3.  Each layer should be used to deter (albeit limited), delay, detect and allow for response.  This layered approach is fundamental to effective access control.

More access control and perimeter security tips at: http://issuu.com/securitymiddleeastmagazine/docs/sme_july-_aug_2015_web/33?e=3061242/14215610

We’ll discuss perimeter security and entry control facility design during a workshop 19-21 July near Tacoma, WA. For more information contact us at +1 (805) 509-8655.

That's Like Closing the Barn Door After the Horses Get Away

How many times have we heard that?  Well, it happens all the time.  Just because you live in the country or away from city folks it doesn’t mean you can’t become a target of vandalism or theft or worse.  Here are some very common sense things you can do immediately to keep the horses safe and from loosing your britches, so to speak.

Check all gates and fence for damage.  If properly maintained they will keep animals in but the will not keep bad guys out.  You may have heard of the “broken window theory”.  Basically, it says in areas where there are rundown buildings, with broken windows crime is sure to follow.  Same goes for fences.  Fences that are not maintained suggest that security is not a very high priority and other areas of the farm, ranch and homestead are vulnerable, too.

Ensure ditches are maintained and clear of debris.  You need to do this for several reasons; 1) to make sure the ditches drain properly, 2) so that they don’t provide hiding places for the bad guys, or 3) allow the bad guys to drive through your fence.  A properly maintained ditch provides some protection.

Keep chemicals/fertilizer under strict control, especially, if being used in the field.  Do not leave outdoors overnight.  Bring the wagon back to the barn and secure it.  You’re going back that way anyway, so there’s really no extra effort.

Report unsolicited requests to buy fertilizers or chemicals from you to the authorities.

Control access to all buildings.  There are lots of electronic gadgets out there these days to assist in that area.  But they all basically fall into one of three categories, each being more secure and more expensive than the previous.  Something you have – like an access card, something you know – like a pin number, and something you are – like a retinal scan or fingerprint.  A system that has a combination of two of the three is preferable.  Make sure all buildings are protected.  Beside the animals, there are lots of items to steal.  Copper wiring, metal tubing, and lead seem to be high the thieves priority list these days.

Install visible deterrents, such as, motion activated lights and cameras.  Some systems allow for you to talk from the camera and warn the bad guy that they’re being watched.  Might be useful to "shoo" those high schoolers away who are "cow tipping" or "snipe hunting".

More common sense tips available https://hainessecuritysolutions.com/Technology_Improvements.html or under the Technology Improvement Tab.

Perimeter Security - What is it Good For?

Absolutely Nothing, If Done Wrong

DEFINITION

Webster describes perimeter as, “the boundary or circumference of a figure having two dimension; the sum of all sides of the boundary.  Webster goes on to describe security as”…freedom from danger or risk.”  So when we put them together our most common definition of perimeter security goes something like this, “an identifiable boundary to provide safety from threats”.

We take that a step further in our definition:  A boundary comprised of several different “layers” of defense, with each layer providing an opportunity to deter, delay and detect unwanted activity.

PURPOSE

Most people think you have to have a fence in order to establish that boundary or perimeter and once you’ve done that, the fence will act as a deterrent and stop the threat.  Both assumptions are wrong.  You don’t need a fence to establish the perimeter.  You just need to identify it in some way to let people know, “Hey, this is my space.  If you want to come in here, then go down there and let me check out who you are”.  Good folks will follow the rules and go down to the entry control or access point.  The bad guy will climb over the fence in about 4 seconds or less, so not much deterrent here.  So in reality the fence doesn’t act as a deterrent, it acts as a method of identifying good and bad intentions. 

Therefore, the perimeter  is merely a line of demarcation that says, if you’re over there we don’t care what you do but if you come over here, we want to know who you are, so go down there where we can check you out.  Now, many of you will disagree with that.  You will say, “No, the fence keeps the bad guys from doing bad things because they have to climb over it and they don’t want to get caught”.  Exactly!  But, the fence doesn’t deter them, it makes it so that if they climb over it we will detect this bad behavior and can possibly catch them.  After all, the good guys will follow the rules and go down to where there is an opening in the fence.

This opening is usually in the form of an access or entry control point (ACP/ECP) of some sort, manned or manned.  The ECP is where we check to see if the person trying to enter is allowed.  There are many ways to do that but we’ll have to discuss that in a future article.  For the time being let’s concentrate on perimeter security excluding its access control mechanics.  There are three distinct purposes for establishing a perimeter.

We already established that, first, it delineates the property line that we care about (deter).  Second, it may slow (delay) the bad guys as they approach with the idea that if we can delay them we may be able to spot their bad behavior.  Which leads us directly into point three – it serves as an early warning systems (detect).  It immediately allows us to determine ill-intent.  Think about it.  If the person climbing the fence wasn’t trying to circumvent the access control point then why climb over the fence.  Why not, go down the ECP, show or use your authorized credentials and enter.  Another way to think away it is, if a person were to break through a wall, you would think this behavior bizarre and want to check them out.

Which brings me to my next point; there are actually four perimeters or layers of defense and each provides an opportunity for us to design against our threats.  Threats come in all shapes and sizes, but we usually are most concerned with vehicle or pedestrian threats.  In pretty short order I can come up with about 40 natural and about 20 or so manmade threats.  For the purpose of this article we’ll concentrate on vehicles and people.

Perimeter Design Considerations

• Visibility – what do people see - both good and bad?  Consider proximity to your neighbors.
• Demographics/Statistics – crime rates, terrorist activity, first responder locations and emergency access
• Landscape and Environmental Conditions - Type of terrain and extreme weather
• Power Requirements - availability, if electronics are used to augment passive barriers
• Accessibility – whether by foot or vehicle, during normal and emergency operations.

Protection Components

• Physical barriers (most common) – fencing or vehicle barriers, landscaping
• Intrusion Detection/Access Control – quickly becoming the norm
• Response Forces – without them the other components are useless.  Forces MUST BE well-trained, well-equipped and regularly drilled and exercised.

Common Mistakes

• If we build a fence high enough, we’ll be okay
• Assume the property boundary to be the external perimeter that requires the most robust system
• Making it look substantial – fortress like will deter everybody and all threats
• Putting barbed or concertina or razor wire on top will deter the bad guy
• Putting CCTV to capture activity without having response force capabilities
• Forgetting about moving vehicle threats (ask the security staff at the Brussels airport about this one.  Had they installed cable-reinforcing to the fencing the diamond thieves would not have been able to cut the fence and drive up to the plane unnoticed.)
• Lighting portions of the perimeter that cannot be patrolled by security forces.

THE FUTURE

• Non-aggressive methods
  • Landscaping and Designing Crime Out strategies
• Arial surveillance
  • Balloons.  This might be the most promising since they can stay airborne for very long periods of time.  One advantage is they can be placed high enough to see three of the layers of defense.
  • Drones.  There are several companies out there that already have off-the-shelf products available.  Once manufacturers are able to overcome the current short battery life cycle and extend them to 10-12 hours or longer and add analytics this will become a great tool.
• Robotics (mobile, semi-fixed or stationary)
  • Mobile – with the advent of self- driven or remotely controlled vehicles I don’t think it will be too long before we see a company promoting a self-driving security patrol vehicle; equipped with sensors, camera systems and audible/visual capabilities
  • Semi-fixed – these systems are attached to or immediately adjacent to a boundary line and can patrol randomly or in a sequential order (not advised).  They can be equipped with sensors, CCTV cameras, spotlights and speakers.
  • Stationary – these systems already exist.  There are many systems out there that have CCTV fields of view of perimeters with video analytics, combined with sensors, DVRs, etc.  Really the sky's the limit based on budget.

CONCLUSION

Don’t fall into the trap of thinking that the property boundary is your only perimeter and therefore, it’s the only one you protect.  Use every layer of defense to deter, delay, detect or defend a would-be aggressor.  Remember, it won’t happen on its own; you have to design your security system to be integrated because if it’s not – it’s worth absolutely nothing.

For more information about perimeter security see our article in Security Middle East magazine Jul/Aug issue 

http://issuu. com/securitymiddleeastmagazine/docs/sme_july-_aug_2015_web/31?e=3061242/14215610

or send an email to info@hainessecuritysolutions.com.