4 Spring Cleaning Tips for Keeping Criminals from Acting Criminal

I’m sitting here in my office writing this Blog post, while wearing a surgical mask.  My wife says, “I don’t have to wear it because I’m not out in public”.  I answered, “Well, I’ve heard my computer can get a virus, and I don’t want it to come from me, lady”. Touché


Like every good spring cleaning job, you have to set some goals.  My wife’s  - windows.  Mine - not falling off the ladder.


When it comes to security spring cleaning though, our first goal needs to be keeping criminals from acting criminal around my property.  Here are 4 tips:


Understanding that your property has a number of layers that you can use to you advantage is essential.  Those layers, if you have them are: property line, internal fence-line (if present), building facade and special spaces within the house.  For instance, I don’t have a fence in the front of my house but I do on the sides and back of the property, so my property line and fence-line are one in the same.  So for that reason, I look at every layer I do have and determine if I can deter, delay, detect and defend against a would-be aggressor breaking in and stealing my stuff.


Deterrence is kind of hard to define.  Mainly, because if the deterrent is perceived to be too tough, then it will get circumvented by those who are actually authorized, and then what’s the purpose of having it in the first place.  Besides, a dedicated threat will not be deterred.  He/she will bring the tools necessary to defeat whatever the deterrence is designed to do. Now, don’t get me wrong I’m not a defeatist.  I do believe you have to do whatever it is you can and evaluate what you’ve done honestly.  If there is still pain, do it some more.


Secondly, my goal is to slow a person down if they have ill-intent enough so that I can detect them.  So instead of a straight sidewalk up to my door, I have a sidewalk that meanders or crosses my front lawn, so while standing inside my living room or office I can see them as they approach.  If someone doesn’t follow the path of the sidewalk and traipses across my lawn then that is an indicator to me that something’s not quite right.  Now, it could be that the person is just lazy or too tired or it could mean something far worse.


Next remove all possibilities of hiding.  So bushes and shrubs that are within 10 feet of windows and doors should be removed.  If you simply must have them for aesthetic purposes, then they should be located away from the building so that as a person approaches they can see around them.  Bushes should be trimmed to a height of three/four feet above ground level and trees down to seven/eight.  Anything higher or lower causes opportunities.


And finally, check windows and doors, to make sure they close properly.  And, while cleaning the windows and gutters, check the outside lights, especially those on a sensor.   

Another thing, stand at your property line at dusk and see if someone can see inside your house while the lights are on and can see that you’re at home.  If they can, then even if you leave lights on to give the appearance that someone’s home they can see that you’re not.  We draw our curtains at dusk so that you can’t see through.


When I said, defend above I didn’t mean confront the bad guy and whip out a gun.  Trust me your stuff is not worth someone’s life.  On the other hand, if they are physically harming or threating harm to my family I can guarantee you that they’d wish that I only had a gun. 


Send me an email and I’ll send you a 28 question checklist you can follow.  FREE.

I Became a Meth Head, Won an Award and Am Now Recruiting Others

“Mom, tell him to stop”, I would hear that all the time from my son as he would tell his Mom I was obsessing over work.  I don’t hear that nearly as often now-a-days, not because I’ve stopped but because he doesn’t live with us anymore.  He’s in New York and we’re in California.  The other evening, while I was drying dishes, my wife said to me.  “You know you’re obsessed.  It’s like a drug for you”.  Perplexed, I said, “What do you mean?”  

“I’m telling you that the cat used the litter box and you’re telling me about bollards in Las Vegas”. 

OMG, she was right!  I can’t get it out of my system.  My every thought is about physical security design – both good and bad.  I’m always analyzing and comparing and thinking; does that work, is it effective, could they have done it cheaper or better?  My mind is on overdrive,  I had become a METHodology addict. 

My addiction was simple - use a proven assessment method to look at criticality, threats, vulnerabilities and subsequent risks of high occupancy buildings and their supporting energy systems.  I guess, that’s why I’m so fond of the Asset Based Risk Analysis (ABRA) and Critical Asset and Infrastructure Risk Analysis (CAIRA) methodologies (both Platinum Award winners; ABRA a GOVIE in 2017 and CAIRA an ASTOR in 2018).  Not because they won awards after having been recognized by teams of experts but because they take allot of the thinking out of the analysis process.  It’s pretty basic math and not allot of calculating.  It’s all already done with macros.  But, the final result answers the questions cited before, will the implemented security measure be truly effective in reducing risk, is there an alternative that can be just as effective and will it bring costs down to a reasonable price.

ABRA ARTICLE https://view.joomag.com/march-2019-ast-magazine-march-2019-ast-magazine/0952115001553308799/p4?short

CAIRA ARTICLE https://view.joomag.com/july-2019-ast-magazine-ast-july-2019-magazine/0612002001563068627/p60?short

Over the years, I’ve noticed that the best thing when it comes to thinking is not to start.  Once you get a thought, it seems to get out of control rather quickly.  “Kind of hard to put the genie back in the bottle”, as they say.  The thoughts just keep coming, no matter what I try to do.  So sorry, Honey, I can't turn it off.  

P.S.  I cleaned the litter box.

Security - It Really is a T or F Question

I know many of you when you read the title thought, “Yep, security is a true or false question.  You’ve either got it or you don’t.  Well, purposefully I didn’t spell out what the T and F stood for. It isn’t true or false.

As many of you know, for some time now I’ve been advocating for a softer approach to security, especially when it comes to the design and layout of high-occupancy spaces.  And during my years of advocacy I’m come across some, who will agree, and others that play lip service and say, “Oh yea, that’s what we should do.”  And when they have their next opportunity to make the change they go back to their olds ways with the bigger, better, faster, stronger, in your face approach.

Recently, while collaborating with a local school district we took a softer approach.  After an active shooter threat (fortunately stopped prior to being carried out due to social media monitoring), parents wanted the District to heighten security by adding guards and cameras, and constructing fences on the perimeter.  They wanted this because that’s what they’ve been seeing on TV.  After every school shooting, there’s a rush to install more cameras, higher fences, and to hire more guards.  I don’t blame the parents; I blame the security companies who are selling their products with the idea that if one is good, two must be better – the more products sold the better for the bottom-line.  Some may argue that adding visible, in your face, deterrence works.  I’ll admit, there is some benefit; however, a dedicated threat will not be deterred – they will bring the tools necessary to circumvent whatever is in place. That said, we can argue until the cows come home about the benefits.  From my point of view, it’s not about effectiveness.  It’s about the psychological impact it has on our youth.  Recently, a local school board approved a bond for security upgrades.  The newspaper ran a picture of a ten foot metal fence gate to allow campus entry and mentioned that everyone would go through a metal detector.  I showed the article to a Latino friend of mine and he said, “They’re always looking at us like we’re all criminals.  The guys are in gangs and the girls are ‘ho’s.”  Is this the intended message?

Additionally, research shows us that “hardening” causes anxiety and even affects performance.  

https://network.aia.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=110227d5-dde4-9c0d-fa52-a23257148cca

Our approach is to add security features that are “hidden in plain sight”.  For example, instead of a fence to keep out trespasser we suggest a buried co-axial cable sensor system.  It provides a warning that someone has breached the perimeter, yet is unseen.  Another example, to keep unauthorized folks off of the roof we suggest placing large flower pots with bougainvillea near drainage pipes or next to other features that a person could climb to get to the roof.   Again, a solution that is unseen.

My article published in American Security Today magazine January 2020 https://view.joomag.com/2019-champions-edition-2019-champions-edition/0683429001578075665/p148?short

So which message do we want to send?  The message that we don’t trust you and we think there will be an incident or the message that we trust you, we expect you to act trustworthy and you can expect the same of others?

My book, The Solutions Matrix: a  Practical Guide to Soft Security Engineering for Architects, Engineers, Facility Managers, Planner and Security Professionals has a Quick Glance Checklist that will allow you to list your current security solutions and then list your ideas on how to take a softer approach.  Order your copy today via the CONTACT US link at https://hainessecuritysolutions.com

Known knowns and unknown unknowns

"There are known knowns" is a phrase from a response United States Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld gave to a question at a U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) news briefing on February 12, 2002 about the lack of evidence linking the government of Iraq with the supply of weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups[1]



This quote tells us something about risk management.  Basically there are threats we know about and there are threats we don’t know about and there are threats that we don’t know we don’t know about.



From a risk management standpoint, that’s pretty disconcerting. 



In order to understand the unknowns you have to look at things from the “bad guys” perspective.  In other words, see what the "bad guy" sees.  And to do that you must understand that there are four aggressor types of criminal/man-made threat groups; criminal (sophisticated/unsophisticated, organized/unorganized), protestors (organized/unorganized), terrorist (domestic/transnational/state-sponsored), subversives (saboteurs/intelligence agents [state/non-state sponsored]).  In an effort to design better mitigation strategies planners must understand the “bad guys” motives or the reason(s) behind why they do what they do.  There are also four primary aggressor objectives; inflict injury or death to people, destroy or damage facilities, property, equipment or resources, steal equipment, material or information and create adverse publicity.



So how can I plan to reduce their effects let alone mitigate them?  The answer is really easier than you think.   Traditionally in risk management, we look at things from a probability standpoint.  We ask the question. “Will it happen here, and if so, what will the impact be”?  I believe, likelihood has little influence on risk.  I believe likelihood comes into play when talking about funding.  Our risk management methodologies assume the threat will be successful 100 percent of the time.  We calculate likelihood when it comes to cost benefit.



Our Asset Based Risk Analysis (ABRA) and Critical Asset and Infrastructure Risk Analysis (CAIRA) methodologies combine the aggressors motives and objectives with what the asset owner sees; thereby, giving a complete picture of risk.  



More about ABRA (Platinum GOVIES Award 2017 for Best Government Security Risk Methodology) https://view.joomag.com/march-2019-ast-magazine-march-2019-ast-magazine/0952115001553308799/p4?short



More about CAIRA (Platinum 2018 ASTOR Award for Best Risk Analysis Methodology in Homeland Security) https://view.joomag.com/july-2019-ast-magazine-ast-july-2019-magazine/0612002001563068627/p60?short



More about risk management and developing mitigation strategies can be found in my new book, The solutions Matrix: A Practical Guide to Soft Security Engineering for Architects, Engineers, Facility Managers, Planners and Security Professionals.  Order here  https://americansecuritytoday.com/dont-surrender-to-fear-new-book-the-solutions-matrix-by-doug-haines/

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[1] Full quote: Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we don't know we don't know. And if one looks throughout the history of our country and other free countries, it is the latter category that tends to be the difficult ones.

Go Where there is No Path. But, I Can't, I'm Afraid of Snakes

A few months ago, my wife and I were shopping and came across this saying on a night shirt, “Go where there is no path”.  When I showed it to her, her reaction caught me a little off guard.  She said, “I can’t I’m afraid of snakes”. And, of course, being the person I am, I immediately translated that into a language I can understand – security-ish.  My first thought was, that explains why people don’t conduct risk analysis or even more importantly why they don’t even start the process.  They don’t tread into uncharted territory because there are snakes hiding in all that tall grass, so they stay where they’re comfortable – on the path.  Doing what is comfortable causes two problems.  

First, as Defense Secretary Don Rumsfeld, said, “We don’t know what we don’t know”, which translates into, we’re only protecting ourselves against what we can see, expect and believe is likely to occur.  Since, we don’t know what we don’t know, we’re not planning on dealing with its affects either.  This can be extremely more sinister because a lack of action could result in someone getting seriously injured or worse.  

Fortunately, there are methodologies out there that can get rid of the snakes.  I’m consulting on security matters with a local school district.  During our initial meeting, the District Superintendent, said, “Okay, where do we start? With an assessment to see where we are?”  Absolutely! 

Risk management is about managing risks.  In order to do that, you have to accept five factors:

1) You can’t prevent or deter everything

2) Protection from one threat may allow for some protection against another unrelated threat

3) Protection options must be in place before the event occurs

4) Risk Management must address the following pillars; detection, assessment, plans and procedures, response and engagement

5) Risk management and the assessment process is continual and is just part of what we do.

For ways to tame the snakes, read related articles here:

https://view.joomag.com/march-2019-ast-magazine-march-2019-ast-magazine/0952115001553308799/p4?short https://view.joomag.com/july-2019-ast-magazine-ast-july-2019-magazine/0612002001563068627/p60?short

Planning Now for the Terrorist Attack that Won’t Come or Will it?

While radical Islamic-extremist inspire large scale attacks have not occurred in the United States in some time, low scale attacks are more common place than you’d think and not necessarily exclusive to radical-Islamist.  “Bad actor” attacks using terrorist tactics occur all the time.  To prevent, deter and reduce the effects of a terrorist style attack, business owners, facility managers or anyone else charged with the security of those they service must determine if they are an attractive target to, not only terrorist attack, but also criminal activity.

In that regard, two questions come up, 1) “Do I deal with the public?” and 2) “Does the public (or a “bad actor”) have access to my facility?”  If the answer to both questions is “Yes”, then you are at risk.  Even if you answer “No” to the second question, you must remember that a dedicated threat will not be deterred and will bring the tools necessary to carry out the attack.  Answering these questions will be an indicator of threat likelihood.  Additionally, if you ask, “What is the public’s opinion of that service/product?”   The operative word here being “the public’s opinion” and not what you think, you will get an even better understand of your risk.  If there is the slightest likelihood that you could be attacked by a criminal or a terrorist, then you should reconsider if  the procedures you follow and the physical security countermeasures you already have in place are adequate.

Usually, criminal activity doesn’t result in injury to people or death.  Terrorist activity, regardless of motivation intends to inflict violence on another person in order to hurt them.  That said, most criminal acts involve the theft of or damage to property.  Consideration must be given to common criminal activities, such as; theft, burglary, damage to property, assault and work place violence, just to name a few.  Criminal activity using terrorist tactics on the other hand are directed toward people and try to cause as much injury or death as possible.  Common tactics still include; improvised explosive devices (Yes Virginia, sick people are still building bombs), using a vehicle or automatic weapon to inflict injury or death.  While school and workplace shootings have become the norm they are not necessarily terrorist attacks, although the results may be the same – they produce mass casualties. 

Mitigation strategies for any type of criminal activity, including terrorism, must be in place before the event occurs.  So, we want to deter the activity from occurring in the first place and then delay it so that it can be noticed and responded to by trained forces.  And finally, in the unlikely event it does occur we want to reduce it effects as much as possible.

In the case of IEDs, we want to move vehicle parking away for places where large numbers of people gather and prevent the placement of unidentified objects near buildings. 

To thwart the hostile vehicle threat, we need to place rated barriers between vehicle traffic and people, especially where large numbers of people gather; i.e., street fairs, sidewalks or pedestrian zones.

Since police departments and some security companies are teaching people to “Run-Hide-Fight, which actually means hide, we need to create spaces that actually offer protection.  Two protective options are, 1) retrofitting walls with rated ballistic materials; so that when people do hide they are actually protected and 2) limit movement of the person with the gun. 

Note, there will always be some level of risk no matter how much you plan and implement countermeasures.  The goal is to reduce the risk to a level you can accept and to continually analyze and make changes when warranted.  When you hear or see something in the news, you should ask yourself, “Can that happen here?”  If the answer is “Yes”, then you should take actions to change that to a “No”.

Chances are you are not going to become a victim of a terrorist attack; however, there is a greater likelihood that you will become a victim of a criminal act that resembles a terrorist act.  

Getting Everyone to Speak a Common Language

A couple weeks ago, I was teaching a class about using building design to deter criminal activity, including terrorist attack, and when it fails reduce its effects and prevent mass casualties.  After the obligatory introductions, I said something to the effect, that building design is a matter of reducing risk whenever and wherever possible.  But in order to do that you have to the know your “DBT”.

Based on the blank stares, I got back, I knew something was wrong.  So, I said it again.  Still the deer in the headlights looks.  So, I said, “Everyone knows what DBT stands for, right”?  Still nothing.  Not one person raised their hand.  I was taken aback.  After all the class was made up of seasoned architects, engineers, planners and security folks.  I would have thought, at least, one or two would have known what I was talking about.

So, we spent the new few minutes talking about Design Basis Threat or DBT, if you will.  DBT is identifying your threats, their tactics, the tools they may use and then designing your building to deter or prevent them from happening, in the first place, and understanding that if they do happen you can reduce their effects if you’ve included reduction strategies into the design.

The very first thing to do is to assemble “the planning team”.  The idea that “it takes a village” needs to be used here.  The team should include architects, engineers, facility manager, security, end users and others.  It’s important to bring these folks together, so that they can discuss the parameters of what they are trying to accomplish and “buy in” to the project.  If done correctly at the beginning of a project, security costs can be kept to a minimum, usually somewhere around five percent of the total project costs.  If security comes in at the end of the project this cost may skyrocket to thirty-forty percent, because of the long term cost of equipment maintenance and especially, personnel costs.

Once the team is assembled, the first step is to identify the threat or threats.  Threats can be divided into two categories; natural and man-made.  Fortunately, laws and ordinances exist that address natural threats in building design; i.e., earthquake, flooding, fire, tornado, etc.  Man-made threats on the other hand – not so much.  Although, that is changing slowly.  Last year, federal legislation was signed into law that addresses the use of hostile vehicles as a method of attack in public spaces.  We’re still waiting for the DHS report the law requires and its subsequent findings and recommendations.  I’m particularly concerned that our government hasn’t the courage to attack hostile shooter legislation, when it is so needed.  But that’s another Blog topic for another time.

The second step is to identify the motives of the man-made threat,; i.e., causing injury or death, theft or unlawful removal of property or equipment, damage to property or facilities and causing adverse publicity.  Then we need to figure out what type of groups commit these acts; criminals (sophisticated/non-sophisticated, organized/unorganized), protesters (organized/non-organized), terrorist (domestic/trans-national/state-sponsored) and subversives.  

Then we look at the tactics they use; stationary or moving vehicle, different types of weapon usage, forced entry, etc.  Each tactic uses a different set of tools. That said, each type of tool use has a countermeasure available to reduce its effectiveness.

If we understand their motives, tactics and tools, we can design countermeasures into inhabited space that reduces the possibility that they will occur and when that falls short reduces their effects. 

My book, The Solutions Matrix: A Practical Guide to Soft Security Engineering for Architects, Engineer, Planners and Security Professionals, will be available in September.  It will outline the processes used to determine DBT, have a quick reference chart that outlines how to counter each type of man-made threat and provide examples of practical real-world solutions.  

Street Market, Outdoor Café, and Pedestrian Zone Security is Lacking

Street Markets

I’m probably stating the obvious here.  But most street markets are temporary in nature (farmer’s, or harvest markets) and only occur on a certain day or two of the week or for a short period (Christmas Markets).  Local police department’s put up metal stanchions and post a traffic cop more for crowd and traffic control, than anything else.  They are not a deterrent to a dedicated threat using a vehicle as a weapon or an errant driver.  Now before you go and tell the mayor or the police commissioner his cops are ineffective let me explain.

It’s a matter of physics and not “goodwill or attentiveness” on the part of the policeman.  A vehicle traveling at just 10 mph covers a distance of approximately 73 to 102 feet in the 5-7 seconds it takes a trained officer to view, identify and react to an errant vehicle – intentional or otherwise.   Unless the speed of the vehicle is severely reduced to below that speed the vehicle will travel significantly further before it is recognized as a potential threat.  Cops are doing a great job everyday but they can’t beat physics – no matter their super hero powers, unfortunately.

Shameless plug here:  My friends at Marshalls Landscaping Protection USA have developed a super-shallow mount bollard that can be easily installed/removed because of the depth of the footing (3.9 inches or about the width of two girl scout cookies laid end-to-end).

Outdoor Cafes

And then there are outdoor cafes.  By nature they are more permanent.  I have to admit, I enjoy sitting in the piazza sipping an espresso just like any other caffeine addicted tourist.  Whole sections of city centers have rows of restaurants and outdoor cafes where you can sit and “take in life” as it passes by.  In response to the current “ramming vehicle threat” some cities are now placing very ugly “jersey” barriers[1] made from reinforced concrete) around these areas. 

A solid planter filled with dirt weighs several thousands of pounds and is an effective barrier, especially if struck by a vehicle at a high rate of speed.  A large vehicle could nudge it out of the way if it is not somehow anchored, but hopefully someone would notice that and sound the alarm.  Fortunately there is “street furniture” in the form of benches, planters, way signs, lighted bollards that are shallow mounted. These devices are permanently affixed, so they can’t be nudged, and can absorb the kinetic energy of a moving vehicle threat as described above.

What about large pedestrian zones?

My concern comes from the idea that besides establishing a perimeter and depending on which city you are in will determine how porous that perimeter is, is there really a separation of the different types of traffic that frequent the space; i.e., delivery vehicles, bicycle, pedestrians.  Each category of traffic poses a threat to the others.  Of course, a vehicle crashing into someone is much more likely to cause injury to.

Many cities are creating large “pedestrians zones” in city centers that cover many city blocks.  This is great but traffic is still mixed within these spaces in some places.  Unless the entire zone is vehicle traffic free, a pedestrian or cyclist must cross the street at some point.  These crosswalks are particularly vulnerable and offer great target selection. 

We need to further separate the traffic within these zones, so that only the traffic we want within a particular zone is allowed[2]; vehicles with vehicle with vehicles, cyclist with cyclist and pedestrian within their assigned zone.  We can design the space so that only the type of travel that we want will be in its particular zone because the unwanted traffic types can’t enter.   To separate vehicles from the rest, we could easily designed higher-than-normal-curbs and reduce speeds by creating a serpentine effect.  We could use the same idea for cyclist either permanently designed as part of the bicycle path or by using planters with trees.  And for the pedestrian only zone, we can design the space so that bicycles and vehicles cannot enter while pedestrians are present.   Again, we can borrow our idea from the outdoor café and place street furniture throughout.  Thereby, allowing pedestrians to duck for cover if something goes wrong.

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[1] Security Industry Association Technology Insight 2018 Spring edition, https://www.securityindustry.org/2018/04/05/the-puppy-movement/

[2] Security Industry Association 2018 Fall Edition, https://www.securityindustry.org/2018/09/14/creating-invisible-security-to-prevent-vehicular-attacks/ 

YEP – IN SECURITY WE STILL NEED TO OCCUPY THE GROUND, WE CAN’T LEAVE IT ALL UP TO ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGIES 

Despite the advances in electronic security technologies one fact remains, we (“the good guys”)still need to occupy the ground.

As many of you know, I’m a former Air Force Security Policeman – a blue grunt, if you will.  So consequently am a little partial to “zoomies” when it comes to the defense of the country.  Our strike capabilities are so sophisticated that we really don’t need the other services (now, don’t get your knickers in a twist and let me explain).  We could just bomb the hell out of the bad guys until they surrender.  But bombing the hell out of them doesn’t do anything for us, because in the end we still have to occupy the ground.  And that’s why the Air Force is just not enough.

The same holds true in the security business.  Everyone is moving towards electronic technologies and the advances in predictive behavioral analyses and other artificial intelligence (AI) technologies is “mind blowing”.  

In the ‘80’s we posted guards, in the ‘90’s we put cameras because guards became expensive and since that time we’ve been using analytics to understand better what we are observing.  With the technologies that are currently “off the shelf” we can do allot more than we used to be able to do.  We can have one guard monitor several cameras and with analytics s/he uses can monitor even more as the software interprets what it’s seeing and notifies those responsible when something is amiss.

This is all well and good, but electronics can’t do it alone.  We still need to “occupy ground”.  By that I mean we need to design the built environment so that it complements the technology we use.   The use of non-electronic technologies will become even more important in the future, and especially in the urban environment.

The city of New York employs thousands of cameras around the city but they also deploy thousands of beat officers.  Both rely on each other to enhance the other‘s effectiveness.  If a patrolman sees something, she/he can have a colleague at the central station bring the field of view into focus and zoom in.  And by looking at adjourning screens or from different angles maybe get a clearer picture of what is happening.  Likewise, if the monitor sees something suspicious, he/she can dispatch a patrol to investigate further and cover those areas that the camera can’t see.

So with the utmost respect, we still need the grunts.

What the LA Ram Superbowl Game Plan Teaches Us about Home Security

What the LA Rams Superbowl Game Plan 

Teaches Us about Home Security

First, I have to admit I had hoped the Rams would win the Superbowl.  It would have made my blog sound allot better.  I could have boosted about how Sean’s crew had analyzed their adversaries and implemented the perfect countermeasures and protected the home front (after all they were the home team).

Then secondly, I admit I’m not a football buff and understand everything about the do’s and don’ts of the game.   But I can with confidence make some comparisons and analogies that I believe most of us can understand.

So, anyway, congratulations to the New England Patriots on their win.

The more I think about it the more I realized that the Rams loss actually teaches us more about sizing up the threats than I first thought.  It teaches us, that not only do we have to look at the attacking forces from our perspective but we also must consider how they see themselves and will adjust.

In security design, we call this the design basis threat or DBT.  In other words, what you’re trying to protect your asset (thing of value) from – whether it’s a natural threat; such as, wind, fire,  rain or a man-made threat; like, graffiti, burglary or theft of property.

The Rams coaching staff had to analyze what the Patriots were capable of (their modus operandi [MO] and then figure out how thwart it.  They also needed to formulate a plan that covered the entire field.  In essence, defense in depth – the front line, the linebackers, the safeties.  We’ve all heard, “The best defense is offense”.  How true.  Ask the Patriots.

Unless, you have a comprehensive plan for the protection of your home, the attacker, be it a burglar, tagger, etc. will circumvent your security by finding the weak spot and exploiting it.  Remember, just having a security camera or system is not enough.  You have to have security built in to every facet of your daily routine. 

For home security that starts with your on-line social media presence.  Don’t give too much information away.  I laugh when I think that someone couldn’t believe she was robbed while in Paris.  Like duh, if you brag about how expensive the stuff is that you have there’s a very strong likelihood that someone also sees the value and will try to take it from you.  There was a case this week in Los Angeles were a rapper was flashing a big wad of cash and posted it on social media.  Well, guess what, he got robbed. 

Next, are you doing other things that tip off those with bad intention?  Do you put boxes out on the curb the night before the trash truck comes by?  Do you put papers in the trash that someone could take out under the cover of darkness and open-up credit card accounts in your name?  When you got that big screen to watch the Superbowl on, did you mount it on the wall so that someone walking on the sidewalk in front of your house could see it through the window?

Your plan has to be comprehensive.  It covers not only what you do but also where you do it.  Start from the roadway and work your way inward, assessing what the bad guy is able to see.  Make sure all lights work and all gates, windows and doors lock.  We lock our car even when it’s parked in the garage and the door from the garage into the house.  These little things delay the perpetrators actions and may possibly give us enough time to call 911.

I few years ago, I posted that the best home security system is actually a plate of cookies.  I still believe that, if you take some freshly baked chocolate chip cookies to the neighbors.  They’ll thank you for them and inadvertently watch out for your stuff because now they think they owe you.  

Maybe if the Rams would have taken some cookies to the Patriot’s locker room before the game things would have turned out differently.

Using Landscaping to Control Access

I want to tell you about two incidents that required a security solution and how the first attempt at providing an adequate solution failed miserably.

First case – illegal dumping

The issue was that people were driving up to the banks of a stream and dumping trash; i.e., tires, mattresses, rubbish, etc.  The first solution provided added a camera to the site so that “things” could be monitored.  The camera fed back to the superintendent’s desk.  Of course, when he wasn’t there (weekends, evening/late at night, attending meetings, lunch, naps) the dumping occurred and continued.  The superintendent was scratching his head on what to do.  After all, he just spent several thousands of dollars on the latest technologies and they didn’t seem to work.

Our solution was not electronic.  Instead, we suggested that they build a raised berm/curb using natural landscaping (trees/boulders/bushes, even park benches) so that the vehicle couldn’t drive up to the water’s edge in the first place.  We suggested landscaping due to the ability to prevent the vehicle from reaching the stream.  We imagined the culprits wouldn’t want to carry the heavy objects from the roadway, across a bicycle/walking path and then into the wood clearing to reach the stream.  Our second reason was to ensure the aesthetics of the area were kept intact.  Sure, we could have suggested a fence along the embankment to deny access and achieve the same effect, but who wants to walk along a fence with barbed wire when they’re taking the dog out or jogging or cycling.

Second case – unwanted access to school property

The issue in this case was that community members were cutting across school grounds in order to shorten the distance to retail shops located near the school campus.  The first security company suggested erecting a chain-link-fence with 3-strand barbed wire outrigger around the entire campus perimeter with a gate for buses and parents/administrators.  When not in use the gate would be kept locked.  The administrators weren’t buying it.  What if a student climbed the fence and was injured?  And where were they going to get the manpower to manage the gate? 

Our solution was to construct on three sides a wooden split-rail fence approximately 4 feet high (similar to those used in the Atlantic Piedmont region) and then to place flower beds in front of the fence and thorny shrubbery and trees behind it so that it would be difficult to cut through.  The front of the campus was left open.  We also suggested installing "speed cushions" to allow just buses to enter the "drive up/drop off" area.  And to have a separate loading/unloading zone for the parent's cars, that would be controlled by school staff.  These solutions provided the aesthetic qualities the administrators were looking for.  We also suggested changing procedures but I don't want to give too much away here.  Needless to say a comprehensive change was needed to address the concerns of the school.

These are just two examples of how not all security solutions need to be electronic.  Unfortunately, surveillance companies will tell you that CCTV is the solution to everything.  The reality is it isn’t.  In both cases we used “natural access control” (Crime Prevention through Environmental Design [CPTED]) as a fundamental principle in our approach to reducing crime.

Additional CPTED ideas and other principles on deterring crime and the effects of terrorist attack will be discuss during a 3-day workshop, Designing Secure Buildings: Integrating Security Technologies being held in New York City, 11-13 Sep 18.

Our ROI Toolkit is available.  The Toolkit will help you justify to your boss why you need to attend this training.

Contact us at info@hainesssecuritysolution.com or call +1 805 509-8655 to register.

Visit us at https://hainessecuritysolutions.com/Training to find out about other classes we offer or to host a workshop. 

Security Opportunities within the Booming IoT Market

The Future is Bright for Non-electronics, Too

The term Internet of Things was coined back in the late 90’s.  The somewhat official definition is “A network of dedicated physical objects that contain embedded technology to interact internally or externally”.  I think we can all agree that is a very broad brush definition.  I would rephrase it to be, basically “an ecosystem that includes electronic things, and the communications and data analysis between them”.

With that in mind, let’s look at where we are today and where we’re going.

Today there are an estimated 7billion devices connected via the internet and applications that use the internet.  That’s a device for every human on the planet.  In just five years that number will increase to over 50billion.  The use of The Cloud is fueling this increase.

What does this mean for the security profession?  Simply put lots of openings and an unlimited number of chances.  In other words, if you can think it, you can make it happen. 

This increase in the realm of possibilities will affect every aspect of our daily lives.  So whether you’re involved in the residential, small business or corporate security market, you can make it.

I usually think of security solutions as following into one of two spheres – electronic or non-electronic.

ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGIES

Electronic technologies are just that – technologies that are electronic.  Kind of a no brainer, don’t you think?  These technologies run the gamut from intrusion detection systems to access control to surveillance and beyond.  They’re becoming ever more sophisticated and complex.

Unfortunately, as technology evolves it will probably become more invasive.  It will collect more and more data about you. 

These invasive technologies already assault our daily lives.  Just imagine how that will change in the future.  While there is tremendous resentment about governments collecting data on individuals.  Companies, such as, Google, Amazon, Microsoft and other major retailers are doing it and no one really seems to care.

The use of cellphones will become almost an extension of ourselves.  We will be able to do everything from or with our phone.  I suspect someone is going to develop a security app that will read your blood pressure or your heart rhythm to authenticate that you are the correct user, instead of the fingerprint reader or PIN code of today.  Your phone will become your “Mini-me”.  It will know your behavior patterns well enough to “help” you make choices.

If you’re a dealer, distributor, integrator, system installer or work in a parallel vertical the opportunities abound, as you provide solutions for your customers.  It really won’t matter which product or service you provide, as there is a place and need for all of it, and combining technologies will provide even more opportunities.

The development of “predictive analytics” based on data collection will allow companies to forecast their customers buying habits better.  My personal opinion is that “predictive analyst” will become a job title and many security companies will hire them to determine future sales projections and to forecast their future markets.  With that in mind, there is already some technology out there that can analyze behavioral patterns.  Does this mean that access control will be determined by a biometric sensor and as a back-up analysis app that says, this is you because you always show up for work at this time or an even more sophisticated analysis by the pressure you apply to the pin-pad as you type in your PIN code?

NON-ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGIES

Non-electronic technologies on the other hand don’t use electricity to function. They can range from windows and doors to landscaping or even the way a particular building or inhabited area is designed. 

Fortunately, to counter the invasiveness of the electronic age, non-technologic innovation will become less invasive as we develop better materials and strategies as we design inhabited space. 

I believe we can “socially engineer” inhabited space.  We can incorporate specific urban design strategies that cause positive behaviors so that there is less reliance on the invasive use of electronic means to keep us safe.  Ultimately citizens don’t want cameras that watch their every move; instead they want space that is functional and free of crime and unwanted behaviors.  By increasing the effectiveness in controlling the social behaviors of the people using or transiting the space, the environments will become safer and need fewer electronic gadgets.

We are at the cusp of an explosion in technologies, both electronic and otherwise.  Whether you are in the business of providing solutions directly in the form of a product or service or in the business of providing solutions indirectly, i.e., architect, engineer, security consultant or government official strap yourself in and hold on to your hat because it’ going to be a great ride with lots of opportunities for all to excel.