YEP – IN SECURITY WE STILL NEED TO OCCUPY THE GROUND, WE CAN’T LEAVE IT ALL UP TO ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGIES 

Despite the advances in electronic security technologies one fact remains, we (“the good guys”)still need to occupy the ground.

As many of you know, I’m a former Air Force Security Policeman – a blue grunt, if you will.  So consequently am a little partial to “zoomies” when it comes to the defense of the country.  Our strike capabilities are so sophisticated that we really don’t need the other services (now, don’t get your knickers in a twist and let me explain).  We could just bomb the hell out of the bad guys until they surrender.  But bombing the hell out of them doesn’t do anything for us, because in the end we still have to occupy the ground.  And that’s why the Air Force is just not enough.

The same holds true in the security business.  Everyone is moving towards electronic technologies and the advances in predictive behavioral analyses and other artificial intelligence (AI) technologies is “mind blowing”.  

In the ‘80’s we posted guards, in the ‘90’s we put cameras because guards became expensive and since that time we’ve been using analytics to understand better what we are observing.  With the technologies that are currently “off the shelf” we can do allot more than we used to be able to do.  We can have one guard monitor several cameras and with analytics s/he uses can monitor even more as the software interprets what it’s seeing and notifies those responsible when something is amiss.

This is all well and good, but electronics can’t do it alone.  We still need to “occupy ground”.  By that I mean we need to design the built environment so that it complements the technology we use.   The use of non-electronic technologies will become even more important in the future, and especially in the urban environment.

The city of New York employs thousands of cameras around the city but they also deploy thousands of beat officers.  Both rely on each other to enhance the other‘s effectiveness.  If a patrolman sees something, she/he can have a colleague at the central station bring the field of view into focus and zoom in.  And by looking at adjourning screens or from different angles maybe get a clearer picture of what is happening.  Likewise, if the monitor sees something suspicious, he/she can dispatch a patrol to investigate further and cover those areas that the camera can’t see.

So with the utmost respect, we still need the grunts.

What the LA Ram Superbowl Game Plan Teaches Us about Home Security

What the LA Rams Superbowl Game Plan 

Teaches Us about Home Security

First, I have to admit I had hoped the Rams would win the Superbowl.  It would have made my blog sound allot better.  I could have boosted about how Sean’s crew had analyzed their adversaries and implemented the perfect countermeasures and protected the home front (after all they were the home team).

Then secondly, I admit I’m not a football buff and understand everything about the do’s and don’ts of the game.   But I can with confidence make some comparisons and analogies that I believe most of us can understand.

So, anyway, congratulations to the New England Patriots on their win.

The more I think about it the more I realized that the Rams loss actually teaches us more about sizing up the threats than I first thought.  It teaches us, that not only do we have to look at the attacking forces from our perspective but we also must consider how they see themselves and will adjust.

In security design, we call this the design basis threat or DBT.  In other words, what you’re trying to protect your asset (thing of value) from – whether it’s a natural threat; such as, wind, fire,  rain or a man-made threat; like, graffiti, burglary or theft of property.

The Rams coaching staff had to analyze what the Patriots were capable of (their modus operandi [MO] and then figure out how thwart it.  They also needed to formulate a plan that covered the entire field.  In essence, defense in depth – the front line, the linebackers, the safeties.  We’ve all heard, “The best defense is offense”.  How true.  Ask the Patriots.

Unless, you have a comprehensive plan for the protection of your home, the attacker, be it a burglar, tagger, etc. will circumvent your security by finding the weak spot and exploiting it.  Remember, just having a security camera or system is not enough.  You have to have security built in to every facet of your daily routine. 

For home security that starts with your on-line social media presence.  Don’t give too much information away.  I laugh when I think that someone couldn’t believe she was robbed while in Paris.  Like duh, if you brag about how expensive the stuff is that you have there’s a very strong likelihood that someone also sees the value and will try to take it from you.  There was a case this week in Los Angeles were a rapper was flashing a big wad of cash and posted it on social media.  Well, guess what, he got robbed. 

Next, are you doing other things that tip off those with bad intention?  Do you put boxes out on the curb the night before the trash truck comes by?  Do you put papers in the trash that someone could take out under the cover of darkness and open-up credit card accounts in your name?  When you got that big screen to watch the Superbowl on, did you mount it on the wall so that someone walking on the sidewalk in front of your house could see it through the window?

Your plan has to be comprehensive.  It covers not only what you do but also where you do it.  Start from the roadway and work your way inward, assessing what the bad guy is able to see.  Make sure all lights work and all gates, windows and doors lock.  We lock our car even when it’s parked in the garage and the door from the garage into the house.  These little things delay the perpetrators actions and may possibly give us enough time to call 911.

I few years ago, I posted that the best home security system is actually a plate of cookies.  I still believe that, if you take some freshly baked chocolate chip cookies to the neighbors.  They’ll thank you for them and inadvertently watch out for your stuff because now they think they owe you.  

Maybe if the Rams would have taken some cookies to the Patriot’s locker room before the game things would have turned out differently.

Question You Should Ask Before Getting a

Home Security System For Christmas

Is a home security system on your wish list from Santa?  If so, here are a couple of things you need to ask before Santa puts your system in his bag.

The first two questions to ask yourself are, “What am I going to protect by buying this type of system?" Then, "Will it do what I want it to do?”  These sound like no-brainers don’t they?  Most of us would say, “I want it to catch the bad guy”.  Well, not really, because it won’t catch a bad guy.  It will let you know when there is behavior inside of your house or when your perimeter is breached. But it won’t tell you if the behavior is good or bad.  YOU have to do that.  YOU have to assess the behavior and determine if it's good or bad.  So, you want to be able to analyze the behavior, like your kids coming home from school or the mailman delivering a package and determine if it is friend or foe.  Which brings us to the next question, which is, “Who will monitor what the system 'sees' and who will respond when there is unwanted behavior?”

If you are relying on your local 911 or a police department response, then you need to find out what the local policy is for home invasion.  Some departments don’t respond immediately for a variety of reasons; sometimes due to competing priorities and sometimes because they don’t want to get there when the bad guy is still on the premises which may cause a “stand-off”.  They don’t want that and neither do you.

If you are relying on a service provider for response, you need to ask, “What is the guaranteed respond time?”  If it’s less than seven minutes the good guys will catch the bad guys.  If it’s more than that, the bad guy will get away with your stuff.  Actually you don’t want the good guys to get there while the bad guy is still there, as it increases the likelihood that someone is going to get hurt.

The National Institute of Justice reported a couple years ago that perpetrators of housebreaking/ burglary usually stay on site less than seven minutes.   I doubt it’s changed much in the last couple of years.

DO-IT-YOURSELF (DIY) SYSTEMS

Many professional installers will swear up and down that home owners cannot do this alone.  But let’s face it.  Just about anybody can do just about anything, given the right tools and knowledge.  Most home kits include instructions, so they’re pretty simple.  Tab A goes into Slot B.  If you can put together IKEA furniture you certainly can install a couple of cameras and sensors around your house.  That’s the tools part.  Now for the knowledge part – where to put cameras and where to put sensors?  Think of your house as an onion.  Start on the outer skin (property line) and work your way in.  Use a combination of sensors and camera that overlap so that all areas are covered by at least two components of your system.  Say a sensor and camera, or two cameras.  By using a combination of different technologies and creating an overlapping system you will, in all likelihood, get notified that something’s going on.  The chances of both systems failing simultaneously is very low.  Make sure you get "real time" notification.  The ability to talk into the system and tell the perpetrator that you're watching him or her (sorry ladies) is a plus.  However, it also let's the bad guy or gal know you are not at home.  So make sure you system covers the perimeter and you can engage before they ever get to the house.

HOME DELIVERY SERVICES

When Amazon recently announced that they would place your parcels just inside your front door if you signed up for this service many security folks cried “foul”.  They cited this service as basically allowing an intruder to enter your house.   Well, not really.  Amazon vets their delivery folks/employees during the hiring process.  If Amazon trusts them then why shouldn’t you?  Sure, there are always a few bad apples, but I see the risk of the delivery person rummaging through your house as a very low possibility since they don’t know if you’re going to come home suddenly and find them in the bedroom.  That just doesn’t make sense.  There are really two factors that are in play here that make this a good idea.  First, Amazon vets their employees and secondly the door lock and code is specific to your home. Additionally, the kit comes with a closed circuit television camera that you can set up to see if the person does more than deliver the package(s).   Plus there’s an electronic record of when the lock opened and when it closed.  Anything more than a minute or two, the amount of time to place the packages inside, would be cause for alarm and indicate something out of the ordinary happened.

If I ordered stuff on line and wasn’t home all day I’d use this service.

NO SYSTEM IS FOOL PROOF

Just remember that no system no matter how sophisticated is fool proof or offers one hundred percent protection one hundred percent of the time.  There will always be some risks involved.  The goal is to reduce the risks as much as possible and accept some risk.   

Do-It-Yourself (DIY) or Credentialed Security Consultant, That Is the Question

My brother built his house.  He borrowed a back-hoe and dug the hole.  He set the foundation and built his house from the ground up.  I look at him and say, “why can’t I even drive a nail straight?”  Well, there are two reason, first he has the knowledge and secondly, he had the right tools.  I, on the other hand, don’t have the knowledge nor have I ever purchased any tools.  Oh sure, I can unplug the toilet or figure out that a fuse is blown but much more than that, I’m in the dark.  The pun was not intentional, I swear. 

This got me to thinking.  Whenever I have something around the house that needs more than my minimum skills I have to call someone.  They usually arrive and the first thing they ask is, “Who did this?” as they look at the thousand mile-an-hour tape or screwdriver wedged against the window or the string hanging from where the handle should be on the screen door.  Then they go about fixing it and charging me the equivalent of a mortgage payment.  They leave with a smile on their face and say, “Call us before you try to FIX IT again.  You’ll save money in the long run”. 

I asked my brother, where he got his knowledge and he told me that he asked lots of questions to people in the know and when he needed to, he bought or rented the tools.  If they had the skill set for roofing he asked roofing questions, same for plumbing and so on.  I was glad when he told me this because up to this point, I thought my Dad shared house building skills with him but not with me.  I was made at my Dad.  Forgive me Dad.

Well, the same holds true in security.  There are projects you can do on your own and there are things you really should get an expert to handle.  With the advancement in technologies in recent months you can basically, “plug and play” all types of electronic security systems.  This is a good thing.  I remember a day when programming the VCR was a disaster.  Even though my English is pretty good, I could never understand the instructions.  I had to get a friend to do it for me.  But back to security.  Electronic security systems have become sophisticated but you don’t have to be an “IT geek” to use them.  Most can be monitored on your phone with an App download.

But, if you’re going to assess your property and take a holistic approach you probably want someone with knowledge in vulnerability assessment/risk analysis or in developing mitigation strategies or someone with a Physical Security Engineering (PSE, SPSE or MPSE) designation.  If you have a very large project or are worried about cost overruns, you could also get someone with credentials from the Security Industry Association (SIA) in project management or a Certified Security Project Manager (CSPM®).  Another reputable organization is the American Society of Industrial Security (ASIS), which provides a variety of designations.   The security consultant having one of these credentials or designation is your guarantee that the person doing the job has the right tools sets and the knowledge to use them.

DIY is okay but remember one thing; good advice has a cost but free advice may cost you more.

FOUR TRICKS TO THE PRINCIPLES OF

EFFECTIVE PHYSICAL SECURITY DETECTION

 I recently had a newcomer to the security business ask me, “So, how would you describe what security is?”  I looked at her like, what a stupid that question is.  But after I thought for a second, actually it was a pretty good question.  A question many of us would provide varying definitions of.   My answer was pretty short.  Security is, the detection of behavior – good, we reward; i.e., password or PIN and we allow you access to the computer or ATM, bad, we deny access. 

Simple, right?  Yes.  So, the questions become, “How do we ensure effectiveness?  How do WE determine good or bad behavior?  Where should we do it? And, how do we make sure we know the difference?”

AS FAR AWAY AS POSSIBLE

Detect activity as far from the asset, thing you’re trying to protect, as possible.  We want to detect all behavior.  Then we can decide if it’s good or bad.  Good behavior – we allow access and bad – we don’t.  When it comes to valuables or assets, anything of value can be considered an asset.  An asset is something you place value on.  It could be a building, a process, an object or people.  Even my crazy cousin back in Indiana could be considered an asset.  Ok, well maybe not my cousin.  But you get the gist.

An asset doesn’t have to have value to the owner.  As long as it has value to somebody, then it is an asset.  I guess that means my cousins back in.

We want to protect those things we value at the furthest opportunity we can afford; either at the property line or even before, if possible.  Usually we do this by defining our property line.  We use fences or signs or other materials that say, “Hey, this is my space, so stay over there and I don’t care what you do, but come over here.  I want to know about it”.  In the old days, we had to post a guard to detect penetration.  Today, we can use electronic technologies that assist us in detecting when people come into our space.

You can access my article “More Power to the Perimeter” starts on page 31. http://issuu.com/securitymiddleeastmagazine/docs/sme_july-_aug_2015_web?e=0/14330179

IT’S ABOUT DETECTING UNWANTED BEHAVIOR

Electronic or non-electronic detection, it really doesn’t matter.  It’s about detecting behavior and then deciding if it should be rewarded (allowed entry) or not (denied access).  I often ask my students if they think we should detect all behavior or just the “bad”.  Most say, just the “bad”.  We don’t have the time to watch everything.  Well, actually we do. It’s just that we’re a lot quicker in rewarding “good” behavior than when something wrong happens.  As long as the rules are followed, everything’s fine.  Let someone forget their badge or password and well, and then the problems start.

BEST DETERRENCE IS A WELL-TRAINED STAFF (YOU WERE EXPECTING ME TO SAY GUARD FORCE, WEREN’T YOU?)

Actually, having a well trained staff in knowing what constitutes good behavior is the best deterrence you can achieve.  Trained staff is a force multiplier.  That means more eyes on your environment.  Trust me; your staff knows when things are out of place or when something is just not right.  That doesn’t mean you’re going to get them to “rat” on each other but you can get them to think about protecting themselves and their colleagues.  I recently read an article about the creation of open office spaces adding to efficiency and productivity.  The psychological impact of the space adds to a sense of belonging and our natural instinct to protect ourselves and each other.  Use that to your advantage.

Teach folks what “suspicious” looks like, when and how to report it and when it’s okay to intervene themselves without getting hurt.  Sometimes “bad” behavior can be corrected on the spot.  Other times the “authorities” need to get involved.  When reporting suspicious behavior, describe the “bad guy/gal” by comparing them to yourself; i.e., taller than me, heavier than me, blond hair like me.  While clothes description are important folks should focus on things that are less likely to be changed quickly; shoes or pants, complexion, color and length of hair.  The responding forces will need to know if any weapons were involved and if anyone has been hurt and where to find you.

DRILLS & EXERCISE STAFF & GUARD FORCE (OFTEN, CREATIVELY AND REWARDING)

Administrators and decision makers can increase the likelihood of detecting unwanted behaviors by conducting routine, periodic and creative drills.  Some drills should be done just for small groups, while others should involve everyone.  Sometimes with the guard forces and sometimes the guard should train alone.  There’s a difference between “preparedness” and “readiness”.  “Preparedness” is having material stockpiled and “readiness” is knowing where to get materials and what to do with them.

Follow me on twitter @hainessecurity for more security tips.

Perimeter Security - What is it Good For?

Absolutely Nothing, If Done Wrong

DEFINITION

Webster describes perimeter as, “the boundary or circumference of a figure having two dimension; the sum of all sides of the boundary.  Webster goes on to describe security as”…freedom from danger or risk.”  So when we put them together our most common definition of perimeter security goes something like this, “an identifiable boundary to provide safety from threats”.

We take that a step further in our definition:  A boundary comprised of several different “layers” of defense, with each layer providing an opportunity to deter, delay and detect unwanted activity.

PURPOSE

Most people think you have to have a fence in order to establish that boundary or perimeter and once you’ve done that, the fence will act as a deterrent and stop the threat.  Both assumptions are wrong.  You don’t need a fence to establish the perimeter.  You just need to identify it in some way to let people know, “Hey, this is my space.  If you want to come in here, then go down there and let me check out who you are”.  Good folks will follow the rules and go down to the entry control or access point.  The bad guy will climb over the fence in about 4 seconds or less, so not much deterrent here.  So in reality the fence doesn’t act as a deterrent, it acts as a method of identifying good and bad intentions. 

Therefore, the perimeter  is merely a line of demarcation that says, if you’re over there we don’t care what you do but if you come over here, we want to know who you are, so go down there where we can check you out.  Now, many of you will disagree with that.  You will say, “No, the fence keeps the bad guys from doing bad things because they have to climb over it and they don’t want to get caught”.  Exactly!  But, the fence doesn’t deter them, it makes it so that if they climb over it we will detect this bad behavior and can possibly catch them.  After all, the good guys will follow the rules and go down to where there is an opening in the fence.

This opening is usually in the form of an access or entry control point (ACP/ECP) of some sort, manned or manned.  The ECP is where we check to see if the person trying to enter is allowed.  There are many ways to do that but we’ll have to discuss that in a future article.  For the time being let’s concentrate on perimeter security excluding its access control mechanics.  There are three distinct purposes for establishing a perimeter.

We already established that, first, it delineates the property line that we care about (deter).  Second, it may slow (delay) the bad guys as they approach with the idea that if we can delay them we may be able to spot their bad behavior.  Which leads us directly into point three – it serves as an early warning systems (detect).  It immediately allows us to determine ill-intent.  Think about it.  If the person climbing the fence wasn’t trying to circumvent the access control point then why climb over the fence.  Why not, go down the ECP, show or use your authorized credentials and enter.  Another way to think away it is, if a person were to break through a wall, you would think this behavior bizarre and want to check them out.

Which brings me to my next point; there are actually four perimeters or layers of defense and each provides an opportunity for us to design against our threats.  Threats come in all shapes and sizes, but we usually are most concerned with vehicle or pedestrian threats.  In pretty short order I can come up with about 40 natural and about 20 or so manmade threats.  For the purpose of this article we’ll concentrate on vehicles and people.

Perimeter Design Considerations

• Visibility – what do people see - both good and bad?  Consider proximity to your neighbors.
• Demographics/Statistics – crime rates, terrorist activity, first responder locations and emergency access
• Landscape and Environmental Conditions - Type of terrain and extreme weather
• Power Requirements - availability, if electronics are used to augment passive barriers
• Accessibility – whether by foot or vehicle, during normal and emergency operations.

Protection Components

• Physical barriers (most common) – fencing or vehicle barriers, landscaping
• Intrusion Detection/Access Control – quickly becoming the norm
• Response Forces – without them the other components are useless.  Forces MUST BE well-trained, well-equipped and regularly drilled and exercised.

Common Mistakes

• If we build a fence high enough, we’ll be okay
• Assume the property boundary to be the external perimeter that requires the most robust system
• Making it look substantial – fortress like will deter everybody and all threats
• Putting barbed or concertina or razor wire on top will deter the bad guy
• Putting CCTV to capture activity without having response force capabilities
• Forgetting about moving vehicle threats (ask the security staff at the Brussels airport about this one.  Had they installed cable-reinforcing to the fencing the diamond thieves would not have been able to cut the fence and drive up to the plane unnoticed.)
• Lighting portions of the perimeter that cannot be patrolled by security forces.

THE FUTURE

• Non-aggressive methods
  • Landscaping and Designing Crime Out strategies
• Arial surveillance
  • Balloons.  This might be the most promising since they can stay airborne for very long periods of time.  One advantage is they can be placed high enough to see three of the layers of defense.
  • Drones.  There are several companies out there that already have off-the-shelf products available.  Once manufacturers are able to overcome the current short battery life cycle and extend them to 10-12 hours or longer and add analytics this will become a great tool.
• Robotics (mobile, semi-fixed or stationary)
  • Mobile – with the advent of self- driven or remotely controlled vehicles I don’t think it will be too long before we see a company promoting a self-driving security patrol vehicle; equipped with sensors, camera systems and audible/visual capabilities
  • Semi-fixed – these systems are attached to or immediately adjacent to a boundary line and can patrol randomly or in a sequential order (not advised).  They can be equipped with sensors, CCTV cameras, spotlights and speakers.
  • Stationary – these systems already exist.  There are many systems out there that have CCTV fields of view of perimeters with video analytics, combined with sensors, DVRs, etc.  Really the sky's the limit based on budget.

CONCLUSION

Don’t fall into the trap of thinking that the property boundary is your only perimeter and therefore, it’s the only one you protect.  Use every layer of defense to deter, delay, detect or defend a would-be aggressor.  Remember, it won’t happen on its own; you have to design your security system to be integrated because if it’s not – it’s worth absolutely nothing.

For more information about perimeter security see our article in Security Middle East magazine Jul/Aug issue 

http://issuu. com/securitymiddleeastmagazine/docs/sme_july-_aug_2015_web/31?e=3061242/14215610

or send an email to info@hainessecuritysolutions.com.