Showing posts with label CPTED. Show all posts
Showing posts with label CPTED. Show all posts

Sunday, August 16, 2020

 The New Centurions

New Concepts for Policing


 

When I first started to outline this article, I was thinking about big bold steps to be taken in order to re-direct police services.  I got the idea from a tweet by Sen Harris, in which she said, “We need to demilitarize the police”.  Well, I couldn’t disagree more.  The reason police departments have military equipment is so that they can deal with the most serious violent crimes and criminals.  Police departments need armored vehicles and high caliber weapons, so that they can deal with gangs and organized criminal enterprises which are using those tactics, but they don’t need to bring them every time they engage the public (we’ll talk about that as a separate issue next time).  Those enterprises have no regard for human life, if they did they wouldn’t be kidnapping kids or young adults and forcing them into slavery, they wouldn’t be selling drugs to the most vulnerable within our society, just so they can make money.  So, to fight in this war the police have to have military style weaponry and they should be using them with efficiency and effectiveness.  You wouldn’t throw rocks at someone with a bazooka, so why would we expect the police to fight without the right tools.

But for the purpose of this article I’ll leave the strategic planning up to those responsible for administration of police departments whether at the local, State or federal level. 

Great interview about the changes needed in policing here:

https://twitter.com/FareedZakaria/status/1272231871896850434

Instead I want to concentrate on a more tactical or operational approach with simple solutions that will most probably be unpopular, especially with the rank and file, but I believe will go a long way in changing the culture within departments, assist in avoiding corruption or unwanted police behaviors and change the way the public views and interacts with the police.  The good news is, these ideas for change don’t need the rule of law.  They just need to be implemented as a new way of thinking and conducting business.  This will take real leadership; change is driven from the top.  While the need for change may be driven from the masses, change actually comes about because those in-charge decide to make the changes being requested. 

In ancient Rome, the Centurions were the professional officers of the Roman Army.  They commanded the troops, which sometimes meant that from time to time they enforced Roman law outside of the military legions they commanded.  Unfortunately in those times they also administered punishment by cutting or burning people’s hand off for stealing or other petty crimes or used a vine staff, with which they disciplined even Roman citizens who were protected from other forms of beatings by the Porcian and Valerian Laws (what punishments Roman citizen could be subjected to; they were not allowed to be humiliated or demeaned with degrading or shameful forms of punishment; such as, whipping, scourging or crucifixion.  Non-citizens and slaves had a different set of rules).  Hopefully, we’re way beyond that.  

At least, I like to think we are, but we can create new Centurions by:

First, stop appointing police chiefs based on political affiliation.  Currently, for the most part chiefs are either appointed by the city/county board, mayor or other elected officials or are elected themselves. Both methods are political.  Since laws are apolitical and should be enforced apolitically, so should the appointment of the police charged with enforcing those laws equally and justly.

Second, first and second-line supervisors should take a test that includes police administration, social – emotional, non-escalating skillsets, leadership skills, human rights and the protection of personal dignity training.  Allot more time needs to be spent of developing social skills needed in conflict resolution, at least at the same level that they spend on equipment usage techniques.

Thirdly, patrolman should be assigned “beats” randomly but with purpose and clarity.  The most troublesome neighborhoods should be assigned to those officers with the most experience.  There should always be a senior and a junior officer together whenever possible.  We should get rid of the notion of “Partners”, whereby, the same two people are assigned a specific sector each and every shift, so that they always work together.  Sure, there is an advantage to having “partners” as the patrolmen become familiar with each other and the neighborhoods they serve.  But conversely, they also become “too friendly” with each other or the residents, and worse, by becoming either complacent or tolerant of bad behaviors.   Additionally, the argument will be made that the patrolman needs to be able to trust his/her partner with their life.  That’s true, but if you can’t do that with everyone in the department, then there’s a problem.  The public also demands the same expectation. 

Over the years we got away from two man patrols due to budget cuts and other factors.  I think we should go back to them.  No more single patrols.  I’m not saying just to double everyone up by consolidating patrol zones.  No, this will only lead to longer response times.  Instead, I’m saying double force sizes by bringing on new officers.  Many will say, “We don’t have the money”.  To me that’s just another way of saying, I’m too lazy to do the hard work to figure out how this can be done.  So, I don’t buy the argument that it will be too costly.  Think about this, we just spent several trillion dollars on corporate and public welfare for COVID relief and didn’t bat an eye.  Not to mention the 10’s of trillions we’ve spent and are spending on the bank bailout of 2008.  It’s not about money, it’s about deciding.

Fourth, everyone in an administrative position, who is physically capable, should work “the road” once a week or a couple days a month – maybe a weekend or night shift.  Even those will mobility issues could have a role.  This gives fresh eyes and reminds everyone why they are there – to serve and protect.

And finally, move personnel around within departments, within organizations.  The military does this with regularity and at tremendous costs.  But the benefits far outweigh the costs.  Each move brings “new life”.  Getting a fresh set of eyes on things is invaluable.  It brings with it; fresh and innovative ideas, opportunities for personal growth, problem solving, and deters complacency and stagnation.  It also roots out those who have a history of misconduct.  New supervisors usually don’t tolerate bad behaviors that old supervisors allowed to go unaddressed. 

A recent study of police training revealed, that on average policeman in the US receive less than a thousand hours of training, whereas their European counterparts receive thousands of hours.  Most police chiefs in Europe are also lawyers or have law degrees, as do many mid-level supervisors.  I don’t believe this requirement exist within the US.  Maybe it should?  

Calls for defunding the police are just wrong.  Police departments need more resources not less.  That said, so do social programs that address the root causes of criminality and unwanted behaviors.  We need to add funding that teaches non-aggressive tactics and de-escalation techniques, social – emotional learning skills, and coping tools that deal with attitudes and behaviors.

I worked for ten years with the Carabinieri, the Italian National Police.  In those ten years I never once saw them man-handle anyone.  Sure they put people in handcuffs and took them to jail but I never witnessed any aggressive tactics on their behalf.  They always talked the guy into getting handcuffed. 

Great article about Carabinieri tactics, here:

https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/10/american-cops-could-learn-a-lesson-from-italys-carabinieri/

To illustrate my point, a few years ago, my son was travelling from Italy to the US.  He had been visiting his aunt and grandma.  At the airport in Rome, he placed his backpack on the conveyor belt at the x-ray machine.  After it was scanned, a Policeman approached him and asked my son to accompany him.  They went to a room, and the policeman pulled an apple, sandwich and serrated kitchen knife from his backpack.  The Policeman said, “Young man, we have one question, who packed your lunch your Mom or your Grandma?”  The Policeman knew, my son being in his thirties was old enough to know better than to bring a knife through the checkpoint.  He also knew that Moms being Moms in Italy meant, someone else had packed his lunch; Mom or Grandma had packed the knife so he could peel the apple, it was just logical. Clearly my son wasn’t a threat.  The Policeman kept the knife and my son boarded his plane.  I believe that had a similar incident occurred here in the States my son, would most probably have gotten arrested for possession of a deadly weapon, would subsequently have a criminal record, which could have an impact on his employment possibilities. 

We have a saying in the military that, “soldiers will be soldiers”.  In other words without supervision they will do stupid stuff.  Good behaviors AND bad behaviors are learned.  Shouldn’t we be doing everything we can to make sure good behaviors are nurtured, if so it’s about leadership?

Change comes from big and bold thinking.  Look at, putting a man on the moon.  Pretty big stuff there!  We didn’t know how we would do it but we decided we would.  Then it came down to many, and I mean many, small steps to get us there.  Well, if we are to truly reform the police, policing and the interactions they have with the public, we’ll need to take many small steps to get there.  NASA had many failures along the way, but eventually they figured it out.  I believe we can too, after all this is America – this is who we are.


Sunday, December 15, 2019


What Message Does Your Security Send – Fear or Trust?




In order to have proper physical security, mitigation strategist and those responsible must understand the types of aggressor groups, what motivates them and the tools they need in order to be successful.
  

Aggressors fall into four main categories: criminals (sophisticated/unsophisticated, organized/unorganized), protesters (organized/unorganized), terrorist (domestic/transnational/State sponsored) and subversives (intelligence agents [State/non-State sponsored]).


And, there are four main aggressor objectives; to inflict injury or death on people, to destroy or damage equipment, facilities or other resources, to steal equipment, material or information, and to create adverse publicity.


Tools on the other hand, don’t fall into any category and are virtually unlimited.


Unfortunately, the security industry has been approaching school security from the wrong angle.  We keep thinking, if one is good two must be better and we can harden our way to a perfect world.  We can’t.  School shootings and worse will continue, I’m sad to say, until we start eliminating the causes that promote this behavior. 


School systems have developed a variety of multi-disciplinary programs that address prevention and response to mental health issues if a student manifests behavior that might precipitate violence on a grand scale; i.e., bullying, addiction and interpersonal violence.  But this is still not enough.

Some security companies offer “social media behavioral monitoring” and are analyzing a person’s social media presence in “real time” and reporting actionable intelligence of patterns or suspicious behaviors to authorities, but this alone isn’t enough.  Using artificial intelligence, and deep learning are great but they’re just another tool.   And, just because a person manifests some type of anxiety or disruptive behavior it doesn’t necessarily mean they’ll act out and it doesn’t mean that that person will become a school shooter.


I believe we need to get to the cause of the angst.  Why does a “perfectly normal kid” decide to go to a school and shoot it up?  Does the “prison look” of many schools contribute to this phenomenon?  Is it possible, that the chain-linked fence surrounding the school yard, the metal detector that everyone passes through and the roaming armed guard all contribute in some way?  Now, just because that has become the “new normal” it doesn’t mean every kid will grow up and commit a criminal act, but there is no doubt that they will carry this angst with them into adulthood.


You don’t have to look very far to see examples of the “big dog” in your face approach and the subliminal message of something bad is expected to happen.  

We can address behavior in the built environment in a non-traditional way as a substitute to the confrontational in your face kind of way.  The approach must be more subtle, in fact, the more transparent it is the more effective it will be.  

Normally, to deter crime, we put up signs that say, “Cameras in Use” and some folks get creative saying, “Smile you’re on camera”.  For access control, we usually mark our territory by placing a chain-linked fence or some other type of “barrier” on our boundary-line.  It has a limited effect because a dedicated threat will bring the tools needed to circumvent it.  Build a big fence; they’ll bring a bigger ladder.  Make it even higher and they’ll bring an even bigger ladder or tunnel under it.  Sure, there is somewhat of a deterrent, but the reality is, a dedicated “bad actor” will bring the tools needed in order to be successful.   


In the early “90’s, Crime Prevention through Environmental Design was introduced to connect these two worlds – unwanted behavior and a physical deterrent.  Research shows that the concepts of natural surveillance, natural access control, territorial reinforcement and maintenance contribute to the deterrence and reduction of criminal activity.  CPTED is not the sole reason, but it helps. https://www.cptedtraining.net/


The basic concept of CPTED is if we can design the space so that it is almost always under observation “bad actors” won’t act bad.  I believe it needs to go further than that.  Not only do we need to design the space using these concepts, but we also must design the space so that “bad acting” can’t occur.  Additionally, in the off chance it does the built environment should help to reduce its effects and not contribute to its severity.  


A couple of years ago researchers in the European Union conducted a survey.  They asked elementary school kids who had emigrated from a country where there was war to draw what they considered safety or security to be.  The kids drew pictures of fencing with razor-wire and “gunships” overhead.  Then the researchers asked the same question to kids from Europe who had not be exposed to hostile environments and those kids drew houses with trees, stick families, a dog and sunshine.  Shouldn’t we be striving for the “sunshine” scenario?


The harder we make it for the “bad guy” to do things the more of a deterrent there is.  There is some truth to that but on the other hand, if security is a tax your people won’t pay it and they will figure out a way to circumvent it.  This in turn defeats its purpose.


Getting away from hardening schools after every incident by using “big dog” philosophies will take time, nonetheless, we can begin immediately.  I submit that beginning this school year, administrators should use the checklist provided by the Partner Alliance for School Safety (PASSK-12) www.PASSK12.org to conduct a physical security risk assessment of their campus and whenever possible replace traditional mitigation solutions they would normally opt for with a hardscaping, landscaping or art strategy.  Creativity and student, staff and community involvement are essential.


Success in security is sloppy.  It’s entangled.  It’s very hard to distinguish where detection, assessment, policy and procedures, response and engagement begin and end.  Addressing behavior must be coupled with addressing the physical environment.  They require a different amount of time, effort and commitment to produce positive results but nonetheless are equally important.  In order for students, and later as adults, to thrive we must create environments, internal and external, that address the need for “well-being” in both the social and physical ecosystems, and if we can do that in a more aesthetically pleasing way, then why not?

More about a softer approach to security: https://www.securityindustry.org/2018/04/05/the-puppy-movement/

My Book The Solutions Matrix: A Practical Approach to Security Engineering for Architects, Engineers, Facility Managers, Planners and Security Professionals is on sale at https://www.hainessecuritysolutions.com  

Haines Security Solutions is a contributor to the Security Industry Association’s education platform, “Center of Excellence” at https://www.securityindustry.org/center-of-excellence/

Sunday, October 20, 2019

Go Where there is No Path. But, I Can't, I'm Afraid of Snakes


A few months ago, my wife and I were shopping and came across this saying on a night shirt, “Go where there is no path”.  When I showed it to her, her reaction caught me a little off guard.  She said, “I can’t I’m afraid of snakes”. And, of course, being the person I am, I immediately translated that into a language I can understand – security-ish.  My first thought was, that explains why people don’t conduct risk analysis or even more importantly why they don’t even start the process.  They don’t tread into uncharted territory because there are snakes hiding in all that tall grass, so they stay where they’re comfortable – on the path.  Doing what is comfortable causes two problems.  

First, as Defense Secretary Don Rumsfeld, said, “We don’t know what we don’t know”, which translates into, we’re only protecting ourselves against what we can see, expect and believe is likely to occur.  Since, we don’t know what we don’t know, we’re not planning on dealing with its affects either.  This can be extremely more sinister because a lack of action could result in someone getting seriously injured or worse.  

Fortunately, there are methodologies out there that can get rid of the snakes.  I’m consulting on security matters with a local school district.  During our initial meeting, the District Superintendent, said, “Okay, where do we start? With an assessment to see where we are?”  Absolutely! 

Risk management is about managing risks.  In order to do that, you have to accept five factors:
1) You can’t prevent or deter everything
2) Protection from one threat may allow for some protection against another unrelated threat
3) Protection options must be in place before the event occurs
4) Risk Management must address the following pillars; detection, assessment, plans and procedures, response and engagement
5) Risk management and the assessment process is continual and is just part of what we do.

For ways to tame the snakes, read related articles here:



Sunday, September 15, 2019


How Preventing the Wrong Threat Will Cost You




My nephew used to work for an IT company.  Upon returning to work after Christmas holiday, they noticed that the rear windows of the building had been broken and all of the computer equipment had been stolen.  The owner of the company did what anyone would do.  He called a security consultant. 

The consultant recommended fixing the windows, adding motion sensors in the hallway and an access management system at the main entrance.  


When the company employees returned after the Easter weekend, they noticed the rear windows had been broken out – again, and all of the computer equipment had been stolen – again. 


Why did this occur?  The security company had misanalysed the Design Basis Threat or DBT.  

Everything of value has a threat that goes with it.  If it has value then someone wants it - either the owner or someone else.  It is also possible that a treat can be naturally occurring, like a earthquake or tornado. Usually, protection from these types of threats are governed by ordinances or laws; i.e., earthquake or tornado protection in construction standards.  For man-made threats, on the other hand, there really isn't any legislation that governs prevention or protection, so it's up to us to focus on man-made threats.  There are four general categories of aggressor types; 1) criminals (sophisticated/unsophisticated and organized/unorganized), 2) protestors (both organized/unorganized), 3) terrorist (domestic/trans-national/state-sponsored, and 4) subversives (saboteurs/foreign intelligence agents).  Each type of threat has an Modus Operandi or tactic and tool it uses to execute its objective.  If you make a list of what those may be you can actually design the space so that it provides protection to the things of value inside.  It is also important to understand the objective of man-made threats, too.  They fall into one or more of these categories; 1) inflict injury or death to people,2) destroy or damage property, equipment or resources, 3) steal equipment, material or information, or create adverse publicity. Understanding the motives, the tactics and tools they use will go a long way in prevention and protection.

The solution the security company had provided failed because, they didn't address the correct DBT; which was, breaking and entering and not unauthorized access.  Although, entering through the window is a form of unauthorized entry.  They had recommended the solutions they normally would suggest to deter or reduce the effects of theft, and focused on electronics, but they hadn’t addressed the DBT of the windows being breakable in the first place and didn’t add non-electronic solutions to the mix.  Had the windows been replaced with laminated glass they would not have been able to be broken and then the other countermeasures would have been effective.  Another solution would have been to prevent access to the parking lot behind the building.  I don't prefer this method because it would be more aggressive and unsightly to use a gate or fence with gate.  Just replacing the windows would not have changed the aesthetics of the space, so that is my preferred solution.

More about non-aggressive/aesthetically pleasing security measures can be found here: https://www.securityindustry.org/2018/04/05/the-puppy-movement/

Sunday, August 18, 2019


The Need to Push Down Silos





A few years ago, a friend of mine, trying to generate additional students for the classes I teach, asked his cousin who works for a very large architecture and engineering firm in the new World Trade Center in New York City, if they would be interested in attending training on integrating security technologies into building design.  His cousin answered something to the effect, “No, we leave that up to the client after we turn the building over to them”.  While his cousin’s answer is not surprising it is disappointing and confusing to me. 



Not surprising because I’ve heard that so many times before.  In essence, everyone stays in their silo and the connection between the disciplines usually only involves answering questions about the project and clarifying requirements; architects architect – engineers engineer – and security securities, if you will.



It’s confusing on two levels.  First, at the beginning of every project the architect gets the client’s desires list; i.e., the building should be blah, blah, blah. Right from the start the architects develop a mental picture of what the building should look like.  Next he or she begins to include all of the regulatory requirements or “best practices” for design.  Best practices are nothing more than this is how it’s normally done.  In New York City, for multi-story buildings in Manhattan the façade default material is glass in the Mid-West it is reinforced concrete or masonry units.  Meeting regulatory requirements deal with disability act, fire and safety codes, such as, hallway width, stairs, doors and windows, and elevator placement, etc. and depending on the region some weather related events.  And second, very seldom are man-made threats considered.  This contributes to the fact that man-made threats continue to occur despite large amounts of money being spent on security measures. I guess the argument could be made, that “well, we’re not required to consider them like we are for natural threats so we don’t need to; besides it will drive up costs”.  On the surface this makes sense but if you dig just under the surface your next thought should be, why don’t “best practices” apply?



The Department of Defense, and some other federal government agencies to a limited degree, requires that integration mitigation strategies be included in their building design review process regardless of where or what type of threat is involved.  In fact, it’s mandated that all threats, including man-made threats be addressed by a group of stakeholders at the onset of any new building construction project and for renovation projects that meet certain thresholds or “triggers”.   The stakeholder group determines the “design basis threat” to the building and its occupants and the level of protection required based on the number of people occupying the space.   These two factors ensure that the appropriate amount of money is spent on protection options and in the unlikely event a catastrophe does occur; injury and death will be kept to a minimum.



By bringing all stakeholders together from a variety of disciplines, everyone 1) has a chance to air their requirements and needs, 2) buys-in to the group’s decision on which threats will be addressed and support the “DBT” and the level of protection required, and costs are kept down.  Adding electronics in the form of surveillance or other technologies lies with the owner after the project is completed.  So in the short term, the cost of this equipment and its installation is currently absorbed by the owner/client and is not part of the building costs.  This “trick” helps keep the building design costs down but doesn’t adequately protect people or the facilities they use.  But more importantly, the real costs to the client come after the installation from the long term requirement for equipment maintenance and manpower. 



Since buildings are currently designed with everyone, remaining in their silos, with  limited exception, the process is treated as if it were a vertical process, when in reality it’s a horizontal one.  The “silo effect” and the isolation it causes make security an “add-on” and limits its efficiency and effectiveness.  

Sunday, June 16, 2019


Case Study: Unimpeded Access Allows Illegal Dumping

The issue was that people were driving up to the banks of a stream and dumping trash; i.e., tires, mattresses, rubbish, etc.  The city called a security consultant.  And as expected, he recommended adding a camera to the site so that “things” could be monitored.  The camera fed back to the superintendent’s desk.  Of course, when the supervisor wasn’t there (weekends, evening/late at night, attending meetings, lunch, naps, etc.), all the time when someone would dump trash the dumping occurred and continued.  The superintendent was scratching his head on what to do.  After all, he just spent several thousands of dollars on the latest technologies and they didn’t seem to work.
Our solution was not electronic.  Instead, we suggested that they build a raised berm/curb using natural landscaping (trees/boulders/bushes, even park benches) so that the vehicle couldn’t drive up to the water’s edge in the first place.  We suggested specific landscaping strategies due to low cost and ability to prevent vehicles from reaching the stream.   We imagined that since the culprits couldn’t physically access the stream embankment without using a vehicle they would be  less likely to want to carry heavy objects from the roadway, across a bicycle/walking path and then into the wood clearing to reach the stream.  Our second reason was to ensure the aesthetics of the area were kept intact.  Sure, we could have suggested a fence along the embankment to deny access and achieve the same effect, but who wants to walk along a fence with barbed wire when they’re taking the dog out or jogging or cycling.
Related articles: 

Sunday, May 19, 2019


Getting Everyone to Speak a Common Language




A couple weeks ago, I was teaching a class about using building design to deter criminal activity, including terrorist attack, and when it fails reduce its effects and prevent mass casualties.  After the obligatory introductions, I said something to the effect, that building design is a matter of reducing risk whenever and wherever possible.  But in order to do that you have to the know your “DBT”.

Based on the blank stares, I got back, I knew something was wrong.  So, I said it again.  Still the deer in the headlights looks.  So, I said, “Everyone knows what DBT stands for, right”?  Still nothing.  Not one person raised their hand.  I was taken aback.  After all the class was made up of seasoned architects, engineers, planners and security folks.  I would have thought, at least, one or two would have known what I was talking about.

So, we spent the new few minutes talking about Design Basis Threat or DBT, if you will.  DBT is identifying your threats, their tactics, the tools they may use and then designing your building to deter or prevent them from happening, in the first place, and understanding that if they do happen you can reduce their effects if you’ve included reduction strategies into the design.

The very first thing to do is to assemble “the planning team”.  The idea that “it takes a village” needs to be used here.  The team should include architects, engineers, facility manager, security, end users and others.  It’s important to bring these folks together, so that they can discuss the parameters of what they are trying to accomplish and “buy in” to the project.  If done correctly at the beginning of a project, security costs can be kept to a minimum, usually somewhere around five percent of the total project costs.  If security comes in at the end of the project this cost may skyrocket to thirty-forty percent, because of the long term cost of equipment maintenance and especially, personnel costs.

Once the team is assembled, the first step is to identify the threat or threats.  Threats can be divided into two categories; natural and man-made.  Fortunately, laws and ordinances exist that address natural threats in building design; i.e., earthquake, flooding, fire, tornado, etc.  Man-made threats on the other hand – not so much.  Although, that is changing slowly.  Last year, federal legislation was signed into law that addresses the use of hostile vehicles as a method of attack in public spaces.  We’re still waiting for the DHS report the law requires and its subsequent findings and recommendations.  I’m particularly concerned that our government hasn’t the courage to attack hostile shooter legislation, when it is so needed.  But that’s another Blog topic for another time.

The second step is to identify the motives of the man-made threat,; i.e., causing injury or death, theft or unlawful removal of property or equipment, damage to property or facilities and causing adverse publicity.  Then we need to figure out what type of groups commit these acts; criminals (sophisticated/non-sophisticated, organized/unorganized), protesters (organized/non-organized), terrorist (domestic/trans-national/state-sponsored) and subversives.  

Then we look at the tactics they use; stationary or moving vehicle, different types of weapon usage, forced entry, etc.  Each tactic uses a different set of tools. That said, each type of tool use has a countermeasure available to reduce its effectiveness.

If we understand their motives, tactics and tools, we can design countermeasures into inhabited space that reduces the possibility that they will occur and when that falls short reduces their effects. 

My book, The Solutions Matrix: A Practical Guide to Soft Security Engineering for Architects, Engineer, Planners and Security Professionals, will be available in September.  It will outline the processes used to determine DBT, have a quick reference chart that outlines how to counter each type of man-made threat and provide examples of practical real-world solutions.  

Sunday, December 23, 2018

How to Protect Yourslf Against Burglary or Housebreaking by Using Surveillance Systems and Safe-rooms






I was watching the news the other night and just like every night, they were showing criminals that had broken in to homes while the owners were away.  There was even footage of the family dog chasing the burglar away.  But one story caught my eye.  It was the story of a homeowner who had installed a doorbell system with a camera.  We’ve all seen the ad where the bad guy approaches the home and the owner say “Get off my lawn” or something to that effect.  Then the perps run away.  It was one of those types.

In this particular case, the homeowner was inside the house with her son.  When the would-be burglar approached the door she got an image of the burglar standing by her front door.  He knocked on the door and pulled a gun from his waist band.  The homeowner took her son and hid in a closet and called 911.

Can’t say I blame her.  After all this was more than a burglary this had all of the potential of being a kidnapping, sexual assault or worse.  I think she did the right thing in hiding.  That said, however, a closet offers very little protection from a dedicated intruder.  What she needed was a closet that had been converted into a safe-room.  A room that was impenetrable from the outside.  There are materials out there that can be used in new construction or retrofitted to an existing closet space for a few thousand dollars. It could even be a DIY project over a weekend.  Shouldn’t every home have one? 

But the real problem here is that the homeowner had bought the security system thinking that it would protect them.  I guess it did, sort of, because she was able to see the perps and take action.  The standard action is to tell the perps to go away.  She didn’t do that, so in essence she didn’t use the system the way it was designed to be used.  Fortunately, the perps weren’t able to force the door open and eventually gave up and left. 

There are two things to remember about having a home security system; 1) it must be used the way it was designed in order to be truly effective, and 2) unless, there is a police or guard force’s immediate response, it really only collects evidence.



More tips on what you can do so it doesn’t happen to you, here:  https://reader.mediawiremobile.com/NYREJ/issues/203922/viewer?page=57



A one-day class on safe-room and shelter design and construction will be conducted on 20 June 2019.  Sign-up by calling 805 509-8655 or sending an email to info@hainessecuritysolutions.com  

Sunday, July 15, 2018


Using Landscaping to Control Access




I want to tell you about two incidents that required a security solution and how the first attempt at providing an adequate solution failed miserably.

First case – illegal dumping

The issue was that people were driving up to the banks of a stream and dumping trash; i.e., tires, mattresses, rubbish, etc.  The first solution provided added a camera to the site so that “things” could be monitored.  The camera fed back to the superintendent’s desk.  Of course, when he wasn’t there (weekends, evening/late at night, attending meetings, lunch, naps) the dumping occurred and continued.  The superintendent was scratching his head on what to do.  After all, he just spent several thousands of dollars on the latest technologies and they didn’t seem to work.

Our solution was not electronic.  Instead, we suggested that they build a raised berm/curb using natural landscaping (trees/boulders/bushes, even park benches) so that the vehicle couldn’t drive up to the water’s edge in the first place.  We suggested landscaping due to the ability to prevent the vehicle from reaching the stream.  We imagined the culprits wouldn’t want to carry the heavy objects from the roadway, across a bicycle/walking path and then into the wood clearing to reach the stream.  Our second reason was to ensure the aesthetics of the area were kept intact.  Sure, we could have suggested a fence along the embankment to deny access and achieve the same effect, but who wants to walk along a fence with barbed wire when they’re taking the dog out or jogging or cycling.

Second case – unwanted access to school property

The issue in this case was that community members were cutting across school grounds in order to shorten the distance to retail shops located near the school campus.  The first security company suggested erecting a chain-link-fence with 3-strand barbed wire outrigger around the entire campus perimeter with a gate for buses and parents/administrators.  When not in use the gate would be kept locked.  The administrators weren’t buying it.  What if a student climbed the fence and was injured?  And where were they going to get the manpower to manage the gate? 

Our solution was to construct on three sides a wooden split-rail fence approximately 4 feet high (similar to those used in the Atlantic Piedmont region) and then to place flower beds in front of the fence and thorny shrubbery and trees behind it so that it would be difficult to cut through.  The front of the campus was left open.  We also suggested installing "speed cushions" to allow just buses to enter the "drive up/drop off" area.  And to have a separate loading/unloading zone for the parent's cars, that would be controlled by school staff.  These solutions provided the aesthetic qualities the administrators were looking for.  We also suggested changing procedures but I don't want to give too much away here.  Needless to say a comprehensive change was needed to address the concerns of the school.

These are just two examples of how not all security solutions need to be electronic.  Unfortunately, surveillance companies will tell you that CCTV is the solution to everything.  The reality is it isn’t.  In both cases we used “natural access control” (Crime Prevention through Environmental Design [CPTED]) as a fundamental principle in our approach to reducing crime.

Additional CPTED ideas and other principles on deterring crime and the effects of terrorist attack will be discuss during a 3-day workshop, Designing Secure Buildings: Integrating Security Technologies being held in New York City, 11-13 Sep 18.

Our ROI Toolkit is available.  The Toolkit will help you justify to your boss why you need to attend this training.

Contact us at info@hainesssecuritysolution.com or call +1 805 509-8655 to register.

Visit us at https://hainessecuritysolutions.com/Training to find out about other classes we offer or to host a workshop. 

Sunday, June 17, 2018


Prediction: An Active Shooter Event Will Occur at Your Child's School Unless Fundamental Security Changes are Made

One more active shooter incident, just a different town, different families but we’ve seen this show far too many times before.  I’m disgusted that everyone is blaming everyone else, the gun lobby oh it’s a mental health issue, the gun control tribe, oh we need gun control, everyone attacking the FBI and the mental health system.  The reality is WE, the collective We, failed.  No single agency or group or person or law is solely responsible.  Non-sensible gun control, non-sensible mental health laws, non-sensible law enforcement and non-sensible governing by public officials who haven’t display even the slightest bit of leadership.  Leaders stand up, admit their failures and take actions to correct course.  I know it’s only been a few days, so maybe just maybe someone will step up but based on previous track records, I kind of doubt it.

ELECTED OFFICIALS

If you’re an elected official, we’re calling you out.  There is nothing and I mean, NOTHING that is more important than protecting our kids, no … America’s kids.  If you think of them as someone else’s kids, then you’re sorely mistaken.  These are American’s kids, they belong to all of us.  It just so happens that they weren’t my blood relatives – at least, not this time. 

If you’re a public official you serve us – not your own or your party’s agenda – OUR agenda, and right now our agenda is – SAVE OUR KIDS! 

I had written a two-hundred-word rant but I think Emma Gonzalez said it much more eloquently that I.

This is not about anything other than will power.  We, after Presidential leadership, decided to put a man on the moon.  Not because we knew how but because that’s who we are.  We did it because of our willpower to do it. 

SAME OLD SOLUTIONS

I fear that in the aftermath of this tragic event those faced with finding solutions; i.e., security companies, elected officials, and school administrators will rush to add security guards and electronic security systems to their schools.  Unfortunately, these products will not solve the problem.  The school in Parkland had both.  Sadly, the guards will be somewhere else when the shooting starts or will become the first victim.  More cameras will only allow us to capture what happened, because there is no one monitoring and responding in “real time”.  Allowing teachers to carry guns, will not stop the carnage.  In fact, the idea of allowing “responsible” people to carry weapons, whether open or concealed, only puts more people at risk.  We could add fences and gates and metal detectors but all of those can and will be circumvented by a dedicated threat.  Besides, fences and gates and access control add to the issue of aggressiveness[1].  And, I certainly don’t advocate that we turn our schools into prison like compounds. It’s going to take a multi-layered approach.  We need to address the possession and use of guns, especially assault type weapons that are designed to kill as many people as possible in the shortest amount of time possible. Since they’re not for protecting a person and or his/her loved ones I don’t get why you need to have one.  I understand the argument that you have the right to protect yourself and your loved ones in your home, but do you really need an AR-15 to do that?  I’m not writing this to get in an argument over guns.  I’m writing this to voice my concern that if we don’t address the use of these type weapons in a logical way, we’re in for more trouble. 

Regrettably, someone will say, “Hey here’s how we fix this, so it doesn’t happen again”.  And then everyone will run after that solution for a while or until the next shooting happens.  Then we’ll figure out what “fell through the cracks”, plug that hole and wait for the next killings to occur.  Unless we have a comprehensive approach bringing a variety of disciplines to the table the “plug a hole” approach will cost lives.

Just like tackling the root causes of what happened in their totality so is the necessity to take a layered approach to implement security at the detection, assessment, command and control (school administration), response and engagement levels.  Without a holistic approach we will not have comprehensive solutions.

CRY FOR HELP – MENTAL HEALTH

I have to say, that while I detest what the Parkland shooter did, I also can see that this was a desperate cry for help.  The system failed this young man and now we have hundreds of victims to show for it.  So mental health professionals need to be consulted so they can express how they can have a greater impact on the actions of those who are troubled before they act out. Note: After the Isla Vista shooting in Santa Barbara a few years ago, the city formed a coalition of mental health professionals, police and others to respond to “welfare check” requests, instead of leaving it solely up to the police.

If we don’t address associated mental health issues and the laws surrounding when a physician can report his or her suspicions and concerns that a person may act out, then we’ll miss the boat again.  I think we all can agree, if a mental health professional says this person may resort to violence, then our first course of action should be to take away their ability to access firearms.  At least, until a risk assessment is done by a professional panel.

LAW ENFORCEMENT’S FAILURE

Now that the FBI is under scrutiny for its failure to follow up on what seems to be a credible tip, everyone wants to blame them.  In this instance, an investigation needs to be conducted (Director Wray has already announced a probe will be conducted) and if someone needs to be held accountable, at whatever level, then so be it.  But to place the blame solely on the FBI is wrong.  I have high confidence that the FBI will get to the bottom of what happened and correct it.

ARMING TEACHERS AND SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS

Many people will want to have officials pass legislation so that teachers and school administrators can carry weapons at school.  Bringing more wood to a burning building only makes the fire grow.  While on the surface, armed teacher/administrators may seem like a good idea but when you think it through it’s not.  These active shooter incidents most often start outside the classroom, somewhere on the periphery.  This means, that in order to be effective armed school officials would need to be outside of the classroom to engage and neutralize the threat.  Second, if everyone has a gun then what is the triggering mechanism for suspicious behavior or “See Something, Say Something”.  The tip that came in to the FBI was initiated because the behavior of the shooter was out of the ordinary.  If everyone is walking around with a loaded weapon, then how do we distinguish the good guys from the bad guys?  Besides, when the shooting starts who’s to say it won’t become the “wild west”?  I fear there would be many more casualties.  We’ve become accustomed to armed security officers or policeman because they’re uniformed, which identifies them as a good guy, and because they receive regular firearms safety training.  Yet accidents do happen.  I doubt teachers and administrators would receive the same degree of rigorous and routine situational training.

Curious note here: A Presidential Pool reporter was stopped this morning because he had a gun in his bag and was attempting to travel with the President.  If gun advocates think everyone should be allowed to “conceal carry” a weapon wherever they go, then why not let the reporter carry his legally registered firearm while accompanying the President to his golf game?  Just saying.

CHANGE IN ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN

Additionally, schools are not designed for protection, they’re designed for education.  Now, that said, some newer schools have been designed with security in mind but most of the effort has been on creating a perimeter that is impenetrable.  The reality is, what happens if a person gets past the perimeter[2], then what?  No places to hide that offer ballistic protection.  Especially in the newer facilities with open floor plans that foster the interaction of students.  The idea of stacking desks and chairs behind a door and expecting the dry-wall to offer protection from a high caliber bullet is just insane. 

We need a change in the way we design inhabited space, especially when the occupancy is higher than 20 people or so.  There should always be two possibilities for escape[3]. 

And we should be teaching to run at all costs; hiding and fighting is not an option.  Throw a chair through the window, kick or punch a hole in the wall (after all it’s just dry-wall) and get out no matter what, the only time a person should stay behind is if they don’t have time to escape.  With that in mind, we need to start creating ballistically protected spaces throughout that provide sanctuary and keep people safe when it’s too late for them to run.

There are off-the-shelf ballistic materials available that can be used to create safe-havens, in new construction or existing facilities and can be embedded in white boards, desks and chairs. 

THE COST OF CHANGE

Now, don’t get me wrong, I think space exploration and figuring out a way that’s economical to get to Mars is a great and necessary thing.  I’m using this as only one of many examples that I could use.  I’m just saying, if we can find the money to this, then why can’t we find the money and willpower to protect our schools.

The fiscal conservatives will say that it will drive the budget up.  So!  I can’t think of a better return on investment.

The cost to launch the Falcon Heavy was somewhere close to $90,000,000.  Not to mention the costs of the R&D that came before hand.  There’s not allot of information about how much money is has been allocated to this program so I’m going to make some guesses here.  Let’s say there were 10 launches (ground tests and orbital) at $50M each.  So that’s $500,000,000. 

So, let’s just say, that to make a space that’s approximately 100 square feet, that can accommodate a classroom full of students and teacher, we use the occupied floorspace guidance provided by DHS for saferooms/shelter (spaces where a person can seek shelter for up to two hours) costs, $20,000.  If, you divide half a billion by $20k that’s 25,000 classrooms that could be built or retrofitted.  And let’s say on average a classroom has 20 students then that’s roughly 500,000 students and teachers that would have been afforded protection in the same period.  Using the same formula and using just the latest launch cost of $90M, equates to protecting 90,000 lives. 

This doesn’t look like rocket science to me.

REAL CHANGE

For real change to occur two actions are required;

First, we need to stop thinking about this as a singular issue to resolve.  This is a multi-layered issue and can only be resolved with a multi-dimensional approach.  No topic or option, no matter how painful, needs to be off the table[4].  Folks need to check their emotions at the door and get to work.

And second, and much more importantly, we need to change our way of thinking.  We need to think that although it didn’t happen in my town or to my family it did happen to me personally – these are not someone else’s kids and teachers, they are OUR kids and teachers – they belong to America!

We claim to be the greatest nation in the history of the earth yet we sure aren’t acting like it.






[1] Security Update Opinion: Little empirical evidence #security measures can really stop school shootings ow.ly/kRah30irCS0
[2] Security guidelines for safer schools can be downloaded from the PASSK12 website http://passk12.org/
[3] “Active Shooter Threat:  Why Run-Hide-Fight is Wrong and Two Ways to Fix It” appeared in the 16 May 17 edition of the New York Real Estate Journal
[4] Toolkits on how to change the safety culture at your school are available here  https://www.safeandsoundschools.org/