Security - It Really is a T or F Question

I know many of you when you read the title thought, “Yep, security is a true or false question.  You’ve either got it or you don’t.  Well, purposefully I didn’t spell out what the T and F stood for. It isn’t true or false.

As many of you know, for some time now I’ve been advocating for a softer approach to security, especially when it comes to the design and layout of high-occupancy spaces.  And during my years of advocacy I’m come across some, who will agree, and others that play lip service and say, “Oh yea, that’s what we should do.”  And when they have their next opportunity to make the change they go back to their olds ways with the bigger, better, faster, stronger, in your face approach.

Recently, while collaborating with a local school district we took a softer approach.  After an active shooter threat (fortunately stopped prior to being carried out due to social media monitoring), parents wanted the District to heighten security by adding guards and cameras, and constructing fences on the perimeter.  They wanted this because that’s what they’ve been seeing on TV.  After every school shooting, there’s a rush to install more cameras, higher fences, and to hire more guards.  I don’t blame the parents; I blame the security companies who are selling their products with the idea that if one is good, two must be better – the more products sold the better for the bottom-line.  Some may argue that adding visible, in your face, deterrence works.  I’ll admit, there is some benefit; however, a dedicated threat will not be deterred – they will bring the tools necessary to circumvent whatever is in place. That said, we can argue until the cows come home about the benefits.  From my point of view, it’s not about effectiveness.  It’s about the psychological impact it has on our youth.  Recently, a local school board approved a bond for security upgrades.  The newspaper ran a picture of a ten foot metal fence gate to allow campus entry and mentioned that everyone would go through a metal detector.  I showed the article to a Latino friend of mine and he said, “They’re always looking at us like we’re all criminals.  The guys are in gangs and the girls are ‘ho’s.”  Is this the intended message?

Additionally, research shows us that “hardening” causes anxiety and even affects performance.  

https://network.aia.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=110227d5-dde4-9c0d-fa52-a23257148cca

Our approach is to add security features that are “hidden in plain sight”.  For example, instead of a fence to keep out trespasser we suggest a buried co-axial cable sensor system.  It provides a warning that someone has breached the perimeter, yet is unseen.  Another example, to keep unauthorized folks off of the roof we suggest placing large flower pots with bougainvillea near drainage pipes or next to other features that a person could climb to get to the roof.   Again, a solution that is unseen.

My article published in American Security Today magazine January 2020 https://view.joomag.com/2019-champions-edition-2019-champions-edition/0683429001578075665/p148?short

So which message do we want to send?  The message that we don’t trust you and we think there will be an incident or the message that we trust you, we expect you to act trustworthy and you can expect the same of others?

My book, The Solutions Matrix: a  Practical Guide to Soft Security Engineering for Architects, Engineers, Facility Managers, Planner and Security Professionals has a Quick Glance Checklist that will allow you to list your current security solutions and then list your ideas on how to take a softer approach.  Order your copy today via the CONTACT US link at https://hainessecuritysolutions.com

Go Where there is No Path. But, I Can't, I'm Afraid of Snakes

A few months ago, my wife and I were shopping and came across this saying on a night shirt, “Go where there is no path”.  When I showed it to her, her reaction caught me a little off guard.  She said, “I can’t I’m afraid of snakes”. And, of course, being the person I am, I immediately translated that into a language I can understand – security-ish.  My first thought was, that explains why people don’t conduct risk analysis or even more importantly why they don’t even start the process.  They don’t tread into uncharted territory because there are snakes hiding in all that tall grass, so they stay where they’re comfortable – on the path.  Doing what is comfortable causes two problems.  

First, as Defense Secretary Don Rumsfeld, said, “We don’t know what we don’t know”, which translates into, we’re only protecting ourselves against what we can see, expect and believe is likely to occur.  Since, we don’t know what we don’t know, we’re not planning on dealing with its affects either.  This can be extremely more sinister because a lack of action could result in someone getting seriously injured or worse.  

Fortunately, there are methodologies out there that can get rid of the snakes.  I’m consulting on security matters with a local school district.  During our initial meeting, the District Superintendent, said, “Okay, where do we start? With an assessment to see where we are?”  Absolutely! 

Risk management is about managing risks.  In order to do that, you have to accept five factors:

1) You can’t prevent or deter everything

2) Protection from one threat may allow for some protection against another unrelated threat

3) Protection options must be in place before the event occurs

4) Risk Management must address the following pillars; detection, assessment, plans and procedures, response and engagement

5) Risk management and the assessment process is continual and is just part of what we do.

For ways to tame the snakes, read related articles here:

https://view.joomag.com/march-2019-ast-magazine-march-2019-ast-magazine/0952115001553308799/p4?short https://view.joomag.com/july-2019-ast-magazine-ast-july-2019-magazine/0612002001563068627/p60?short

How Preventing the Wrong Threat Will Cost You

My nephew used to work for an IT company.  Upon returning to work after Christmas holiday, they noticed that the rear windows of the building had been broken and all of the computer equipment had been stolen.  The owner of the company did what anyone would do.  He called a security consultant. 

The consultant recommended fixing the windows, adding motion sensors in the hallway and an access management system at the main entrance.  


When the company employees returned after the Easter weekend, they noticed the rear windows had been broken out – again, and all of the computer equipment had been stolen – again. 


Why did this occur?  The security company had misanalysed the Design Basis Threat or DBT.  

Everything of value has a threat that goes with it.  If it has value then someone wants it - either the owner or someone else.  It is also possible that a treat can be naturally occurring, like a earthquake or tornado. Usually, protection from these types of threats are governed by ordinances or laws; i.e., earthquake or tornado protection in construction standards.  For man-made threats, on the other hand, there really isn't any legislation that governs prevention or protection, so it's up to us to focus on man-made threats.  There are four general categories of aggressor types; 1) criminals (sophisticated/unsophisticated and organized/unorganized), 2) protestors (both organized/unorganized), 3) terrorist (domestic/trans-national/state-sponsored, and 4) subversives (saboteurs/foreign intelligence agents).  Each type of threat has an Modus Operandi or tactic and tool it uses to execute its objective.  If you make a list of what those may be you can actually design the space so that it provides protection to the things of value inside.  It is also important to understand the objective of man-made threats, too.  They fall into one or more of these categories; 1) inflict injury or death to people,2) destroy or damage property, equipment or resources, 3) steal equipment, material or information, or create adverse publicity. Understanding the motives, the tactics and tools they use will go a long way in prevention and protection.

The solution the security company had provided failed because, they didn't address the correct DBT; which was, breaking and entering and not unauthorized access.  Although, entering through the window is a form of unauthorized entry.  They had recommended the solutions they normally would suggest to deter or reduce the effects of theft, and focused on electronics, but they hadn’t addressed the DBT of the windows being breakable in the first place and didn’t add non-electronic solutions to the mix.  Had the windows been replaced with laminated glass they would not have been able to be broken and then the other countermeasures would have been effective.  Another solution would have been to prevent access to the parking lot behind the building.  I don't prefer this method because it would be more aggressive and unsightly to use a gate or fence with gate.  Just replacing the windows would not have changed the aesthetics of the space, so that is my preferred solution.

More about non-aggressive/aesthetically pleasing security measures can be found here: https://www.securityindustry.org/2018/04/05/the-puppy-movement/

The Need to Push Down Silos

A few years ago, a friend of mine, trying to generate additional students for the classes I teach, asked his cousin who works for a very large architecture and engineering firm in the new World Trade Center in New York City, if they would be interested in attending training on integrating security technologies into building design.  His cousin answered something to the effect, “No, we leave that up to the client after we turn the building over to them”.  While his cousin’s answer is not surprising it is disappointing and confusing to me. 

Not surprising because I’ve heard that so many times before.  In essence, everyone stays in their silo and the connection between the disciplines usually only involves answering questions about the project and clarifying requirements; architects architect – engineers engineer – and security securities, if you will.

It’s confusing on two levels.  First, at the beginning of every project the architect gets the client’s desires list; i.e., the building should be blah, blah, blah. Right from the start the architects develop a mental picture of what the building should look like.  Next he or she begins to include all of the regulatory requirements or “best practices” for design.  Best practices are nothing more than this is how it’s normally done.  In New York City, for multi-story buildings in Manhattan the façade default material is glass in the Mid-West it is reinforced concrete or masonry units.  Meeting regulatory requirements deal with disability act, fire and safety codes, such as, hallway width, stairs, doors and windows, and elevator placement, etc. and depending on the region some weather related events.  And second, very seldom are man-made threats considered.  This contributes to the fact that man-made threats continue to occur despite large amounts of money being spent on security measures. I guess the argument could be made, that “well, we’re not required to consider them like we are for natural threats so we don’t need to; besides it will drive up costs”.  On the surface this makes sense but if you dig just under the surface your next thought should be, why don’t “best practices” apply?

The Department of Defense, and some other federal government agencies to a limited degree, requires that integration mitigation strategies be included in their building design review process regardless of where or what type of threat is involved.  In fact, it’s mandated that all threats, including man-made threats be addressed by a group of stakeholders at the onset of any new building construction project and for renovation projects that meet certain thresholds or “triggers”.   The stakeholder group determines the “design basis threat” to the building and its occupants and the level of protection required based on the number of people occupying the space.   These two factors ensure that the appropriate amount of money is spent on protection options and in the unlikely event a catastrophe does occur; injury and death will be kept to a minimum.

By bringing all stakeholders together from a variety of disciplines, everyone 1) has a chance to air their requirements and needs, 2) buys-in to the group’s decision on which threats will be addressed and support the “DBT” and the level of protection required, and costs are kept down.  Adding electronics in the form of surveillance or other technologies lies with the owner after the project is completed.  So in the short term, the cost of this equipment and its installation is currently absorbed by the owner/client and is not part of the building costs.  This “trick” helps keep the building design costs down but doesn’t adequately protect people or the facilities they use.  But more importantly, the real costs to the client come after the installation from the long term requirement for equipment maintenance and manpower. 

Since buildings are currently designed with everyone, remaining in their silos, with  limited exception, the process is treated as if it were a vertical process, when in reality it’s a horizontal one.  The “silo effect” and the isolation it causes make security an “add-on” and limits its efficiency and effectiveness.  

Getting Everyone to Speak a Common Language

A couple weeks ago, I was teaching a class about using building design to deter criminal activity, including terrorist attack, and when it fails reduce its effects and prevent mass casualties.  After the obligatory introductions, I said something to the effect, that building design is a matter of reducing risk whenever and wherever possible.  But in order to do that you have to the know your “DBT”.

Based on the blank stares, I got back, I knew something was wrong.  So, I said it again.  Still the deer in the headlights looks.  So, I said, “Everyone knows what DBT stands for, right”?  Still nothing.  Not one person raised their hand.  I was taken aback.  After all the class was made up of seasoned architects, engineers, planners and security folks.  I would have thought, at least, one or two would have known what I was talking about.

So, we spent the new few minutes talking about Design Basis Threat or DBT, if you will.  DBT is identifying your threats, their tactics, the tools they may use and then designing your building to deter or prevent them from happening, in the first place, and understanding that if they do happen you can reduce their effects if you’ve included reduction strategies into the design.

The very first thing to do is to assemble “the planning team”.  The idea that “it takes a village” needs to be used here.  The team should include architects, engineers, facility manager, security, end users and others.  It’s important to bring these folks together, so that they can discuss the parameters of what they are trying to accomplish and “buy in” to the project.  If done correctly at the beginning of a project, security costs can be kept to a minimum, usually somewhere around five percent of the total project costs.  If security comes in at the end of the project this cost may skyrocket to thirty-forty percent, because of the long term cost of equipment maintenance and especially, personnel costs.

Once the team is assembled, the first step is to identify the threat or threats.  Threats can be divided into two categories; natural and man-made.  Fortunately, laws and ordinances exist that address natural threats in building design; i.e., earthquake, flooding, fire, tornado, etc.  Man-made threats on the other hand – not so much.  Although, that is changing slowly.  Last year, federal legislation was signed into law that addresses the use of hostile vehicles as a method of attack in public spaces.  We’re still waiting for the DHS report the law requires and its subsequent findings and recommendations.  I’m particularly concerned that our government hasn’t the courage to attack hostile shooter legislation, when it is so needed.  But that’s another Blog topic for another time.

The second step is to identify the motives of the man-made threat,; i.e., causing injury or death, theft or unlawful removal of property or equipment, damage to property or facilities and causing adverse publicity.  Then we need to figure out what type of groups commit these acts; criminals (sophisticated/non-sophisticated, organized/unorganized), protesters (organized/non-organized), terrorist (domestic/trans-national/state-sponsored) and subversives.  

Then we look at the tactics they use; stationary or moving vehicle, different types of weapon usage, forced entry, etc.  Each tactic uses a different set of tools. That said, each type of tool use has a countermeasure available to reduce its effectiveness.

If we understand their motives, tactics and tools, we can design countermeasures into inhabited space that reduces the possibility that they will occur and when that falls short reduces their effects. 

My book, The Solutions Matrix: A Practical Guide to Soft Security Engineering for Architects, Engineer, Planners and Security Professionals, will be available in September.  It will outline the processes used to determine DBT, have a quick reference chart that outlines how to counter each type of man-made threat and provide examples of practical real-world solutions.  

YEP – IN SECURITY WE STILL NEED TO OCCUPY THE GROUND, WE CAN’T LEAVE IT ALL UP TO ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGIES 

Despite the advances in electronic security technologies one fact remains, we (“the good guys”)still need to occupy the ground.

As many of you know, I’m a former Air Force Security Policeman – a blue grunt, if you will.  So consequently am a little partial to “zoomies” when it comes to the defense of the country.  Our strike capabilities are so sophisticated that we really don’t need the other services (now, don’t get your knickers in a twist and let me explain).  We could just bomb the hell out of the bad guys until they surrender.  But bombing the hell out of them doesn’t do anything for us, because in the end we still have to occupy the ground.  And that’s why the Air Force is just not enough.

The same holds true in the security business.  Everyone is moving towards electronic technologies and the advances in predictive behavioral analyses and other artificial intelligence (AI) technologies is “mind blowing”.  

In the ‘80’s we posted guards, in the ‘90’s we put cameras because guards became expensive and since that time we’ve been using analytics to understand better what we are observing.  With the technologies that are currently “off the shelf” we can do allot more than we used to be able to do.  We can have one guard monitor several cameras and with analytics s/he uses can monitor even more as the software interprets what it’s seeing and notifies those responsible when something is amiss.

This is all well and good, but electronics can’t do it alone.  We still need to “occupy ground”.  By that I mean we need to design the built environment so that it complements the technology we use.   The use of non-electronic technologies will become even more important in the future, and especially in the urban environment.

The city of New York employs thousands of cameras around the city but they also deploy thousands of beat officers.  Both rely on each other to enhance the other‘s effectiveness.  If a patrolman sees something, she/he can have a colleague at the central station bring the field of view into focus and zoom in.  And by looking at adjourning screens or from different angles maybe get a clearer picture of what is happening.  Likewise, if the monitor sees something suspicious, he/she can dispatch a patrol to investigate further and cover those areas that the camera can’t see.

So with the utmost respect, we still need the grunts.

What the LA Ram Superbowl Game Plan Teaches Us about Home Security

What the LA Rams Superbowl Game Plan 

Teaches Us about Home Security

First, I have to admit I had hoped the Rams would win the Superbowl.  It would have made my blog sound allot better.  I could have boosted about how Sean’s crew had analyzed their adversaries and implemented the perfect countermeasures and protected the home front (after all they were the home team).

Then secondly, I admit I’m not a football buff and understand everything about the do’s and don’ts of the game.   But I can with confidence make some comparisons and analogies that I believe most of us can understand.

So, anyway, congratulations to the New England Patriots on their win.

The more I think about it the more I realized that the Rams loss actually teaches us more about sizing up the threats than I first thought.  It teaches us, that not only do we have to look at the attacking forces from our perspective but we also must consider how they see themselves and will adjust.

In security design, we call this the design basis threat or DBT.  In other words, what you’re trying to protect your asset (thing of value) from – whether it’s a natural threat; such as, wind, fire,  rain or a man-made threat; like, graffiti, burglary or theft of property.

The Rams coaching staff had to analyze what the Patriots were capable of (their modus operandi [MO] and then figure out how thwart it.  They also needed to formulate a plan that covered the entire field.  In essence, defense in depth – the front line, the linebackers, the safeties.  We’ve all heard, “The best defense is offense”.  How true.  Ask the Patriots.

Unless, you have a comprehensive plan for the protection of your home, the attacker, be it a burglar, tagger, etc. will circumvent your security by finding the weak spot and exploiting it.  Remember, just having a security camera or system is not enough.  You have to have security built in to every facet of your daily routine. 

For home security that starts with your on-line social media presence.  Don’t give too much information away.  I laugh when I think that someone couldn’t believe she was robbed while in Paris.  Like duh, if you brag about how expensive the stuff is that you have there’s a very strong likelihood that someone also sees the value and will try to take it from you.  There was a case this week in Los Angeles were a rapper was flashing a big wad of cash and posted it on social media.  Well, guess what, he got robbed. 

Next, are you doing other things that tip off those with bad intention?  Do you put boxes out on the curb the night before the trash truck comes by?  Do you put papers in the trash that someone could take out under the cover of darkness and open-up credit card accounts in your name?  When you got that big screen to watch the Superbowl on, did you mount it on the wall so that someone walking on the sidewalk in front of your house could see it through the window?

Your plan has to be comprehensive.  It covers not only what you do but also where you do it.  Start from the roadway and work your way inward, assessing what the bad guy is able to see.  Make sure all lights work and all gates, windows and doors lock.  We lock our car even when it’s parked in the garage and the door from the garage into the house.  These little things delay the perpetrators actions and may possibly give us enough time to call 911.

I few years ago, I posted that the best home security system is actually a plate of cookies.  I still believe that, if you take some freshly baked chocolate chip cookies to the neighbors.  They’ll thank you for them and inadvertently watch out for your stuff because now they think they owe you.  

Maybe if the Rams would have taken some cookies to the Patriot’s locker room before the game things would have turned out differently.

The Truth About Walls (Fencing)

A few years ago, I was asked by the editors of Security Middle East magazine[1] to write an article about perimeter security.  During the conversations with the editor that lead to the eventual article, she asked me to summarize what the article would be about.  I told her that in order to understand perimeter security you first needed to accept the fact that if you have a ten-foot fence the bad guy will bring an eleven-foot ladder. 

The idea that you can build a fence or wall and keep the bad guys out faded out sometime after the medieval ages when new technologies and new ways of conducting warfare came about.  Well, the same holds true today.

If you look up on Google the difference between a wall and a fence you’ll get the following explanation: “A fence is usually a wooden or metal structure that encloses a yard, pasture or other area…The difference between a fence and a wall is that you can almost always see through a fence, at least to some degree, while a wall is solid”.

If you look up fence purposes, you’ll get the following explanation; “A fence is a structure that encloses an area, typically outdoors, and is usually constructed from posts that are connected by boards, wire, rails or netting.  Alternatives to fencing include a ditch (sometimes filled with water, forming a moat)”.

Both definitions suggest that a boundary is formed between property that is not controlled and property that is controlled. 

Whether using a wall or fence, the purpose is to delineate a boundary; usually at a property boundary.  This is the true meaning of fencing or "walling", if you will.  To delineate property boundaries, in other words, you’re over there and I don’t care what you do but it you come over here you need to go down to the access point so I can check you out.  With that in mind, you could paint a line on the ground and put up a sign that says, “stay out or go over there for access”.  Both would achieve the same effect as a wall of fence.  So, why not just paint a line.  Because the value in constructing a fence or wall, is 1) to identify the boundaries of the controlled space, 2) to cause a delay in unauthorized access, and 3) to identify unwanted behavior.  An authorized person will not climb over a fence or wall, tunnel under it or cut through it.  An unauthorized person will, especially if they have nefarious intentions.  So, with that in mind, the fence serves an early warning system.  It tells us when someone breaches it that they have  “bad intentions”.  If they didn’t, they would not breach the fence/wall and would proceed to an access control point to display the proper credentials to gain entry.  Hopefully, the fence will be constructed in such a way as to delay their unauthorized access.  Sadly, even without tools a eight foot chain link fence with three strand barbed wire outrigger can be scaled or climbed over in about four seconds.  With tools, like a ladder or a truck to stand on it takes even less time.

Which brings us to the next truth, unless there is a guard or technology monitoring the fence-line in real time, we have no way of knowing if the boundary has been breached.  We must monitor for unauthorized access, respond to it, and engage the aggressor in real time.  The operative word here is “real time”.  If we don’t what’s the use?

Another thing to remember, no matter how solid, sturdy, high or how many bells and whistles are added, there will always be a way to circumvent whatever is put in place.  The key is, making sure there is enough time to delay the “bad guy or gal” so that his or her behavior can be identified and the “good guys/gals” have time to respond and engage.

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[1] Security Middle East magazine article More Power to the Perimeter link https://issuu.com/securitymiddleeastmagazine/docs/sme_july-_aug_2015_web?e=0/14330179

How to Protect Yourslf Against Burglary or Housebreaking by Using Surveillance Systems and Safe-rooms

I was watching the news the other night and just like every night, they were showing criminals that had broken in to homes while the owners were away.  There was even footage of the family dog chasing the burglar away.  But one story caught my eye.  It was the story of a homeowner who had installed a doorbell system with a camera.  We’ve all seen the ad where the bad guy approaches the home and the owner say “Get off my lawn” or something to that effect.  Then the perps run away.  It was one of those types.

In this particular case, the homeowner was inside the house with her son.  When the would-be burglar approached the door she got an image of the burglar standing by her front door.  He knocked on the door and pulled a gun from his waist band.  The homeowner took her son and hid in a closet and called 911.

Can’t say I blame her.  After all this was more than a burglary this had all of the potential of being a kidnapping, sexual assault or worse.  I think she did the right thing in hiding.  That said, however, a closet offers very little protection from a dedicated intruder.  What she needed was a closet that had been converted into a safe-room.  A room that was impenetrable from the outside.  There are materials out there that can be used in new construction or retrofitted to an existing closet space for a few thousand dollars. It could even be a DIY project over a weekend.  Shouldn’t every home have one? 

But the real problem here is that the homeowner had bought the security system thinking that it would protect them.  I guess it did, sort of, because she was able to see the perps and take action.  The standard action is to tell the perps to go away.  She didn’t do that, so in essence she didn’t use the system the way it was designed to be used.  Fortunately, the perps weren’t able to force the door open and eventually gave up and left. 

There are two things to remember about having a home security system; 1) it must be used the way it was designed in order to be truly effective, and 2) unless, there is a police or guard force’s immediate response, it really only collects evidence.

More about turning a closet into a safe-room, here:  https://drive.google.com/a/amuletbb.com/file/d/0B_EElZXso5ZmdUVZYVlXNFRscEU/view?usp=drive_web

More about how thieves target homes, here: https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:6466683287757733888/

More tips on what you can do so it doesn’t happen to you, here:  https://reader.mediawiremobile.com/NYREJ/issues/203922/viewer?page=57

A one-day class on safe-room and shelter design and construction will be conducted on 20 June 2019.  Sign-up by calling 805 509-8655 or sending an email to info@hainessecuritysolutions.com  

Architects Meet Security Halfway

Architects Meet Security Halfway

What Should They Do to Go All the Way? 

The normal process for building or inhabited space design goes something like this:  the client goes to the architect and describes his/her vision.  The architect interprets that vision using their creative juices.  That’s a good thing! Once the client approves the vision then project is handed over to an engineering firm to “build the guts”. Once the infrastructure is done and the project is finalized.  The client accepts the project.  At that point, it’s up to the client to coordinate the security features of the designed environment.

Sometimes, this process works.  But more often than not, it doesn’t for a very simple reason.  Everyone sees the project differently.  The first questions the architect asks the client is how many people, what type of space (open/shared/closed offices, how many floors, etc.?  During that conversation there should be questions asked that regard the Design Basis Threat; i.e, what types of threats are we trying to protect against? This particularly the case when it comes to man-made threats; such as, active shooter, hostile vehicle, insider threats.  Natural threats to buildings and people are usually governed by ordinances or codes; fire, earthquake, high winds, etc.  Man-made threats on the other hand are not usually governed by ordinance.

That said, when understanding man-made threats it is important to identify several keys elements of the threat:

1) Types of aggressors threats (covert or overt, group or individual, organized or not)

2) Aggressor motivations or objectives (inflict injury or death, damage or destroy property, steal equipment or materials, and create adverse publicity)

3) Aggressor tactics (both the modus operandi and the tools needed to be successful)

Unfortunately, these elements are usually left up to the security consultant towards the end of the project.  If they were considered during the initial 15% phase or 35% phase of the project, it could easily accommodate countermeasures that mitigate these identified threats purely by designing the space to do just that while still maintaining functionality and aesthetics.

The Department of Defense, Department of State and Veteran’s Administration mandate that a security representative be part of the design team from the very beginning.  The civilian world should follow suit, instead of the current halfway method.

Other trends in the built environment are discussed here:

Security Industry Association Technology Insight, Spring edition

https://www.securityindustry.org/2018/04/05/the-puppy-movement/

Security Industry Association Technology Insight, Fall edition

https://www.securityindustry.org/2018/09/14/creating-invisible-security-to-prevent-vehicular-attacks/ 

The 310 Year Gamble

The Federal Government’s 310 Year Gamble on Your Child’s School Safety

In the days following the Parkland High School shooting, my emotions were out of control; first, because of the lack of “adult” leadership by the Federal government officials and secondly, because when called out by the high school’s young adults they (politicians) attacked the teens.  Whenever asked about how they intended to keep another active shooter event from happening they hid behind thinly veiled comments about how it was someone else’s responsibility to address the causes and fix them.

Let’s be realistic, it’s about guns, it’s about mental help, it’s about a person’s desire for fame, it’s about lack of protection, it’s about lack of designed evacuation routes and the list goes on…  Some causes can be fixed in the short term and others, like mental health issues will take many years to devise systems that are effective in identifying “at risk behaviors” and getting the person the proper treatment.  We also need to address the way schools are designed not only should they be great environments for learning by they must also be safe.  One example is there should always be two ways to egress a space in an emergency.  Currently, many times there is only one and if there are two, they lead into the same hallway.

So, in the meantime, if students and faculty are going to be taught to “hide” in the back of the classroom then the space must provide ballistic protection.  If it doesn’t, the AR-15 bullet will travel through the hallway locker, drywall or classroom furniture.  I thought, if we don’t have specific ballistic protection in place couldn’t we design a system similar to have hotels create additional space by mobile walls.  I reached out to my friends at Amulet Ballistic Technologies and come up with a design for retrofitting existing classrooms or new construction.

In 2018, the Federal government allocated $100 million for security upgrades to schools.  The deadline for application to receive some of that money was 31 July 2018.  If your school district didn’t apply, it for sure won’t get any of the money, so you’ll have to wait until next year.  Fortunately, many State legislatures have been setting aside funding and the process seems to be continuous.

Another unfortunately circumstance when it comes to funding is that most of the money will go to hiring school resource officers (RSO) from the local sheriff or police department.  Placing an armed guard is not in of itself sufficient.  While it will help deter possibly, the truth is if a RSO is present he/she will become the first victim and/or will not be where the shooting starts when it starts.  Another key security feature will be electronic surveillance and access control.  Both are useful and effective but have their limits as well.  Cameras must be monitored in “real-time” AND a response must be immediate.  Access control is only effective if it doesn’t become a burden to day-to-day operations.  If it becomes “taxing” people will figure out how to get around it.  

Now, back to $100 million per year for the next 10 years ($1Billion total).  There are an estimated 50.2 – 58 million students in America’s schools.  The average class size in the US is somewhere between 17 and 26, so let’s just say 20-22 students.  If we divide the average size class occupancy into the lower number of total students that tells us we have about 2.5 million classrooms (give or take).  Now, if the average cost of constructing or retrofitting one classroom with ballistic protection is $15,000 (I suspect that once we get going the costs will be lower and more likely to be about $10-12k for a classroom of 20 using the Department of Homeland Security recommended square footage for safe-haven/shelter space occupancy.) then it will take $3,750,000,000,000 to retrofit all existing classrooms.  At one billion every ten years that will be 375[1] years to protect every classroom in the US.

Let me put that into context.  Most people think that during the 2008 financial crisis[2], the treasury department used $700M to save the banks.  This is not true.  The Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in their summary report says that the total commitment of the government is $16.8 trillion with about $4.6 trillion already paid out.

According to a team at Bloomberg News, at one point last year the U.S. had lent, spent or guaranteed as much as $12.8 trillion to rescue the economy.[3]

In either case, more than enough to protect America’s kids in less than 10 years instead of over 300. 

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[1] I rounded down to 310 years just in case my numbers are off a little, at any rate you get the idea.

[2] https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikecollins/2015/07/14/the-big-bank-bailout/#1c0b5b752d83

[3] http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-know/economy/the-true-cost-of-the-bank-bailout/3309/

Parents and School Administrators are Buying
Security Equipment That Won’t 

Protect Children – Why?

Salesmanship and fear are the two main reasons.  Fear because active shooter events are more commonplace than a few years ago.  The recent discovery in New Mexico of abducted children being trained to carry out armed attacks at schools is frightening.  Since the federal government won’t address some of the underlying issues of gun violence by creating sensible legislation maybe they can concentrate instead on finding the horrifying number of missing kids that occur every year in America[1].  Just saying.

In the meantime, parents and school administrator know that something has to be done and have taken matters into their own hands.  

I applaud many States and school districts that have taken steps for comprehensive security improvements.  Unfortunately, there are an equal number of school districts that have only made superficial changes that really don’t offer protection from the active shooter threat or errant vehicle threats.  

Right after the February 14^th event in Parkland, everyone wanted to put more resource officers on campuses, more cameras and more access control.  While on the surface these may be good ideas, just getting more is not enough.  There must be processes in place that make them effective.  For example, if a school increases the number of CCTV cameras, then who monitors them in real time becomes essential.  Unless monitored in real-time, they only have evidentiary value.  The real value of CCTV is that it allows investigators to go back in time and figure out what happened.  We don’t need after-the-fact protection. 

Students and staff need to rely on protection that will actually protect them[2].

Bulletproof - C'mon really?

I saw a news report a couple days ago about a company offering “bullet proof” backpacks.  My antennae went up – way up.  There is no such thing as “bullet proof”!  The correct term is “ballistic resistant” or “bullet resistant”.  It may stop some types of bullets but it won’t stop all.  Therefore it is bullet resistant and not bullet proof.  Shady salesmen will play on your fear and lack of knowledge in knowing the difference.  Anyway, the news reporter had a marksman fire two types of handguns, which the backpack manufacturer said would be stopped, and they were, but when rounds from an AR15 (the most common type of weapon used in school mass shootings) were fired and the rounds went straight through the backpack and into the dirt berm behind.  The reporter asked why, and a guy whom I believe to be a company spokesman, said something to the effect, “well, it was shot at without books and binders being inside. That would change everything”.  To suggest that books and binders offer ballistic protection is just ludicrous.  Backpack manufacturers if I’m wrong AND you have the data to prove it!  Then do so and I will publically admit I was wrong.  

I’m amazed that Walmart and Costco are selling these backpacks for upwards of $100 and apparently do not make this distinction.  

Even if the backpack will stop a .9mm or .45mm, a person would have to be wearing it and be shot from the back.

Use Whatever You Can  

Police Departments and some companies have made a very profitable business out of teaching Run-Hide-Fight.  A defense strategy that teaches: run if you can, hide if you can’t and fight if you have to.  At first, this concept makes sense but the reality is the instructions being given during the R-H-F training actually teaches people to hide and use whatever they can for protection, or in worse case scenarios, use whatever they can to fight.  With this in mind, the idea that a student could hold a backpack in front of them and hide behind it, to me seems a little unreasonable.  I have a hard time imagining a ten year old reducing herself down to the size of a book-bag.  

Instead we should be teaching, to get out - Run-Run-Run - no matter what. Throw a chair through the window, punch thru the dry-wall - but do something that allows you to escape.  The idea of waiting for the "cavalry" to arrive and save the day is just crazy.  We could start designing all occupied spaces with, at least, two avenues of escape.  

This will take a considerable amount of time because first, we have to change our mindset about how we think about high occupancy spaces and how to design them to our advantage, and second, we have to actually implement these concepts into retrofitting classrooms or building new ones.

Don't D-I-Y This

A couple weeks ago, I was sitting next to a second grade teacher on a flight to Houston.  Of course, the conversation got around to school safety.  She said, “I don’t think about it.  I mean, I know what the security measures are for sheltering-in-place and fire drills and such but I really don’t give it much thought, and especially the “big stuff”.  I assumed she meant events like active shooters or terrorist attacks.  She’s right – she shouldn’t be worrying about security.  She should concentrate on teaching.  Educators should not try to D-I-Y this.  Instead, they should contact security professionals that are agnostic to products and are concerned solely with providing effective security solutions.  

That way, educators will get honest protection options that address issues on multiple levels and not just be sold more products.

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[1] National Center for Missing & Exploited Children   http://www.missingkids.com/KeyFacts

[2] One More Town – One More Family – One More Angel – One More Funeral February 22^nd 2018 on-line edition of American Security Today.  https://americansecuritytoday.com/one-town-one-family-one-angel-one-funeral/