DESIGNING INHABITED SPACE

Social Engineering

Spaces that are occupied are designed with a specific purpose in mind.  If the space is private then the space is designed to perform a particular function, such as, office space or a factory work floor.  On the other hand, if the space is public it is normally designed to allow open access to it, to allow people to either use the space or transit through it.

The concept of using design to “socially engineer” public and private space has been around for some time now.  Building designers have been designing spaces to achieve a variety of desired effects.  Back in the Middle Ages, castles were designed to withstand an enemy’s siege and when that didn’t work and the invaders breached the walls divide the aggressors into small enough numbers in order for the hometown folks to kill them.

So it really should come as no surprise that over the years new concepts and technique have been developed to address new threats.  Although we’ve come a long way in our tactics based on new threats the purpose remains the same – cause people to do what we want them to do or suffer the consequences of their actions; detection or capture.

In the modern era, threats come in a multitude of forms, either natural and man-made.  We’ve done a pretty good job in regulating construction standards for natural threats, such as, high winds, tornadoes, earthquake and fire but we’ve done less of a good job for man-made threats.

THE ENVIRNOMENT

In 1991, Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) was introduced as a concept to reduce crime in neighborhoods.  The program has become so successful that most cities have ordinances that require implementation of CPTED principles during all new construction projects or phased in during major renovations.

CPTED controls the surrounding environment of a building thru four strategies:

Natural Surveillance – developing opportunities for observation of all spaces within an area by those occupying, using or transiting the area.

Natural Access Control – causing access control to be part of the environment by allowing design to create “choke points” and paths to and from buildings so that there is no doubt this is the proper way to enter/egress the area, even for first time users.  Non-adherence would cause detection and a response by authorities.

Territorial Reinforcement – identifying public and private space.  There should be a clear distinction of who the property belongs to.  This doesn’t mean putting up a fence; instead this can be achieved by using different materials, shrubbery/bushes, and cobble stone paver instead of poured concrete for example.

Maintenance – although not really a concept, the fact remains, if the space doesn’t have continuous upkeep it will come into disrepair through normal use and before too long become unsightly and bred criminal activity.

THE BUILDING ITSELF

After the Khobar Tower terrorist attack in Saudi Arabia in 1993, the Department of Defense identified the lack of a comprehensive overarching standard for building construction for the protection of personnel.  During the investigation of that incident it was observed that most of the victims were not killed or injured by the blast itself but instead were injured because of how the building reacted to the blast.  This was again proven in Oklahoma City in 1995.  Most fatalities were the result of the building collapsing upon them and not from the bomb blast itself.  Over the course of the next few years, through analysis and a lot of painstaking work, 21 standards were developed for the construction of DOD Buildings.  When implemented correctly the standards will reduce the effects of terrorist attack to personnel in the inhabited space.  While these standards are regulatory for DOD buildings the concepts are proven and can, and I believe should be implemented for all new construction or during major renovation projects for buildings that house 10 or more folks.  Implementing these standards at the beginning of a project may add 2-5% in increased costs to the project.  Adding the features later can add an additional 20-30% in cost overruns.  So just from a cost benefit perspective it makes good sense.  Not to mention, the reduction of injuries and number of dead during a catastrophic event.  You can’t put a price on that.

THE INTERIOR

Over the course of the last 10 years or so, we have seen a dramatic increase in criminal activity within inhabited space – in schools, hospitals, theaters, police station, etc.  Those involved in planning mitigation strategies and designing inhabited and uninhabited spaces, basically anywhere the public gathers, should now consider criminal activity within the confined spaces they are designing.  Recent events prove this activity can include, knife attacks in hospitals, shootings in schools, theaters and police stations and bombings at military facilities.  Unfortunately, this trend will continue for the foreseeable future.

So what can we do about it?  First, we would be well served if we required our leaders to implement legislation that addresses these current crises and looks to the future for emerging threats.  Unfortunately, the criminal threat and terrorist threat will be with us for some time to come, probably forever.  Both have changed over the years and as we address them we need to change too.  Second, even without the government we can start designing spaces addressing these three components; the environment, the building and its interior.  We really shouldn’t wait on the government to act; we should take it upon ourselves to do the right thing even without government intervention or supervision.  We can start by implementing these concepts on all new construction or whenever a renovation project meets a certain threshold (to be established locally).

I sincerely believe that when all three design components are incorporated into the building design “from the curb inward”, risks to personnel can be significantly reduced and their effects on people minimized.  We have to design the inhabited space so that people do what we want them to do and when they don’t they’re detected and captured, and the results of their bad actions are kept to a minimum.  It won’t happen on its own – we have design it that way!

 

How to Use Building Design To Increase Security Effectiveness

 

The Aesthetics vs Design Basis Threat Approach

 

Did you know that adding security measures after the design process has reached the 35% designed phase can increase the cost of a construction project by 20% in the short term and much more long term.  Think about it.  Adding security at the beginning may add a mere 2% to the overall project costs.  Why is that?

Most buildings are designed for aesthetics and not the threat that the building must face – whether those threats are man-made or from natural causes.

There are plenty of regulations that address fire and earthquakes but rarely are their construction codes for incorporating security measures for the myriad of other threats.  That can change.  By bringing architects, engineers, planners, facility managers and security professionals together at the beginning of the design process the building design including the surrounding area can actually be used to deter criminal activity and reduce the effects of catastrophic events; such as, high winds or terrorist attack.

The design team needs to know and agree on what possible threats there are to the building, people and information inside.  This is called the “design basis threat” or DBT.  By knowing the DBT the design team can ensure each potential threat is mitigated through the design of the building.  Possible mitigation measures could be maximizing the stand-off distance from legal parking spaces to the building façade.  For example, the further the stand-off distance is, the less likely it is that the building will be affected by a stationary vehicle borne improvised explosive device.  Also by keeping the “unobstructed space” (the area immediate adjacent to the façade) free of shrubs or other places where small explosive devices or tools could be concealed, will eliminate that potential threat.  These are just two threats that can be affected through design.  Most others can be too.

In order to be effective the design team must consider all threats that are capable of effecting the building, whether they control the surrounding property or not.  If adjacent property offers the opportunity for people will “ill intent” to compromise the building then that area must also be considered. 

We usually call this “designing from the curb”.  There are four general rules to follow in providing mitigation strategies in building design. 

First, deter bad behavior.  We do this by training personnel on what is expected of them during on-boarding orientation.  We should also teach what constitutes “bad behavior” and how to report it.  An additional deterrent is a well-trained and well-equipped security force.  A common practice is to post a warning sign or a fence but rarely will this deter a determine advisory.  That said, we can design inhabited space so that a would be perpetrator will choose another “softer” target.

Secondly, we should delay “the bad guy” so that through effective design their presence and the activity they are conducting will be noticed.  A very effective way of doing this is creating as much distance as possible from the entrances of the building to the uncontrolled/public space.  The longer it takes to transit the space the more likely it is that someone will notice.  We commonly forget that each perimeter layer provides an opportunity to delay.  Perimeter layers are:

o   Layer 1 – property boundary

o   Layer 2 – exterior enclave or enclosure
o   Layer 3 – facility façade or elevation
o   Layer 4 – internal enclave or controlled/restricted space

Third, detect bad behavior. We can do this by limiting the number of access points, so that someone attempting to enter in a different fashion will stand-out and be noticed.  The use of combined landscaping; i.e., rocks, meandering pathways, shrubs, trees, water obstacles can be very effective tools in channeling persons to the correct access point.   Another good design tool is to make walkways pass by windows where people in the building, either from their workstations or a public space, such as, a break room, will be able to see people approaching.  In the 80’s we relied on security guards to do the watching for us.  As man-power cost rose over the next couple of decades, we replaced the guards and started to rely heavily on electronic security systems (ESS); i.e., Close Circuit Television (CCTV) or Access Control Systems (ACS).  While ESS is a great force multiplier, I submit that by designing approaches to the building so that they can be observed by persons inside will add tremendous detection capability and reduce long term costs in maintaining and monitoring the ESS systems.  Some assistance is provided by biometrics and analytical video but remember technology is a tool to be used by a human.  A recent article in the Chicago Tribune reported that less than one half of one percent of crime is solved by cameras. 

And finally, the fourth element of design is to defend against bad behavior.  One of the most common mistakes in using too much technology is that the requirement to respond to bad behavior is forgotten.  Therefore, a response force must be readily available.  They must be well-trained through drills and exercises and they must be well-equipped. 

Remember, the building does not have to look like a fortress in order to be secure.   By working together, architects, engineers, planners, facility managers and security professional can ensure it’s aesthetically pleasing and still provide adequate measures of security that are transparent to the public.  When these disciplines collaborate and security is incorporated at the beginning of the project, an immediate gain can be realized in keeping the project costs down and in the long term by limiting the need for maintenance and manpower. 

 

 

Unconventional Crises Require Unconventional Leadership

 

 

Unconventional Crises

Require Unconventional Leadership

by

Ed Beakley

 Director, Project White Horse 084640

If you “Google” leadership, you will find that there are 158 million sites noted. Yet the events of this century make me wonder if we really understand what leadership must be in our current environment, and lead me to ask on the opening page of my Project White Horse  website, that what if nothing leaders have ever been taught or experienced is sufficient to face the problem? 

The implication is that there is more to survival in worst case disasters than just “who’s in charge,” and that we as citizens need to be less expectant of the arrival of duex ex machina by way of the cavalry is on the way, and become more able to be an active part in our own survival when worst cases occur. Leadership required – but maybe of a different kind.

The nature of worst cases is that the complexity and chaos generated, almost by definition mean that no leader by himself is capable of the multi-faceted decisions required.

Many types of emergencies occur every day and are routinely mitigated by local first responders. In certain areas hurricanes, flooding, earthquakes and fire are seasonal or typical of the area. The manifestation is well understood and planning well thought out and resourced. While they move past routine emergencies based on magnitude of destruction and/or significant loss of life, physical response assistance goes no higher than county or state mutual aid and the need for federal assistance is basically limited to financial aid.  Command and control during the event and recovery follows the locally developed “playbook.”  A Category 3 level (CAT 3) hurricane is a good example of a large emergency or conventional level disaster event, with potential for significant damage, yet normally it is well understood with only a small possibility of response being overwhelmed at the local level.

But researchers note that there are “disasters that go beyond typical disasters.” The latter have come to be noted as “catastrophes.”  Most notably would be 9/11, the 2004 Tsunami, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and in 2010, the earthquakes in Haiti and the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. indeed, earthquakes, heat waves, floods, volcanoes, super typhoons, blizzards, landslides and droughts killed at least a quarter million people in 2010 — the deadliest year in more than a generation. More people were killed worldwide by natural disasters that year than have been killed in terrorism attacks in the past 40 years combined.

By virtue of unusual scale, a previously unknown cause, or an atypical combination of sources, responders face challenges that are indeed novel, the facts and implications of which cannot be completely assimilated in the moment of crisis.  These events are not only characterized by high stakes—the likelihood of major losses (to life, limb, property, heritage, or other highly valued social or private assets) – but they have shared striking similarities, inasmuch as they foster destabilization of leaders in charge of response and reconstruction efforts, and the whole of communities. 

Dr. Erwan Lagadec in  Unconventional Crises, Unconventional Response: Reforming Leadership in the Age of Catastrophic Crises and Hypercomplexity further defined these events as follows:

Conventional crises rarely require high levels of inbuilt resiliency from our systems. This is because such events tend to affect circumscribed “ground zeros,” and therefore can be tackled by bringing to bear the “normal” assets and strategies of the unscathed outside on the impacted area.  On the other hand, catastrophic or hyper-complex events will destabilize entire systems, forcing leaders and public alike to abandon “normality” altogether, and look for a coherent fallback position. However, it is eminently difficult to organize an orderly general retreat, especially when leaders must redefine a new line of defense while on the run, and from the ground up. Miracles at Dunkirk are precisely that: miracles.  Even before the planning phase, and more fundamentally, the makeup of our systems itself must anticipate the destabilizing effects of unconventional events by weaving resiliencies (visible or “hidden”) into their fabric.”

The level of personnel training, system performance and system-system interoperability acceptable for routine or conventional crisis events does not guarantee usefulness when the environment becomes hyper- complex and severely stochastic. Nor does the 1) training and experience of key decision makers in the lower end of the spectrum, nor 2) “planned for in the playbook script” leadership insure that the magnitude and novelty of the emerging catastrophe does not overwhelm communities and emergency management, or simply negate “the plans” and won’t destabilize the entire response structure. 

Unconventional/Hyper-complex/Catastrophic level events are often noted as Low Probability, High Impact events. but we should keep in mind that these events are actually Absolute-Certainty, Low-Predictability, High-Impact incidents that take place all the time.

Hyper complexity makes it near impossible for “traditional” leaders to plan, let alone coordinate response efforts.  Extrapolation of training and system evaluation suitable for routine emergencies and conventional disasters as suitable for unconventional or catastrophic operational response is an intrinsically flawed strategy.

So, what can be done?                                                                                                    

To start, we must recognize and acknowledge the differences between crisis/disaster types and the different set of challenges in planning, execution, and required forms of leadership. Additionally, we must accept that we will most probably require new and innovative analytical methods and metrics, and methods for learning - not just training.

We must ask what accounts for whether the first response process will be able to provide effective mitigation of unfolding disaster incidents. How can that effort best be organized to respond to novel or unconventional crises? 

Then, what must be done in advance to create the capacities needed in the face of unconventional crises?   The real "new" must be recognizing the need to put higher level leadership - beyond incident management and the trained response force - into complex crisis exercises with intent on learning how to think and not on "feel good" check in the block exercises, that leave senior decision makers with the parting thought " all is good, I got this."

More information about Project White Horse 084640 can be found at:  http://projectwhitehorse.com/

 

 

How to

Assess Values, Threats, Vulnerabilities and Risks

 

           To accomplish its mission or function, every organization must protect personnel and critical assets from all threats, both natural and man-made.  

Spending limited funds to protect personnel, assets, and equipment is a delicate balancing act in risk management.  The question always arises: “Am I getting enough bang for my buck?”  Without a quantitative method for risk assessment and analysis, this question cannot be adequately answered.  Responding, “I think so,” simply won’t cut it.

Risk analysis methodologies fall into one of two categories – qualitative or quantitative. 

Using the qualitative method requires the assessor to be a subject matter expert.  He or she relies on his/her experience in order to conduct the analysis.  Over time, this type of analysis deteriorates as the assessor’s enthusiasm wanes in the twilight years.  Additionally, two assessors assessing the same asset will most likely arrive at differ results because they view what they see based on their own individual background and experiences.  Even the time of day will affect the outcome.  Think about it, who want to assess something right after lunch when their body is crying for a hammock?  This variation becomes especially critical when analyzing multiple assets.  The final drawback of the qualitative model is that it cannot be easily transferrable to others as it is based primarily on the person’s years of expertise.  All of that said, single assets that require to be assessed only once are good candidates for a qualitative assessment.

The second methodology involves assigning numerical values to differ aspects of the analysis.  By assigning values to certain features, the methodology becomes quantitative.  This is important, as the assessment doesn’t change between assessors because it isn’t based on their experience.  The old guy and the young guy observe and assign a value based on what they see.  There is or isn’t an 8-foot high chain link fence with 3-strand barbed wire outrigger.  Both analysts see the same thing and provide relatively the same analysis – so, it’s quantitative!  There may be a slight variance in the number they assign but usually not significantly.  Another advantage of quantitative analysis is that it can be easily taught and doesn’t deteriorate over time.  No matter how many assessments and analyst has conducted the results are consistent.  Quantitative analysis are especially effective when assessing multiple assets, where there is a need to compare asset values to determine prioritizing countermeasures.  Quantitative analysis allows decision makers to invest limited resources in reducing the risks to the greatest number of people first.  After all, isn’t that what it’s all about?

Next month, Ed Beakley, Director, Project White Horse 084640 will share his ideas on leadership during crisis.  More information about Ed and his 30+ years of research can be found at www.projectwhitehorse.com.

5 Strategies for Designing Buildings That Don't Kill

5 Strategies for Designing Secure Buildings

Resolving to Prevent Mass Casualties 

We all have a responsibility to ensure the places where people work and live will provide them relative safety from a variety of threats, both natural and man-made.   Protecting people in occupied space is paramount to building design.  Normally, this is done through a series of government regulations concerning building construction codes.  The goal is to ensure people are protected from the elements and threats, and that the building itself doesn’t become the hazard. 

So, as part of the design process, everyone on the design team, has an inherit responsibility in applying strategies, whether regulatory or industry “best practice” that manages or mitigates threats to people in the buildings they occupy.   Toward this goal, a concept that has been around since the late 90’s is Crime Prevention through Environmental Design.  It is commonly known by its acronym CPTED.  CPTED incorporates four principles of design.  CPTED is founded on the idea that crime can be designed out of the environment.  CPTED implements the following four approaches:

·         natural surveillance – the placement of physical features, activities and people in a way to maximize visibility

·         natural access control – physically guiding people through a space by strategic design

·         territorial reinforcement – using physical attributes to express ownership or separating public from private space

·         maintenance – allows for the continued use of the space for its intended purpose

In short, the idea is to get “eyes on” in as many places as possible on the property so that the users/occupants will “police” the area due to a sense of ownership.   Many municipal governments have formally adopted CPTED principles and police departments have been partnering to enforce the codes and have been effectively reducing crime in their cities.

While CPTED works to control the environment where people are, the five design principles discussed here focus on lowering the risk to people and reducing the effects of a catastrophic event through building design.   In essence, preventing or reducing the possibility of mass casualties. Both formulas can work together to provide a full spectrum of protection, especially from man-made threats. 

THE PROCESS

The normal process for designing buildings goes something like this; a requirement is formed, then an architect is contacted, some designs are drawn up based on the functionality or proposed use for the building, the owner approves the visual, and then the engineers go to work putting together all of the detailed drawing that ultimately will incorporate the owners desires and the architect’s concept and…viola’ a building is born.

Sure there are varying steps where the stakeholders (functional area experts) may have some input, but for the most part, they are limited to the parameters outlined by the design team.  Consequently, their input is limited to, “Let’s put an electrical outlet there or a door here”.  They really have very limited input as to the structural design of the building. 

And finally in the process, the security team gets called in almost as an afterthought.  This causes the engineers to scramble to redesign the electrical grid and other facets of the building to accommodate “newly” added security equipment; such as, intrusion detection systems or access control technology.  Sometimes, but rarely can the security team have enough influence to affect the changing of a wall or the removal of a recessed doorway.

With this scenario in mind, the first order of business is to ensure the design team includes everyone from the very beginning; i.e., architects, engineers, owners, stakeholders, security and building management – everyone. 

With everyone included from the on-set, the second issue of beginning the process with everyone “on the same page” becomes redundant, due to everyone’s “buy in” from the start.  This keeps modifications to the project to a minimum; thereby, reducing additional costs and delays.

DESIGN PHILOSOPHIES

The overarching philosophy should be that in the case of a catastrophic event occurring at our building, the building will not be what kills or injures people.  This must be unequivocal in our planning.  We can do this by first accepting the fact that we cannot provide protection from all threat scenarios, whether natural and man-made.  There is considerable guidance and mandatory regulations concerning designing buildings to seismic code or to resist hurricane or tornado force winds and for fire safety.  Little guidance provides for protection against most man-made threats.  Although, recently considerable effort is being put toward thwarting “active shooter/barricaded hostage” situations by designing schools differently. Unfortunately, this focus doesn’t include other places where people congregate, like shopping malls or theaters or factories or administrative office buildings.

I probably shouldn’t even say the next design philosophy, because it really is a “no brainer”.  Implement protection into buildings were people usually are.  Many of you are saying, “Like, duh!”  But there are some people out there that will say, buildings are designed to house people so just by their nature people will be inside of them.  That’s somewhat true of all buildings, but many are simply structures to prevent the elements from having an impact of the equipment or materials located inside and are rarely inhabited consistently.

We must also accept that in order to get the protection we need, the philosophies outlined here must already have been designed into the building prior to an event occurring.

ASSUMPTIONS

With that in mind, there are several basic assumptions that must be made:

·         All buildings will “come into compliance” over time, as major modification or renovations are made

·         Specific protection from some threats will provide protection from other threats or hazards

·         Reduced vehicle stand-off distances (how close a vehicle can legally park next to a building) equates to increased construction costs due to construction hardening

·         If the building is located within a compound, vehicle threats will be stopped at the property line due to the presence of qualified guard personnel or sufficient security measures are already in place to prevent a vehicle borne device from breaching the perimeter

STRATEGIES

Strategy 1 – Maintain Staff-off Distances

Maximize the distance a vehicle can legally park near a building.  By keeping parking away from the building, then any illegally parking closer to the building than is allowed will be noticed as unusual and warrant a call to the security folks to investigate.  

The same rule applies to trash containers, dumpsters and such. 

Reduce the opportunities for people to hide objects.  Lanscape so that if an object were placed near the building it would be seen as people approach the entrance.  Create an area of unobstructed space near the buildings by using low-laying ground cover or grass or cobbles.  Limit access to spaces immediately surrounding the building by the placement of sidewalks, so that if a person were to tread off of the pedestrian walkway, it would draw attention and guards would be summoned.

If the parking must be close to the building, underneath or on the roof, then control the parking.

Strategy 2 – Prevent Progressive Collapse

Most of the people who were killed in the Oklahoma City bombing didn’t die from the truck explosion; instead, they died because the building fell on top of them. Buildings that have three or more stories should be considered for non-progressive collapse design.  

Strategy 3 – Minimize Flying Debris Hazards

Even without progressive collapse a high number of injuries can occur because of flying glass fragments and debris from walls, ceilings, fixtures and non-structural features.  Flying debris can be minimized through building design and the avoidance of certain building materials and construction techniques.  Limit windows to the upper third of the elevation.  If possible, replace annealed glass with laminated glass. Consult a blast mitigation specialist to determine thickness.  Avoid fragmentation retention film (FRF) as a solution to the flying debris issue because it is rarely installed properly.  To install it properly the window and frame needs to be taken out, the film stretched over it and then the window and frame reinstalled.  Since the costs for a laminated glass system is about the same as the process described here for installing FRF, why not just replace the window system with laminated glass?  Besides laminated glass systems last longer. 

Additionally, don’t forget about secondary debris hazards – furniture or equipment flying around.  With this idea in mind, avoid placing people close to windows.

Strategy 4 – Limit Airborne Contamination

Effective design of heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) systems can significantly reduce the potential for chemical, biological and radiological agents from being dispersed throughout the building, whether they originate internally or externally. 

A common practice these days is to locate the HVAC or air intakes on the roof.  While this is a good practice, all too often we forget about limiting access to the ladder that leads to the roof.  A better solution is to place roof access within an internal room, such as a mechanical room, of the building that is normally kept locked.

By installing emergency cut-off switches in prominent locations through the building; such as in the break-room, or close to the emergency exits we can further limit airborne contamination.  Periodic drills and the training of fire alarms procedures will go a long way in teaching people what to do if there is a contaminant.  Make sure you train new hires during orientation.

During the anthrax scare right after 9/11 many mailrooms and admin offices received letters or packages with suspicious white powder.  You probably are thinking that this threat no longer exists.  Well guess again, white powder substances arriving in the mail are almost a daily occurrence somewhere in our country.  Although, anthrax is rarely found, it cannot be ruled out as a potential threat; therefore, isolate mailroom ventilation systems from the rest of the building.

Strategy 5 – Provide Mass Notification

Providing notification to building occupants about potential threats and how they should respond to those threats in a timely fashion can reduce the risk of mass casualties.  Effective design will include both local and remote origination of information.

Real time visual and audible notification is essential.  Whatever type of notification you choose make sure it is programmable, in other words, it can have pre-recorded messages or tones and has the ability to provide on-the-spot announcement.  Ensure all areas of the facility grounds are covered; including parking lots, playgrounds, etc.  The last thing you want is for someone from outside to go inside and vice versa and get contaminated.

By implementing these five simple and effective design strategies we can reduce the effects of hazardous events at our buildings.  At the end of the day, preventing or reducing mass casualties is our goal – after all, isn’t that what it’s all about?