5 Strategies for Designing Secure Buildings
Resolving to Prevent Mass Casualties
We all have a
responsibility to ensure the places where people work and live will provide
them relative safety from a variety of threats, both natural and man-made. Protecting people in occupied space is
paramount to building design. Normally,
this is done through a series of government regulations concerning building
construction codes. The goal is to
ensure people are protected from the elements and threats, and that the
building itself doesn’t become the hazard.
So, as part of the design process, everyone on the design team, has an inherit responsibility in applying strategies, whether regulatory or industry “best practice” that manages or mitigates threats to people in the buildings they occupy. Toward this goal, a concept that has been around since the late 90’s is Crime Prevention through Environmental Design. It is commonly known by its acronym CPTED. CPTED incorporates four principles of design. CPTED is founded on the idea that crime can be designed out of the environment. CPTED implements the following four approaches:
·
natural surveillance – the placement of
physical features, activities and people in a way to maximize visibility
·
natural access control – physically guiding
people through a space by strategic design
·
territorial reinforcement – using physical
attributes to express ownership or separating public from private space
·
maintenance – allows for the continued use of
the space for its intended purpose
In short, the idea is to get “eyes on” in as
many places as possible on the property so that the users/occupants will
“police” the area due to a sense of ownership.
Many municipal governments have
formally adopted CPTED principles and police departments have been partnering
to enforce the codes and have been effectively reducing crime in their cities.
While CPTED works
to control the environment where people are, the five design principles
discussed here focus on lowering the risk to people and reducing the effects of
a catastrophic event through building design.
In essence, preventing or reducing the possibility of mass casualties. Both
formulas can work together to provide a full spectrum of protection, especially
from man-made threats.
THE PROCESS
The normal
process for designing buildings goes something like this; a requirement is
formed, then an architect is contacted, some designs are drawn up based on the
functionality or proposed use for the building, the owner approves the visual,
and then the engineers go to work putting together all of the detailed drawing
that ultimately will incorporate the owners desires and the architect’s concept
and…viola’ a building is born.Sure there are varying steps where the stakeholders (functional area experts) may have some input, but for the most part, they are limited to the parameters outlined by the design team. Consequently, their input is limited to, “Let’s put an electrical outlet there or a door here”. They really have very limited input as to the structural design of the building.
And finally in the process, the security team gets called in almost as an afterthought. This causes the engineers to scramble to redesign the electrical grid and other facets of the building to accommodate “newly” added security equipment; such as, intrusion detection systems or access control technology. Sometimes, but rarely can the security team have enough influence to affect the changing of a wall or the removal of a recessed doorway.
With this scenario in mind, the first order of business is to ensure the design team includes everyone from the very beginning; i.e., architects, engineers, owners, stakeholders, security and building management – everyone.
With everyone included from the on-set, the second issue of beginning the process with everyone “on the same page” becomes redundant, due to everyone’s “buy in” from the start. This keeps modifications to the project to a minimum; thereby, reducing additional costs and delays.
DESIGN PHILOSOPHIES
The overarching philosophy should be that in
the case of a catastrophic event occurring at our building, the building will
not be what kills or injures people.
This must be unequivocal in our planning. We can do this by first accepting the fact
that we cannot provide protection from all threat scenarios, whether natural
and man-made. There is considerable guidance and mandatory
regulations concerning designing buildings to seismic code or to resist
hurricane or tornado force winds and for fire safety. Little guidance provides for protection
against most man-made threats. Although,
recently considerable effort is being put toward thwarting “active
shooter/barricaded hostage” situations by designing schools differently. Unfortunately,
this focus doesn’t include other places where people congregate, like shopping
malls or theaters or factories or administrative office buildings.
I
probably shouldn’t even say the next design philosophy, because it really is a “no
brainer”. Implement protection into
buildings were people usually are. Many
of you are saying, “Like, duh!” But there
are some people out there that will say, buildings are designed to house people
so just by their nature people will be inside of them. That’s somewhat true of all buildings, but
many are simply structures to prevent the elements from having an impact of the
equipment or materials located inside and are rarely inhabited consistently.
We
must also accept that in order to get the protection we need, the philosophies
outlined here must already have been designed into the building prior to an
event occurring.
ASSUMPTIONS
With that in mind,
there are several basic assumptions that must be made:
·
All buildings will “come into compliance” over
time, as major modification or renovations are made
·
Specific protection from some threats will provide
protection from other threats or hazards
·
Reduced vehicle stand-off distances (how close
a vehicle can legally park next to a building) equates to increased construction
costs due to construction hardening
·
If the building is located within a compound,
vehicle threats will be stopped at the property line due to the presence of
qualified guard personnel or sufficient security measures are already in place
to prevent a vehicle borne device from breaching the perimeter
STRATEGIES
Strategy 1 – Maintain Staff-off Distances
Maximize the distance a vehicle can legally park
near a building. By keeping parking away
from the building, then any illegally parking closer to the building than is
allowed will be noticed as unusual and warrant a call to the security folks to
investigate. The same rule applies to trash containers, dumpsters and such.
Reduce the opportunities for people to hide objects. Lanscape so that if an object were placed near the building it would be seen as people approach the entrance. Create an area of unobstructed space near the buildings by using low-laying ground cover or grass or cobbles. Limit access to spaces immediately surrounding the building by the placement of sidewalks, so that if a person were to tread off of the pedestrian walkway, it would draw attention and guards would be summoned.
If the parking must be close to the building, underneath or on the roof, then control the parking.
Strategy 2 – Prevent Progressive Collapse
Most of the people who were killed in the
Oklahoma City bombing didn’t die from the truck explosion; instead, they died
because the building fell on top of them. Buildings that have three or more
stories should be considered for non-progressive collapse design.
Strategy 3 – Minimize Flying Debris Hazards
Even without progressive collapse a high number
of injuries can occur because of flying glass fragments and debris from walls,
ceilings, fixtures and non-structural features.
Flying debris can be minimized through building design and the avoidance of certain building
materials and construction techniques. Limit
windows to the upper third of the elevation.
If possible, replace annealed glass with laminated glass. Consult a
blast mitigation specialist to determine thickness. Avoid fragmentation retention film (FRF) as a
solution to the flying debris issue because it is rarely installed properly. To install it properly the window and frame
needs to be taken out, the film stretched over it and then the window and frame
reinstalled. Since the costs for a
laminated glass system is about the same as the process described here for
installing FRF, why not just replace the window system with laminated glass? Besides laminated glass systems last longer. Additionally, don’t forget about secondary debris hazards – furniture or equipment flying around. With this idea in mind, avoid placing people close to windows.
Strategy 4 – Limit Airborne Contamination
Effective design of heating, ventilation and
air conditioning (HVAC) systems can significantly reduce the potential for chemical,
biological and radiological agents from being dispersed throughout the
building, whether they originate internally or externally. A common practice these days is to locate the HVAC or air intakes on the roof. While this is a good practice, all too often we forget about limiting access to the ladder that leads to the roof. A better solution is to place roof access within an internal room, such as a mechanical room, of the building that is normally kept locked.
By installing emergency cut-off switches in prominent locations through the building; such as in the break-room, or close to the emergency exits we can further limit airborne contamination. Periodic drills and the training of fire alarms procedures will go a long way in teaching people what to do if there is a contaminant. Make sure you train new hires during orientation.
During the anthrax scare right after 9/11 many mailrooms and admin offices received letters or packages with suspicious white powder. You probably are thinking that this threat no longer exists. Well guess again, white powder substances arriving in the mail are almost a daily occurrence somewhere in our country. Although, anthrax is rarely found, it cannot be ruled out as a potential threat; therefore, isolate mailroom ventilation systems from the rest of the building.
Strategy 5 – Provide Mass Notification
Providing notification to building
occupants about potential threats and how they should respond to those threats in
a timely fashion can reduce the risk of mass casualties. Effective design will include both local and
remote origination of information.
Real time visual and audible
notification is essential. Whatever type
of notification you choose make sure it is programmable, in other words, it can
have pre-recorded messages or tones and has the ability to provide on-the-spot
announcement. Ensure all areas of the
facility grounds are covered; including parking lots, playgrounds, etc. The last thing you want is for someone from
outside to go inside and vice versa and get contaminated.
By implementing these five simple
and effective design strategies we can reduce the effects of hazardous events
at our buildings. At the end of the day,
preventing or reducing mass casualties is our goal – after all, isn’t that what
it’s all about?
