Threats, Designs and Delphic predictions: Designing-in Security for Major Sporting Infrastructure and Other High-Occupancy Spaces (Part 1)
Looking into the future
In the summer of 480 BC, the Athenian
celebration of their Olympic games was disrupted by fears of a second invasion
by the Persians, the first having been defeated at the Battle of Marathon, ten
years earlier. The Athenians consulted
the Oracle of Delphi for guidance about how to defend themselves and were
advised to place their trust in a “wall of wood”. Taking this to be a reference to ships, the
Athenians prepared their fleet and subsequently used it to evacuate Athens and
later defeat the Persians at sea.
The organisers of today’s major international
sporting events do not need to rely on Delphic predictions for security advice;
there are highly sophisticated systems available to assess and respond to
immediate threats and great levels of information sharing and international
cooperation to support the host country.
However, the infrastructure for the sporting event may have been designed
many years earlier when it would have been impossible to know with accuracy
what kind of threats it would need to withstand. This article looks at some of the challenges
facing architects, designers and engineers to ensure that sporting events can
take place safely and securely in a variety of threat environments.
Strategic approach
Infrastructure of any type, sporting or
other, takes a long time to plan and build and will last even longer. A recent Experts’ Summit organised by the
International Centre for Sport Security (ICSS) concluded that it took an
average of eight years from a decision to build a new piece of sporting
infrastructure before it was in operation[1]. The prevailing threat that might bear upon
that infrastructure when it is used will be impossible to predict accurately
that far in the future. Furthermore, the
threat can change much more quickly than any defensive posture arranged to
protect it. An unexpected terrorist
attack, for example, is likely to cause an abrupt re-assessment of the
threat. New cyber threats and avenues of
attack can appear very rapidly, a situation that is unlikely to diminish in the
short term and may get significantly worse.
Where protective measures need to be added retrospectively, it is
invariably at great expense in terms of time, money and disruption.
How do those designing infrastructure and
sports venues build-in protection against threats that they cannot accurately
predict? The answer is that by following
a few strategic guidelines, it is straightforward to produce designs that not
only satisfy the sporting requirements, but do so in a safe and secure manner,
are aesthetically pleasing and are capable of withstanding changes to the risk
environment in a flexible and cost effective way throughout any legacy use.
Wider context
The first guideline is that the design
needs to take place against a wider
context, for example a national security strategy or plan that is set by a
higher authority (normally the national government). The security planning for most international
sporting events will take place within the context of the host country’s strategic
planning framework. This is likely to
consider a range of risks to people, events, and physical and logical
infrastructure. Underpinning this should
be a comprehensive set of relationships between the event organisers and the
relevant Law Enforcement and other government agencies that are responsible for
assessing security threats and disseminating advice about how to mitigate
them. The organisers of a major sporting
event must work with these agencies to address any issues relating to threats
that might bear upon the event; they cannot reduce the threat by themselves. It is therefore important for them to
understand the broader risk environment and how the national (and local) response
machinery is organised. The way to
achieve this is to establish long term working relationships with the relevant
organisations, which then can be utilised to respond to a particular event,
from a one-off match to a sporting fiesta like the Football World Cup or
Olympics.
Impact
driven
The second guideline is that the focus of
the design should be on minimising the impact
of a hostile event (e.g. terrorist bomb, cyber attack). Designers and architects are very familiar
with the need to ensure that sports stadia and other infrastructures are built
to ensure the highest levels of safety at times of an emergency such as a
fire. There is no reason why security
should not figure as prominently in their considerations. There is a considerable body of knowledge
about how to protect against the effects of blast from a terrorist bomb
(whether vehicle or person borne) or against shots from a weapon. There is a similar wealth of knowledge about
how to defend against cyber attacks. It
is essential, therefore, that designers and architects engage early with security
practitioners to understand the impact that a catastrophic event might have on
the sporting venue and its occupants.
However, all too often designers focus on the likelihood of an attack,
rather than on what impact it would have.
A mindset that considered impact ahead of likelihood is much more likely
to produce a design that is capable of withstanding a variety of threat
scenarios including new ones and those that may change in nature over the lifetime
of the infrastructure.
To achieve this, the designer should have a
clear understanding of what is critical to the functioning of the
infrastructure, venue, etc. Some of this
may emerge naturally from consideration of the safety aspects (e.g. having
multiple entrances and exits that can be used in the case of a fire), but
others may not be so evident. Sometimes,
good design and good security design may not be the same thing. For example, placing the back-up to a
critical system alongside its master may be elegant in design terms and cheap
to implement, but a bomb designed to damage one may take out the back-up as
well. The designer needs also to place
critical systems as far away as possible from the public domain to minimise the
chances that intruders can quickly penetrate a protective perimeter and cause
damage.
Good physical security need not detract
from the aesthetic impact of the venue.
Planned in advance, it can be built into the fabric of the venue and its
surroundings in such a way as to be pleasing on the eye, discreet and highly
effective. The challenge for the
designer is to use the natural lie of the land, and existing geographical
features to avoid the need to construct defences that might present a more
stark appearance. A stream or ditch
might easily be adapted to control the flow of vehicles or block potentially
hostile ones. Earth banks planted with
attractive foliage can protect buildings from the effects of blast. Where defensive structures need to be built,
they should be merged into the surrounding ‘streetscape’ as much as
possible. Raised flower planters,
bicycle racks and street lighting fixtures might all be adapted to act as
hostile vehicle mitigation of some form.
A major north London football club has some of its hostile vehicle
mitigation measures constructed in the form of giant letters of the club’s
name. Other barriers might be hidden
behind stone balustrades or constructed from materials that blend in with the
surrounding architecture and heritage of the site. All that is required is for the designer to
have early engagement with the security professionals so that the artistry of
the former might blend with the requirements of the latter in as attractive a
way as possible.
Holistic approach
Acquiring a comprehensive understanding of
what is critical to the functioning of a venue leads to the third of the
strategic guidelines – taking an holistic approach. The complex nature of modern communications
and control systems throws up highly complex interdependencies between the
physical and logical elements in a modern stadium. Entry gates, CCTV monitors, Public Address,
display screens, etc., will all be controlled across communications networks
which themselves are based on Internet Protocols (IP). Such networks will be flexible and able to
adapt to changing requirements, but unless they are properly protected, they
will be vulnerable to a cyber attack.
This could result in sound physical protection measures being
compromised in some way. Any holistic
approach must also include the people who operate the physical and cyber
measures at a venue.
However, an holistic approach means much
more than just considering physical, cyber and personnel risks together in some
way. Security functions that are organised
in silos are inefficient and obstruct the identification and mitigation of
risk. It is important that the
governance of the various security functions is structured in such a way as to
support an holistic approach. Having
different reporting or line management chains for these functions will stretch channels
of communication and introduce potential gaps from which greater risk is likely
to emerge. In our follow-up article in
the next edition of this journal, it will also become clear as to why it is
important to embed this holistic approach throughout the supply chain for both
the build and operation of an event.
Effective security starts at the top of the
organisation and should be embedded throughout it by a culture in which the
everyday attitudes of staff contribute effortlessly towards an organisation’s protective
security regime. It is vital that event
organisers work to achieve such a positive culture and one that takes an
holistic, not silo-ed, approach to security – designed to minimise physical,
information and personnel risks and protect spectators and staff.
The cyber threat to a venue will manifest
itself in many ways, not just those relating to the operation of physical
elements. Information in many forms will
be vital to the successful design, construction and operation of any sporting
venue, not only for its immediate use, but possibly for many years of legacy
beyond that. The protection of information
needs to be considered in a number of circumstances such as:
·
The documents relating to the
design and construction of the venues. Inappropriate
disclosure of these could allow the identification of weak points or
vulnerabilities in the construction that could be exploited.
·
The operation of the venues,
especially during sporting events when the risks are greatest. Again, inappropriate disclosure of this could
allow security regimes to be subverted or compromised.
·
In either electronic or paper
form. Whilst the majority of information
will be carried via electronic systems and networks, the use of paper will
still be necessary in certain cases. It
is important that the information protection plan encompasses both mediums and
enables venues to be confident that hard copy (paper, electronic media, CDs,
etc.) is protected as effectively as that carried on the numerous (cyber)
networks that will be necessary to support events.
·
The identification of new
threats as they emerge. The rapid
development of cyber threats is unlikely to diminish in the short term and may
get significantly worse. It will be
particularly important for sporting venues to have confidence that appropriate
protection is in place to counter the most sophisticated of these.
The last point, underlines why it is so important
to adopt an impact driven approach to the security of cyber
infrastructures. Focusing on a threat
that can change so rapidly and far more quickly than defences can be
reconfigured will not lead to a secure cyber infrastructure that will remain
resilient in the face of uncertainty.
However, by understanding what is critical to its operations, a venue
can start to build a cyber system that can deter, detect and defend against the
inevitable attempts to compromise its operations.
An effective and holistic security risk
management regime will therefore have a number of components including: senior
management support; capable people; efficient processes; and the selection of
appropriate physical and technical controls.
Each component should interact with and support others in an holistic
manner. It is important to seek a
balance between these components as the model is compromised if any one
component is deficient or fails.
Organisers should understand that technology is just one piece of a
complex jigsaw that will eventually deliver a safe and secure celebration of sport. A multidisciplinary team is needed to ensure
that physical assets and information are safeguarded appropriately and a
positive security culture is fostered amongst staff.
At this stage it will also be necessary to
consider any legal and compliance issues set by a higher authority (e.g.,
regional or national government). There are
numerous relevant national and international industry standards that might be
adopted. However, it will be important
for the leadership of the venue to ensure that the focus remains on effective
and proportionate risk management and not just the slavish obedience of a
particular standard. The danger of
adopting standards is that the focus of management effort switches to achieving
compliance with the standard rather than holistic management of the risk.
Getting there
The three guiding principles of considering
a wider context; being impact driven; and taking an holistic approach may be easy to say
yet much more difficult to achieve. It
is vital to get things right from the start and have security considered at the
beginning of the design stage, not as a post-build ‘add-on’. As we have already seen, early engagement
between security professionals, designers and architects is essential. This can save money in the long term and
produce a design that enhances the spectator experience by inducing a greater
feeling of safety and security.
Achieving this requires nothing more than
good communication skills and the ability to keep that going throughout the
design and build of a project and its subsequent operation. But that is easier to say than do as personal
relationships, group dynamics and overarching governance structures can all
interfere in the process and allow differing elements to drift off in their own
directions. So often, security is
considered well after the start of the design process when changing plans
becomes expensive and time consuming.
Whilst getting it right at the start is vital, so is the ability to keep
that level of engagement going. This
requires continuing commitment and leadership from the management and an
engaged and supportive workforce that understand their roles and work
seamlessly to embed the security objectives into their everyday actions. As we will consider in part two of this
article, it becomes even more important to achieve this once the design phase
is over and construction begins. During
this phase, as the real venues start to emerge and the number of people
involved in the project rises, a different set of challenges emerge. However, by following a simple set of
guidelines it is possible to achieve a safe, secure and highly enjoyable
celebration of sport that can provide a lasting legacy for generations to come,
whatever the prevailing threats of the time and despite our continuing
inability to see into the future.
The author (Roger Cumming) is the Technical
Director of Atkins’ security business. Atkins, an international design,
engineering and project management consultancy, was heavily involved in the
design of the infrastructure for the Olympic Park and temporary venues for
London 2012.
Part 2 coming 16 July at 4pm (PST).
[1] Insert reference to the Experts’ Summit in Vienna in May 2013.
